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Abstract
Are the less healthy relatively less employed because they are unable to work? Or vice
versa? In the first part of the thesis, I evaluate the impact of health shocks on individual
labour market transitions in 27 EU countries and I explain these results through the
heterogeneity in social security systems across members. In the second part, I investigate
the mechanism through which tied transfers relate to both elderly and grandchildren
care later on in life.
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Summary
There is relatively abundant and mixed evidence on the relationship between socioe-
conomic conditions and general health since the pioneering work by Grossman (1972)
who defines the theoretical framework for the topic. His approach to the demand for
health has been labeled as the human capital model in much of the literature on health
economics because it draws heavily on human capital theory (Becker, 1964). His model
has several characteristics: first, the stock of health today depends on past investments
in health and on the rate of depreciation of health capital - it is similar to human
capital in the traditional models. Second, health is valued by consumers and finally
non-market time is an input into both health production and the production of other
valued non-market goods (e.g., leisure activities). From an empirical point of view, the
main implication of the model is that health must be treated as an endogenous choice
(Currie and Madrian, 1999). Are the less healthy relatively less employed because they
are unable to work? Or vice versa? It is plain to see that, depending on which causal
pathway is at work, policies are quite different. In the first case, measures aimed at
increasing the supply of labour of the relatively unhealthy, be it through reducing the
direct costs of working or (with the necessary caveats) the opportunity costs in terms
of foregone benefits, might be considered. In the second case, there is a relevant need
for measures that focus on access to health care and the promotion of healthy lifestyles
among particular groups in the population.
In the second part of the thesis, I investigate the relevance and the rationale behind
intra-family exchanges. Becker (1991) was the first who investigates and models the
increase and decrease of wealth from one generation to another. Foremost among these
models are the altruistic model and the exchange model, with less well-known theories
of paternalism, warmglow and evolutionary motivation recently gathering additional
attention. Starting from Becker (1991)’s pioneering work, economists have increasingly
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come to the conclusion that intervivos transfers are, to a considerable extent, moti-
vated by altruistic concerns of parents with regard to their children. Understanding
the intergenerational transmission mechanism, surely demonstrates the relevance of the
family in the functioning of modern societies, despite the many transformations shaping
this social unit. Several authors have recognized the role of the family as an insurance
mechanism against different risks or misadventures (Altonji et al., 1997).
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The objective of the first chapter is to pro-
vide a systematic literature review on both areas of my empirical research. The chapter
itself is divided in two sub-sections: first I discuss the existing evidence on the impact
of health shocks on labour market transition in different countries. I consider a range
of evidence which provides a comprehensive overview of the significant negative effects
disability has on employment status. Importantly, this part shows specific features of
the disabled group which I also analyse in the second paper. Then, I illustrate the recent
evidence relating to significant changes in legislation affecting the disabled, such as the
introduction of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the US, the Disability Discrim-
ination Act in the UK and across Europe. The second part of the survey focuses on
informal care and intergenerational transfers between generations. I discuss the most
relevant papers on the economic motives behind unpaid assistance to aging parents and
grandchildren. I further discuss the empirical results which per se might help the policy
maker to design new interventions. In fact, these exchanges involve two of the most im-
portant forms of support between members of the extended family network: monetary
transfer, elderly and grandchildren care.
In detail, in chapter 2, I investigate the relationship between an adverse health
shock, measured by the limitation in performing daily activities, and labour market
transitions in 27 European countries. Matching techniques are implemented in order
to control for the non-experimental nature of the data (European Union Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions). The empirical analysis reveals a significant causal
effect of the health shock on the likelihood of leaving full-time employment. Individuals
who incur an adverse health shock are significantly more likely to transit either into
part-time, unemployment or inactive status. Nevertheless, the alternative routes out
of the full-time status differ across countries depending on the country-specific social
security system. The largest effect is found in Romania and Ireland, ranging from 23%
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to 21%, respectively. This is close to zero in Bulgaria and Austria. I argue that these
discrepancies are explained through the heterogeneity in social security systems across
Europe. Individuals living in countries characterised by higher work incentives, within
the integration disability policy, are less likely to drop out from full-time employment
after the health shock occurs.
Finally, in chapter 3, I contribute to the debate about the economic rationale behind
unpaid assistance to ageing parents and grandchildren. Using Italian data, I show
a positive correlation between downstream intergenerational transfers and intra family
informal care. I analyse the effect of tied transfer on both elderly care and grandchildren
care. On the one hand, married couples who receive a transfer from their parents
during severe economic hardship are more likely to reward them with elderly care later
in life. On the other hand, I observe a strong correlation between tied transfer and
grandchildren care as well, which seems to be driven by pure altruism. The results
suggest not only the reciprocity between parents and adult children in terms of exchange
- the money transfer for future elderly care - but also a higher likelihood of receiving
grandchildren care. Furthermore, I investigate whether this correlation is entirely due
to a smaller geographical distance between generations. Interestingly, this can be only
partially explained by the increased geographical proximity between the families. Taking
advantage of a rich set of information on family background and network, unobserved
heterogeneity due to family taste is dealt with by using information on parents’ and
in-laws occupations. I implement an IV approach where I exploit the variability in the
job occupations of parents and in-laws when their (adult) children were 14 years old in





1.1 A brief introduction to the literature
In the following Sections I give an overview of the literature on two fundamental branches
of the applied micro economics which are analysed in the next two chapters. First, I
focus on the labour market responses to the worsening of health condition at individual
level across Europe. Second, I investigate the motive behind the financial transfers from
parents to adult children and future exchange of informal care between families.
With respect to the first topic, as a result of theoretical predictions starting from
Grossman (1972), acute health shocks may decrease the labour supply by rising the
disutility of being employed and reducing the ability to perform well on the job. Cov-
ersely, health shocks rise the financial needs - for instance, through increased medical
cost - and thus may increase desired labour supply. For example, among those aged 51
to 64, medical conditions increase health spending and reduce non-health spending of
individuals with low income (Butrica et al., 2009). Thus the effects of health on labour
force participation are (theoretically) ambiguous and the empirical evidence on the net
effect of an acute health shock on labour supply is mixed as well. It seems there is
still a need for a better understanding, especially in relation to country-specific social
security systems. This heterogeneity across EU countries may cause differences in the
labour supply responses depending, for instance, on better health insurance. Then, if
access to health insurance depends on employment, workers have a greater incentive to
continue working in order to keep their health insurance (Datta et al., 2011).
Concerning the second topic of this study, I start discussing the economic theory
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which develops various models on intervivos transfers motives between families. The first
is the altruistic model in which donors transfer resources to their children in exchange
of the provision of some (costly) action from the recipient, also called “services” - future
informal care. Under the altruistic model, donors provide transfers to equalize the
marginal utility of own consumption to that of the recipient of help. In that case, private
help may be displaced by public support. Conversely, if private transfers are meant to
compensate services received, those may in some cases reinforce the redistribution made
by the government.
The following Sections will clarify the related literature on the health status and
labour market partecipation and intergenerational transfers, respectively. First, I dis-
cuss the definition of disability, the transitions from employment to all the other statues
then I focus on the exchange of elderly and grandchildren care once the individuals have
received a financial help from parents or in-laws.
1.2 Literature on health shocks and labour market condi-
tions
This survey shows the existing evidence related to the impact of health status on labour
market outcomes and it considers a range of international papers which reveal the effect
of suffering from a health shock on the labour market transitions: from employment
to unemployment/inactive and the impact on the earnings. Moreover, this review de-
scribes the different econometric techniques that have been used to solve or attenuate
the endogeneity issue: selection bias, omitted variables, measurement of disability. In
particular, the latter problem yields different estimates depending on the definition of
disability itself (Bound, 1991). As defined by Wolfe (1984), disability is a restriction
or inability rather than a demographic characteristic and there is not a single, consis-
tently used, definition or method for classifying the disabled, which may cause a further
increase in the bias.
In his pioneering work on human capital, Becker (1964) drew an analogy between
“investment” in health capital and investment in other forms of human capital. Then,
Grossman (1972) extends the theory of human capital to the demand for health and
medical care over the life-cycle. The model has several characteristics: (i) the stock of
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health today depends on past investments in health, and on the rate of depreciation of
health capital - it is similar to general human capital in the traditional models.1 (ii)
Health is valued by consumers both for its own sake and because being sick is assumed
to take time away from market and non-market activities. (iii) Non-market time is an
input into both health production and the production of other valued non-market goods
(e.g., leisure activities). This model can be solved to yield a conditional labour supply
function in which labour supply depends on the endogenous health variable. Grossman
(1972)’s model provides the foundations to a large body of empirical research where
health is treated as an endogenous choice (Currie and Madrian, 1999).
This complex endogeneity issue may cause the observed mixed empirical evidence.
Nevertheless, in theory, if labour market policies aimed at people with disabilities were
effective, economists should have observed no significant discrepancies in labour market
outcomes between disabled and non-disabled individuals (Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez,
2011). In the data, generally, social scientists observe dramatic differences in labour mar-
ket status between individuals with and without disability. In the late 2000s, just before
the onset of the recent economic downturn, disabled employment rate was marginally
over a half, while their unemployment rate was doubled with respect to the OECD
average for people without disability (OECD, 2010).
According to Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2011), in addition to this controversial
situation, the size of the disabled group has grown and their labour market outcomes
have deteriorated over the past twenty years.2 Their low rates of participation raise
concerns about the presence of employer discrimination and social exclusion of the
disabled and the implications of high rates of social security benefit claimants on public
spending (Burchardt, 2003).
As a result, this issue has received growing attention from policy makers. In fact, a
range of legislative and other reforms aimed at securing an improvement in the labour
market position of the disabled have been introduced in all OECD countries. Signifi-
cant legislative changes around the world have been implemented in order to enhance
1One of the main differences between health and other forms of human capital is that health capital
is often subject to large negative shocks. If variation in current health is dominated by shocks, then
uncertainty about the return to investments in health will be very important, and insurance should play
a large role in mediating the relationship between health and the labour market (Currie and Madrian,
1999).
2See, for instance, Bound and Burkhauser (1999) for the US case and Bell and Smith (2004) for the
UK one.
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the access of disabled people to employment. Most industrialized countries recognize,
defacto, the need for effective policies and practices in support of workers who suffer
from long-term illness and/or disability but, most of the time, they are not completely
well functioning (OECD, 2010).
For example, in the USA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires em-
ployers to accommodate disabled workers and outlaws discrimination against the dis-
abled in hiring, firing, and pay. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) show, both empirically
and theoretically, that the ADA had a negative effect on the employment of disabled men
of all working ages and disabled women under age 40. The effects appear to be larger in
medium-size firms, possibly because small firms were exempt from the ADA. Further-
more, they also demonstrate that the negative effects of the ADA have been larger in
states where there have been more ADA-related discrimination charges. DeLeire (2001)
using the Survey of Income and Program Participation show a substantial wage and
earnings gaps between people with and without disabilities, and only a small fraction of
this difference is due to discrimination. In particular, the author estimates that, in 1984,
only 3.7 percentage points of the earnings gap is caused by discrimination. Although
in the USA discrimination did not change over the 1984 to 1993 period, the negative
effects of poor health on the earnings of people with disabilities fell substantially.
The UK government passed the Discrimination Disability Act (November 1995)
with provisions relating to employment to come into effect at the end of 1996. The Act
defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment, which has a substantial and
long term (greater than 12 months) adverse effect on the ability to carry out day-to-day
activities. Kidd et al. (2000), using for the first time Labour Force Survey data, confirm
the presence of substantial wage and participation rate differences between people with
and without disability in the UK. Using the decomposition methods, they show that
the differences in productivity-related characteristics between groups explain around
50% of both the wage and participation rate differential between the disabled and not.
The unexplained components may in part be addressed by the implementation of the
1995 Disability Act. This is the first attempt to explain how the legislation can lead
towards wage convergence between the two groups. Nevertheless, in the UK the current
employment rate is just 32.8% for the disabled, compared to a rate of 80.3% for their
counterparts.
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In recent years, Germany reformed their welfare and labour market structure based
on the idea of improving employment services, making greater demand on individuals
to actively participate and speeding up the reintegration process. These reforms were
implemented until 2005, the so-called Hartz IV.3 The Hartz IV reform constitutes a
remarkable change in the German welfare policy. For the first time welfare recipients
are a target group of labour market activation. Before 2005, almost no effort was made
to reintegrate those people into the labour market. Thus, there is neither experience nor
any evidence on the effectiveness and efficiency of welfare-to-work programmes prior to
the reform. Around 11% of the active German population are classified with some degree
of disability that may range from 1% to 100%; approximately 5% of all disabilities are a
consequence of occupational injury (Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez, 2011). Despite these
very costly policies, which attempt to increase the employment chances of the disabled,
the available statistical evidence points to the fact that an onset of disability leads to
an increase in the risk of unemployment and to reduced earnings and labour market
participation (Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez, 2011, p. 389). Garcia-Gomez (2011) was
the first author who made an attempt to explain the possible consequence of a health
shock comparing various institutional settings across Europe. She studies the effect of
health shock on the probability of employment. Her evidence suggests that individuals
who incur a health shock are significantly more likely to leave employment and this effect
differs according to the differences in social security arrangements across countries.
The rest of the chapther is organized as follows. Section 1.2.1 focuses on the mea-
surement error in the disability context. Section 1.2.2 reports the impact of disability
on employment and wages. In Section 1.3 I introduce the other topic which is about
the monetary transfer and intergenerational exchanges. The following Section defines
the different motives behind a monetary transfer, while in Section 1.3.2 I discuss the
relevant aspects of intergenerational transfers between families.
1.2.1 The measurement of disability
There are two main ways to determine the existence of a disability from survey data.
Generally, the disability measure is self-assessed in data sources such as Labour Force
Survey (LFS), National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), Current Population Survey
3Hartz is the set of proposals which has been adoped in order to reform the labour market in Germany.
Jacobi and Kluve (2006) provide an excellent survey of the reform package.
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(CPS), Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and European Union Statis-
tics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), where an individual assesses their
own condition which is correlated to their capacity to undertake “normal” work (Jones,
2008). Survey questions typically take the form: Do you have a health condition that
limits the kind or amount of work you can perform?.4 As pointed out by Banks et al.
(2004), the exact wording of question strongly affects the number of people defined as
disabled, while the positive aspect of such question is that they provide direct informa-
tion on work ability.5 Nevertheless, determining whether people suffer from a health
shock is often not objective and it also depends on social and economic incentives to
misreport the status, for instance, to claim disability benefits. Then, health status be-
comes endogenous in a regression analysis when the employment status determines a
misreported level of disability. This is called “justification bias”, namely the situation
in which disability becomes a justification for choosing unemployment or inactivity sta-
tus in the questionnaires. Several papers analyse this controversial aspect and most of
them focus on the US economy (Bound, 1991; Currie and Madrian, 1999). Conversely,
it may happen to face a situation in which the individuals have a rational incentive to
underestimate their health shock to avoid, for example, stigmatisation (Bound, 1989).
The author constructs a natural ’control’ group for beneficiaries using the applicants for
Social Security Disability Benefits who fail to pass the medical screening. Data drawn
from the 1972 and 1978 surveys of the disabled done for the Social Security Adminis-
tration show that fewer than 50% of rejected male applicants work. Typical earnings of
those that do are less than 50% of the median earnings of other men their age. These
data cast doubt on recent econometric work which suggests that the disincentive effects
of disability insurance have been substantial.
In addition to the potential justification bias, self-reported health measures are also
subject to measurement error. Recently, Hancock et al. (2014, 2013) explain the con-
4In the second chapter I explain the measure implemented in the analysis and how it is related
to this one. The International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps provides for
definitions for each of these concepts. An impairment is any temporary or permanent loss or abnormality
of a body structure or function, whether physiological or psychological; an impairment is, then, a
disturbance affecting functions that are essentially mental (memory, consciousness) or sensory, internal
organs (heart, kidney), the head, the trunk or the limbs. A Disability is a restriction or inability to
perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being, mostly
resulting from impairment. A Handicap is the result of an impairment or disability that limits or
prevents the fulfilment of one or several roles regarded as normal, depending on age, sex and social and
cultural factors (Jones, 2008).
5See for example Kidd et al. (2000) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001).
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cerns about the quality of subjective assessments and the possible failure in addressing
causality. The health measure they consider is closely related to the one I adopt in
my second chapter. Furthermore, a certain medical condition may be interpreted as
work-limiting by one individual, but not by another, making self-reported disability
non-comparable across individuals or across countries (Campolieti, 2002). Nonetheless,
other factors such as the individual’s own employment opportunities, the accessibility to
the workplace, the technological advances and the changes in the nature of employment
may influence the relationship between health and labour market partecipation. Banks
et al. (2004) examine the differences in the rates of self-reported disability across coun-
tries (the US, the UK and the Netherlands) and across different labour market statues.
They find that the wording of the questions leads to contrasting market partecipation
rates for disabled. Results suggest that more than a half of the gap between the rates of
self-reported work disability in the US and the Netherlands can be explained by differ-
ences in how the question has been constructed. Using the harmonized EU-SILC survey
(in my second chapter) allows me to limit, or at least mitigate, this concern due to the
fact that the questionnaires are directly comparable across EU countries.
Recently, some authors instrument the self-assessed disability status with other ob-
jective health related measures. For instance, Han et al. (2005) control for labour
market participation alongside detailed health variables and individual covariates to,
possibly, directly measure the justification bias. Kreider and Pepper (2007) tackle the
endogeneity issue non-parametrically, but rather than imposing strong assumptions to
obtain correct point identification, they derive different sets of bounds. These formalize
the identifying power of primitive non-parametric assumptions, which appear to share
broad consensus in the literature. To sum up, their findings corroborate the hypothesis
that non-workers appear to systematically over-report disability, under relatively weak
non-parametric assumptions.6 Differently, others studies do not find any evidence of
health misreporting caused by labour market status. Stern (1989) estimates the effect
of disability on labour force participation by using symptoms or diseases as instruments
in a simultaneous equations model of endogenous reported disability and labour force
participation. The results show that each measure of disability explains a significant
amount of variation in labour force participation, though the two are not perfect sub-
6Other recent examples of instrumental approach are Campolieti et al. (2010); Disney et al. (2006);
Lindeboom et al. (2006); Hallan and Zweimullera (2013) and, Dwyer and Mitchell (1999).
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stitutes. There is only weak evidence of endogeneity of the disability variables. In
the discussion on whether individuals tend to exaggerate the severity of their health
problems in order to rationalize their decisions regarding labour force participation and
application for disability benefits, Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) are unable to reject the
hypothesis that self-reported disability is an unbiased indicator of the Social Security
decisions. In addition to this, some authors find that reporting errors vary between
types of disability. Baker et al. (2004), using a unique data set that matches a variety
of self-reports of health with respondents’ medical records, find that these measures are
subject to considerable response error resulting in large attenuation biases when they
are used as explanatory variables.
1.2.2 The impact of disability on employment and wages
Apart from the measurement problem which may cause a bias in the estimates of the
disability status, the difference in labour market participation between the two groups,
disabled and not, is dramatically wide and persistently increasing. In many studies, the
probability of being employed has been modelled using a probit as part of a Heckman
(1976) correction for sample selection on wages (see Baldwin and Johnson (1994, 2000);
Kidd et al. (2000) for the US and the UK, respectively) or in an analysis of the effects
of health conditions on the labour supply of older workers (Disney et al., 2006).
Baldwin and Johnson (1994) estimate the degree of labour market discrimination
against disabled men. Men with disabilities are classified either into a group of individ-
uals with impairments that are subject to prejudice (handicapped) or into one where
they are less subject to prejudice (disabled). They find that the employment rates and
hourly wages of disabled men are (i) slightly lower than those of non-disabled but (ii)
substantially higher than those of handicapped. Moreover, they find that wage differen-
tials between non-disabled and both disabled and handicapped men increased between
1972 and 1984, while it is not the case for the employment rate. Using the same ap-
proach, Kidd et al. (2000) find substantial differences in wage and participation rates
between able-bodied and disabled men in the United Kingdom, which have implications
for the operation of the 1995 Disability Discrimination Act.
Other papers principally focus on whether an individual who suffers from a health
shock undertakes different types of employment with respect to non-disabled. US evi-
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dence highlights the fact that disabled workers are concentrated in non-standard forms
of contracts, such as part-time and temporary jobs. In this stream, Hotchkiss (2004) use
data from the Current Population Survey to examine how the incidence and nature of
part-time jobs among workers with disabilities have changed over time compared with
the experiences of non-disabled workers. She finds that disabled workers are not being
marginalized and they consider part-time employment more attractive. According to
the author one possible explanation is that employers are increasingly accommodating
the needs of disabled workers, offering them part-time jobs that would be available only
on a full-time basis to non-disabled workers. A second, more likely, explanation is that
policy changes and more generous Social Security Disability Insurance benefits have
made part-time employment more financially attractive to disabled workers. Hence, the
important question is still whether this is driven by a voluntary choice or not. Control-
ling for a rich set of observable characteristics, Schur (2003) finds that health problems
make traditional full-time jobs difficult or impossible for many people with disabilities.
Despite the lower pay and other drawbacks of many non-standard jobs, they still allow
many people with disabilities, who would not otherwise be employed, to work.
When ill health or a disability reduce the individual’s productivity at work, they
directly impact earnings, though this will vary depending on the requirements of the oc-
cupation and the severity of the disability. Nevertheless, this reduced capacity to work
may also change an individual’s preferences away from consumption towards leisure. In
addition, “non-work income” that a person can obtain may increase with the onset of
disability, which will similarly increase the reservation wage and reduce the probability
of employment. Independently from this, the empirical evidence suggests that disabled
workers earn significantly less than non-disabled, even after controlling for differences
in human capital, job-related characteristics and other socio-economic conditions (Ace-
moglu and Angrist, 2001).7
DeLeire (2001) splits the population into three groups: (i) the self-reported work
limited disabled, (ii) the disabled who class their disability as non-work limiting and (iii)
the non-disabled. The author assumes that the disabled who have a non-work limiting
disability have same productivity to the non-disabled and, therefore, any unexplained
7Using the Current Population Survey Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) analyse the impact of the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Their findings corroborate the idea that the disability policy
in the USA had, generally, a negative effect on the wages of disabled. In the medium firm and in the
states more ADA-related, the effects appear larger.
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gap in wages between these two groups of workers is solely due to discrimination. The
unexplained gap between the work limited disabled and the non-disabled is a com-
bination of discrimination and productivity differences. The results indicate that 3.7
percentage points of the earnings gap is due to discrimination. Jones et al. (2006) apply
the method of Deleire (2001) to UK LFS data in the period following the DDA. They find
substantial differences in employment incidence and earnings which continue to exist,
especially for those with mental health problems. DeLeire (2001) is able to separate the
effects of disability and of discrimination and his results show limited evidence of wage
discrimination against the disabled. For women the “penalty” for work-limiting disabil-
ity has increased more than for men. Finally, the author observes large raw earnings
differences between the disabled groups, indicating the importance of the unobserved
heterogeneous productivity effects.
Less attention has been paid to the problem of selection bias that can arise as a
result of the non-random assignment of individuals into disability status. Using UK
data, Madden (2004) controls for both selection into health and employment status.
However, controlling for the endogeneity of health status does not significantly change
the estimated impact of disability on participation or earnings in his paper, in fact
the selection into health status is found to be of little empirical importance. Lechner
and Vazquez-Alvarez (2011) use matching techniques and data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (1984-2001) to overcome the same problem. Despite the difference
in methodology they identify a significant negative impact of disability, including an
employment differential of nearly 10% and an earnings differential of 16%. In the longer
term, their results suggest that training seems to increase employment rates by 10-
20 percentage points. For most programs the longer-term positive effects seem to be
sustainable over the eight-year observation period.
A closely related study with respect to mine is Garcia-Gomez (2011), who investi-
gates the relationship between health shocks and labour market outcomes in 9 European
countries using the European Community Household Panel. Also in this paper some
matching techniques are implemented to control for the non-experimental nature of the
data. The results suggest that there is a significant causal effect from health shocks on
the probability of employment and the heterogenous evidence relates to the differences
in social security arrangements across countries.
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In the attempt to disentangle the different effects between health status and labour
market outcome, it is worth to mention Jenkins and Rigg (2003)’s work. Using UK data
from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), they split the effect of disability into
three stages: (i) a selection effect, (ii) the effect of a disability onset, and (iii) the effect
of a disability post onset. Their evidence stresses the point that individuals who experi-
enced a disability onset were typically more disadvantaged prior to becoming disabled,
which is consistent with self-reporting bias issue. They find lower incomes, lower em-
ployment rates for disabled and finally they shed light on the fact that the probability
of being in employment declines with the duration of disability. The general evidence
suggests that worsening health conditions might cause lower labour market partecipa-
tion but there are many counfonding factors which may influence this relationship and,
among the most relevant, is the specific social security system.
1.3 Literature on transfer and exchange between genera-
tions
Economists have long been fascinated by intra-family exchanges and there are numerous
theoretical models to guide the thinking on the subject. Some of them develop the idea
that the main motive for this relationship is altruism.8 Others implement the exchange
motive while less well-known theories concern paternalism, warmglow and evolutionary
motivations which have recently gathered additional attention. Since Becker (1991)’s
work, economists have increasingly come to the conclusion that intervivos transfers are
to a considerable extent motivated by altruistic concerns of parents with regard to their
children. Nevertheless, the empirical results are mixed.
The study of private intergenerational transfers surely demonstrates the importance
of the family in the functioning of modern societies, despite the many transformations
shaping this social unit. Several authors have recognized the role of the family as
an insurance mechanism against different risks or misadventures (Altonji et al., 1997).
This hypothesis gains strength given that the percentage of people aged 29-54 at risk
of poverty or social exclusion increased from 22.4% in 2008 to 24% in 2011, whereas it
decreased from 23.3% to 20% for the cohort of those aged 65 and over. Better knowledge
8Kathleen (2013) is a valuable example of family transfers both from the theoretical and empirical
point of view.
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of the criteria used by families, and especially parents, to provide financial support for
their adult children would improve the ability of decision makers to design effective
social programs that may improve the quality of life of more vulnerable individuals.
In an evolving context of increasing presence of women in the labour market, people
working until later in life, a low number of children per woman and budgetary pressures
jeopardising the sustainability of the welfare state, it is relevant to understand what
to expect from the family as a provider of support. Intergenerational transfer is the
mechanism deployed by families to help generations deal with crises, transitions and
even long lasting needs. Thus, they function as a safety net (Albuquerque, 2014).
This Section revisits the literature on the on-going relationship between the different
kind of private transfers. Intervivos transfers appear more interesting than other forms
of transfer (e.g. bequest) for two main reasons: (i) they reach their recipients earlier in
life when needs are more acute, for example in terms of starting a family or in case of
particular critical moment in life: divorce or entry to unemployment; (ii) they are part
of complex family network which includes other dimensions of solidarity and exchange
such as informal care.
In the following Sections I discuss the main motives for intervivos transfers: altruism
towards children, and (inter-temporal) self-interested exchange between parents and
children. Finally, I review the most relevant papers in the literature.
1.3.1 The transfer motives
The intergenerational transfer literature mainly distinguishes between bequest and in-
tervivos transfer (McGarry, 1999). In this analysis I principally focus on intervivos
transfers because it directly relates to my third chapter. The motive behind this kind of
transfers are: “accidental”, “voluntary”, and “capitalist”. The first type occurs when
the transfer is made as a consequence of precautionary savings and deferred consump-
tion. The second case involves a range of motives, from “pure altruism” behaviour to
self-interested strategic “exchange” (Becker, 1991). The altruism theory assumes affec-
tion, a moral duty or obligation as the basis for providing help in situations of need;
conversely, the exchange theory posits that one gives to others because she expects them
to give in return; when the exchange expectations are in effect, it follows that the more
resources the elderly have, the more they can receive in return.
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By positing an indirect exchange motive, Stark (1991) provides a sort of bridge be-
tween the economic literature on altruism and exchange through the so called “demon-
stration effect”. The basic idea behind this behaviour is to identify a mechanism by
which children get accustomed to accept a general normative pattern of obligation to
help their elderly. Stark (1991) finds that adults who have young children are likely to
visit or call their aged parents ten times more than the adults who are childless. The
interpretation is that the middle generation treats their elderly parents well in order to
demonstrate to their children how they would like to be treated when they are aged.
The author assumes stronger demonstration effects from visits, telephone calls, and the
provision of everyday services than from the giving of money because the children can
see and understand what is happening. Thus, the demonstration theory proposes an
extension of the exchange motive in the direction of “indirect reciprocity”, i.e. you give
to a person other than the one from whom you expect the benefit of the exchange.
Finally, “capitalist” bequests (or intervivos transfers) are directed to accumulation
for its own sake to either create or preserve the wealth beyond one’s own personal
existence (Masson and Pestieau, 1996). As I said before, I focus on the importance of
intervivos transfers relative to bequests. For instance, Cox (1987) and Cox and Raines
(1985) claim that an enlarged conception of intervivos transfers, including in kind or
in cash transfers received by any “adult” child even in the same household, make them
more important than inheritance (in the ratio of 3 to 2). Even more interestingly, the
US inter-household transfers are worth more than 3,000 dollars and in general intervivos
transfers account for at least 20% of US wealth (Gale and Scholz, 1994).
Hence, the literature recently establishes a shift of interest from bequests to inter-
vivos transfers. It is relevant to provide a general sense of some conceptual pitfalls before
focusing on the case of parent-to-child financial transfers, which has the most important
implications. Three are the main questions to address: (i) to whom, (ii) what, and (iii)
when the transfer has been done.
• To whom? Intergenerational transfers may go downwards, from parents to chil-
dren, or upwards, from children to parents. They may also skip a generation, and
occur between grandparents and grandchildren in both directions.
• What? Intervivos transfers may consist of monetary or time transfers. Financial
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transfers, especially those from parents to children, cover a large range of transac-
tions. They may take the form of gifts of various assets, cash transfers made once
or regularly. But they also include in kind transfers, such as the payment of a
rent, free disposal of a home, college fees, loans, co-signature for home mortgage,
which may not have an obvious equivalent cash value. Time transfers concern a
priori any non-financial help or service, including co-residence.
• When? This is the most neglected question on which reserchers pose their focus
(Arrondel and Masson, 2006).
1.3.2 Intergenerational transfers: theory and empirical results
Starting from the microeconomic models of family discussed by Becker (1974) and Barro
(1974), the overall picture is that the donors are, generally, altruistically motivated.
Nevertheless, several other motivations for intergenerational transfers have, since then,
been posited: exchange, reciprocity and demonstration. Transfers may directly enter in
the utility function of the receiver and of the donor or they may also enter the utility
function through the utility of the counterpart (in altruism), and they also may be a
factor in budget constraints and/or in time constraints.
A relevant survey, written by Laferrere and Wolff (2006), describes different ways to
model private transfers. First, the authors consider the case of pure altruism model in
which the utility of the parent is augmented by the utility of his children and that may
induce the parents-to-child transfers. A crucial implication of this model is the strong
property of “redistributive neutrality”: due to the fact that the two generations basically
pool their income, any kind of government transfer to one of them will be undone by the
other adjusting her transfer. Second, this class of models have been modified considering
the “impure” version of altruism. In this scenario, exchange and strategic considerations
matter. Third, in a non-altruistic framework with imperfect credit market, transfers
to children and to old parents correspond to a reciprocity contract and they are an
investment for old age. Moreover, for much of what is exchanged within families there
exists no market substitute, therefore family transfers appear to possibly condition intra-
and inter-generational inequality, hence the importance to assess their motivation.
Across Europe, intervivos transfers from parents to children are a common pattern,
although the exact extent is notoriously difficult to estimate (Albertini et al., 2007).
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As expected, the authors find a net downward flow from the older to the younger
generations, both by intervivos financial transfers and by social support. Conversely,
transfers from children to parents are less frequent and less intense than vice versa.
In addition, they provide a clear evidence on the fact that country-specific transfer
patterns follow the typology of welfare regimes and the welfare regime effect holds after
controlling for the most relevant characteristics of the parents. For instance, in the
Nordic European countries the monetary parents-to-children transfers are more usual
but less intense than in the Southern ones, while the Continental European countries
somehow lie in between the two regimes.
As pointed out by Gale and Scholz (1994), intervivos transfers are estimated to be
around one third of all the intergenerational transfers, which means hundreds of billions
of dollars per year. Altonji et al. (1997) uses Panel Study of Income Dynamics data
on the extended family to test whether intervivos transfers from parents to children are
motivated by altruism. In their contribution they find that 20% of the children receive
around 100 USD (the mean corresponds to slightly less than 300 USD) yearly. Finally,
the authors focus on whether an increase by a dollar in the income of the parents (the
donor) and a reduction in child’s income (the usual recipient) results in a one-dollar in-
crease in the parents’ transfer to the child. Surprisingly, they find that the redistributing
effect leads to a 13% increase in the transfers, that is far less than the one-dollar increase
implied by altruism. McGarry (1999) presents a new framework for analysing transfers
from parents to children that is more consistent with observed behaviour than the al-
truistic and exchange models alone. The model explains the differences in behaviour
induced by intervivos transfers and bequests, which depend on liquidity constraints and
uncertainty about the permanent income of the recipient. Using a nationally representa-
tive sample of the elderly, the author finds that intervivos transfers (in 25% of families)
go disproportionately to less well-off children, while bequests are divided equally across
children. Over 60 per cent of parents who made intervivos transfers do so unequally,
meaning that at least one child received money and at least one did not. These esti-
mates are conservative in the sense that the author counted a transfer as equal when
all children received some kind of transfer, regardless of its actual amount.
Henretta et al. (1997) use the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) dataset to investigate whether people who received a transfer will be more
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prone to provide informal care in the future - basically the opposite relationship de-
scribed by all the other papers. The authors find a positive and significant relationship
between past transfers and current care-giving using a model with fixed effect. Ac-
cording to their results, informal care is one of the easiest way to exchange for elderly
parents, in fact the most relevant source of care-giving, besides the spouses, are children.
Who provides more care? Surely the children with specific characteristics such as lower
opportunity costs, unemployed, caring for other people or living in proximity; all these
features may increase the likelihood of being a care provider. On top of this, females
typically provide more care than men.
Adult children’s provision of in-kind services to their parents, namely elderly care,
represents an important form of economic transfers to them (Pezzin and Schone, 1999).
Focusing on adult daughters, the authors jointly estimate a model of labour market
participation and informal care decisions and their evidence suggests that competing
demands on daughters’ time reduce both co-residence and informal care-giving. Du-
ration of care-giving can also vary greatly, from several months following, e.g, a hip
fracture or other health shocks, to many years. Parents rarely pay children directly
for their assistance. Nevertheless, financial or non-financial transfers depend on the
care provided. The former include stocks, other assets, or cash transfers. Moreover, as
known in the literature (Bernheim et al., 2004; Poterba, 2001), intervivos transfers have
often tax advantages with respect to bequests and for this reason they are preferred to
the second ones. The latter are more difficult to measure but could include transfers of
belongings such as furniture, cars, or even the title to one’s house.
Understanding the reason why an individual decides to transfer resources to someone
else within the family is of great relevance in view of the direct potential effects on
inequality and in relation to public transfers. On the one hand, it is important to
identify whether they crowd-out, crowd-in or have no effect on private transfers and the
link between the services and credit provided by the family and those provided by the
market. On the other hand, helping is a form of insurance to be helped in return if and
when needed (Wolff, 2006).
It is of great interest to know how private, market and public transfers between
generations are connected, in particular nowadays, as the retirement system is facing the
demographic pressure of the baby-boomers caused by the rising of life expectancy and
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the fall of fertility rates. The scenario is getting worse especially during this persistent




Health Shocks and Labour
Market Transitions across Europe
2.1 Introduction
Too many workers leave the labour market permanently due to health problems or
disability, and too few people with reduced work capacity manage to remain in employ-
ment. This is a social and economic tragedy that is common to virtually all OECD
countries (OECD, 2010). It is essential to social inclusion and integration that peo-
ple with health problems find a job, nevertheless their occupation opportunities are
restricted. The literature, which mainly focuses on individual countries, still provide
evidence of dramatic differences in labour market outcomes on the basis of disability
(Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and DeLeire (2001) for the US and Kidd et al. (2000)
for the UK).
As it is shown in Figure 2.1, people with disability register lower employment rate
and, simultaneously, higher inactivity rate than non-disabled ones. Then, it seems that
people who suffer from health related problems remain cornered in the “inactivity”
trap which reflects the scarce labour market opportunities for these people.1 During
the late 2000s, the employment rate for disabled people was only slightly over half of
that of the ones without any disability. Closely related to these poor labour market
outcomes, people with disability also experienced poverty more intensely than their
1In addition, all the key indicators of the labour market outcomes do not exhibit any substantial
discrepancy before the onset of the global economic crisis (the black rhombus in the picture), when for
about a decade economic growth was rather strong in many European countries and employment rose
quite significantly.
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Figure 2.1: Differences in the labour market outcomes by disability
Source: EUROSTAT; Note: Average employment, unemployment and inactivity rates measured as %
of working-age population; poverty rate measured as % of people with a disability living in households
with income lower than 60% of the median-adjusted disposable income for late-2000s. The rhombus
shows the key labour market indicators since mid-1990s. The OECD average is an unweighted average
across 27 OECD countries excluding Japan, New Zealand and Turkey.
peers without disability.2 For these reasons, most industrialized countries recognize
the need for effective policies for the disabled.3 Recently, across Europe, the focus of
disability policies has shifted from being passive towards a more employment-orientated
approach. Such policies should re-think the balance between income protection and
integration in order to ensure right incentives to work, encouraging the participation of
disabled people, which is still scarce (OECD, 2010).
Most of the literature focuses on individual countries effects. This paper aims at
providing a cross-country evidence of the causal effect of health shocks on the labour
market outcomes, specifically looking at the individual transition from full-time to all
the other possible statuses: part-time, unemployed, retired and inactive. As a result
of the harmonization process behind the EU-SILC dataset, I can analyse these effects
through a comparable survey framework (Campolieti, 2002). Differently from most of
the literature, I use a different measure of health shock and I find that individuals who
suffer from a sickness are significantly more likely to leave their full-time employment
and, depending on country-specific welfare, they transit to the other statuses. For
instance, higher standard of integration in disability policy are associated to fewer drop
2For what concern the disabled, Figure 2.1 shows no statistical difference in the labour market
outcomes before and after the last economic downturn. The disadvantaged condition persists till the
mid-1990s.
3The American with Disability Act (ADA) for the U.S.A., the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA)
for the UK, the Severely Disabled Person Act (SDPA) for Germany.
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outs from full-time employment. This policy encourages the workers to stay on the
job market through, for example, vocational rehabilitation services.4 It is therefore
of great interest to investigate the relationship between health condition and labour
market performances and, in view of the ongoing unification and integration process, it
is also worth to compare the different findings across EU members.
Most of the studies focus on the transition from work to retirement for elderly
people.5 Partly due to data unavailability, a few papers look at the impact of bad
health on labour market for young individuals and Lindeboom et al. (2006) represent
a valuable exception. Generally the evidence is mixed and the findings are sensitive to
different specifications and factors, moreover there is still a limited evidence for cross-
country comparisons. Starting from this scarse evidence, I investigate the effect of an
adverse health shock on the individual labour market outcomes across Europe (2003-
2009). The main contributions are threefold with respect to the existing literature.
First, it deepens the understanding of the relationship between health status and labour
market dynamics across Europe. Second, as main health regressor I use the limitation in
activities which is a more specific measure of disability (Hancock et al., 2014). Third, I
provide evidence on the existing heterogeneous effects of health shocks on labour market
outcomes depending on country-specific social security arrangements.
Specifically, (i) I carry out the analysis using the EU-SILC harmonized sample which
makes the comparison across 27 European countries feasible. To the best of my knowl-
edge, the only similar contribution has been done by Garcia-Gomez (2011) with an
different and smaller sample of 9 EU member countries. (ii) I consider a different mea-
sure of disability which properly captures the presence of long-standing limitations,
impairment and disabilities, which are more likely to cause an adverse effect on labour
market outcomes. As underlined by Hancock et al. (2014, 2013), the health indicators
are plagued by measurement errors.6 The authors use ten indicators of ability to af-
ford particular items or delivery activities to construct a latent index which describes a
severe difficulty for an individual to perform usual dayly activities. The variable used
here considers any form of disability, handicap, impairment and other severe difficul-
4In Section 2.2 I discuss the policy reform and disability policy indicators across Europe.
5See some examples on both static and dynamic effects: Berkovec and Stern (1991); Bound and
Burkhauser (1999); Currie and Madrian (1999); Riphahn (1999); Smith (2004); Han et al. (2005);
Disney et al. (2006); Hagan et al. (2008); Jones et al. (2010) and Zucchelli et al. (2007).
6They explain the concerns about the quality of subjective assessments and the failure to address
problems caused by measurement error in the health related variables.
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ties in performing usual daily activities. This represents the most similar measure of
health shock with respect to Hancock et al. (2014). The purpose of using this measure
is to isolate the presence of severe limitations and to rule out cases in which individuals
are affected by chronic illnesses, but are not substantially limited in their usual work
activity. For example, I can rule out cases - such as anaemia, asthma, celiac disease,
diabetes and headache - that are considered as chronic illnesses but do not strongly
influence individuals’ work activities.7
Finally, I relate the findings with the heterogeneity in social security system across
EU countries. Individuals living in countries characterised by higher work incentives
are less likely to drop out from full-time employment after a health shock occurs.8
Thus, poor health reduces the individual’s productivity in work and in earnings.
The effects will differ depending on both the peculiarity of the occupation (Brant et al.,
2012) and the severity of the disability (Jimenez-Martin et al., 2006; Oguzoglu, 2011)
which are considered as controls in the main analysis. Brant et al. (2012), using U.S.
longitudinal data, analyse a job history of both blue and white-collar employees and
their transitions from good to bad health statuses. Their findings suggest that blue-
collar workers’ health deteriorates faster than their white-collar counterparts mainly
because the formers are more likely to experience a negative health shock on the job
market. Jimenez-Martin et al. (2006) find that, for Spanish workers aged between
50 and 64, the probability of continuing working decreases with the severity of the
shock. Furthermore, in Oguzoglu (2011), the effect of work limitation on labour market
participation is explored by considering different health shocks, which are heterogeneous
with respect to their severity.
There are at least two ways in which a health shock may influence labour market
trajectories. On the one side, health shocks are likely to cause longer unemployment
spells when an individual is out of the labour market (Boheim and Taylor, 2000; Gannon
and Nolan, 2007).9 On the other side, health shocks are more likely to move workers
7I also use another measure of health shock - chronic illness - in order to make some comparisons
with respect to the previous literature.
8This is one of the possible channels. The paper proposed by Jenkins and Rigg (2003) explains
the complexity of the mechanisms through which a health shock affects labour market outcomes. The
authors use the BHPS to split the effect of disability into three steps: the selection effect, the effect of
disability onset and the effect of disability post onset. Jenkins and Rigg (2003) point out that people
who had experienced the onset of disability were typically characterized by having lower qualifications,
income and employment rates. After the initial onset effect, average work earnings rise, but the proba-
bility of being unemployed linearly increases with the duration of the disability.
9Gomez and Nicolas (2006) analyse the effects of a health shock on the probability of leaving em-
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from employment to unemployment, retirement or inactivity, which is to say looking
at transitions (Garcia-Gomez et al., 2010).10 This paper fits into this second line of
research. I condition on past health and labour status to evaluate the effects of changes
in health using two definitions of health deterioration. Following others, such as Lechner
and Vazquez-Alvarez (2011), Dano (2005), Gomez and Nicolas (2006) and Garcia-Gomez
(2011), I rely on the possibility of conditioning on sufficient observable information to
obtain a credible counterfactual against which I measure the impact of the health shock
on labour market outcomes.Then I relate these different effects with the country-specific
social security system.11
Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of social protection policies and health status
across Europe. The EU-SILC data and the descriptive statistics are presented in Sec-
tion 2.3. Estimations and main results are in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 focuses on the
relationship between the probability of leaving full-time employment and the integration
policy indicator. Section 2.6 concludes.
ployment and transiting out to unemployment or inactivity in Spain.
10Additionally, a blooming literature examines the influence of measurement error, justification bias
and the endogeneity problems that further complicate the analysis (Bound, 1991).
11Recently Polidano and Vu (2015) study the causal labour market impacts of disability onset by
gender, age and education levels using longitudinal data from the Household Income and Labour Dy-
namics Australia survey and difference-in-difference propensity score matching techniques. Using the
same dataset, Cai et al. (2015) study the effect of health status and health shocks on hours worked.
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2.2 Disability policy reforms across Europe
Sickness and disability outcomes are still inadequate in most countries, with low employ-
ment rates and high benefit dependence, calling for further, often unpopular, reforms.
In the past 10 years, EU countries have started to shift away their approach from merely
paying benefits to people with disability (“compensation policy”) towards helping them
stay in, or return to, work (“integration policy”). The former guarantees that individu-
als who are disabled do not endure economic hardship and provides them benefits for the
potential income losses. The latter tries to avoid the exclusion of disabled individuals
from the labour market by encouraging participation and integration. Therefore, such
policies should be designed to ensure that the incentives to work are relatively higher
to being unemployed or merely collecting disability benefits (OECD, 2010).12
While social security policies have been interpreted, up to the recent time, only in
terms of mere financial assistance, a new wave of reforms has recognised the need for
a stronger active support in order to help people with disabilities to stay in the labour
market. This shift can be explained using the two disability policy indicators previ-
ously mentioned.13 The first dimension measures the compensation or benefit programs
for each country where the sub-components are: coverage, minimum disability level,
disability level for a full benefit, maximum benefit level, permanence of benefits, med-
ical assessment, vocational assessment, sickness benefit level, sickness benefit duration
and unemployment benefit level and duration. A higher score means greater system
generosity, with 50 being the maximum. The second dimension covers employment or
integration measures (coverage consistency, assessment structure, employer responsibil-
ity for job retention and accommodation, supported employment program, subsidised
employment program, sheltered employment sector, vocational rehabilitation program,
timing of rehabilitation, benefit suspension regulations and additional work incentives).
A higher score indicates a more active approach, therefore more focused on the vo-
cational rehabilitation and work incentives.14 Table B.4 provides a general idea of
12To the best of my knowledge, Garcia-Gomez (2011) is the only one study that tries to analyse the
incentives provided by the alternative routes out of employment after the onset of a health shock across
Europe but with a smaller sample. There is no other study that tries to understand the correlation
between the onset of disability, the labour market outcomes and the incentives provided by the different
policy. Consequently, here and in the forthcoming Sections it will deepen the relationship between the
country-specific policy indicators and the effect on labour statuses.
13OECD (2010), p. 87.
14See Table B.1, Table B.2 and Table B.3 in the Appendix for a detailed description of the sub-
components of policy indicators provided by OECD (2010).
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disability policy typologies across Europe. The Nordic countries and Portugal have a
higher score for compensation policy, so, a priori, one would expect the highest outflows
from full-time job in these countries. Vice versa, in the United Kingdom is the least
generous. Considering integration policies, Norway and Finland register the highest
score, meaning a more employment oriented approach, whereas Mediterranean coun-
tries occupy the bottom of this ranking. Thus, it seems straightforward to hypothesize
an higher probability to transit into part-time job for the Nordic countries with respect
to Southern Europe.
Figure 2.2: Disability policies orientation across EU (2009)
Figure 2.2 shows the variation in policy attitude across countries by describing a
generalized different policy pattern between North and South. Countries with high
scores on both scales have a comparatively stronger integration policy in place, but the
generosity and accessibility of benefits is likely to mitigate the potential advantages in
terms of incentives of the integration component. The worst situation is found in those
countries, which are characterised by low levels in both scores. Only a few countries
have a more predominant focus on one of the two policies - either compensation or
integration. On the one hand, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Italy, have the strongest
compensation orientations, hence I should expect the highest outflows from employment.
On the other hand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, followed by Austria
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register the strongest attitude towards integration policy. In these countries, the incen-
tives to continue working seem to be the highest: this implies a higher likelihood to
remain in full-time (such as in Austria) or transit to part-time (Scandinavia). Devia-
tions from the dashed 45-degree line represent a country orientation towards one of the
two types of policies. The scores in the first dimension, encapsulating the benefit or
compensation policy tools, range from around 20 in the UK, that has the least generous
and least accessible benefit system, to over 30 in the majority of the Nordic countries
and Portugal. The scores in the second dimension, summarising the integration policy
tools, span within a slightly broader range: from around 15 in some Southern European
countries and Ireland to 35 points or more in Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe in a generalised full shift in policy orientation
towards a more employment-oriented approach due to the presence of high heterogeneity
across countries. OECD (2010) points out two main reasons: firstly, the policy imple-
mentation is lagging behind policy intentions. The big shift in rhetoric and policy has
yet to translate in many cases to an actual shift in everyday practice of health system.
This will require very significant additional changes addressing the financial incentives
of the main stakeholders. Secondly, the policy shift has not been accompanied to the
necessary degree by a corresponding shift in resources - contributing to the very low
take-up in most cases of new and modified services. This suggests that the correla-
tion between the policy indicators and the labour market outcomes might be difficult
to interpret. The empirical results corroborate this idea. Workers living in countries
characterised by higher work incentives are less likely to leave the full-time employment
after a health shock occurs.
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2.3 Empirical strategy
This paper contributes to the existing literature in estimating the impact of an adverse
health shock on labour market outcomes, assessing whether people who suffer from a
health shock are more likely to stay in full-time job, or transit to other statuses - namely
employed part-time, unemployed, retired or inactive and consequently decreasing the
weekly working hours. One main concern in estimating an equation between health
and labour status is how to properly deal with the simultaneity between labour market
outcomes and a health shock, which likely generates endogeneity within the model. A
possibility would be to look for an instrument for health condition in a reduced form for
labour outcomes. In this framework, a valid exclusion restrictions could be a detailed
regional information which is not available from the EU-SILC due to the high level of
aggregation employed for the regional markers. Another option - which is not applicable
to this analysis due to data limitations - would be to consider a random assignment to
treatment, i.e. suffering a health shock.15 For these reasons, the identification strategy
in this study involves matching technique in which, conditioning on sufficient observable
information, I am able to compare individuals who undergo a health shock with their
counterpart in a control group that will help to tackle the endogeneity issue. I also
check the sensitivity of the results using different estimators.16
2.3.1 The evaluation framework
Let T be the binary variable describing the treatment status: specifically, T = 1 if the
individual suffers from a health shock and T = 0 otherwise. The binary variable Y1 and
Y0 defines the outcome of the interest for treated and untreated subjects, respectively.
17
The realisation of both outcomes for the same individual is not observable to econo-
metricians due to the lack of counterfactual. Nevertheless, some features of the joint
distribution can be estimated to obtain the Average Treatment effect on the Treated
(ATT ) which can be written as follows.
ATT = E(Y1 − Y0 | T = 1) (2.1)
15This is the strategy implemented by Smith (2004) and Lindeboom et al. (2006).
16See Becker and Ichino (2002) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for some practical guidance for the
implementation of propensity score matching.
17In the rest of the analysis, ‘untreated’ and ‘controls’ are used indifferently.
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The ATT determines to what extent the outcome of interest varies on average for those
individuals who suffer from health shocks (treated). The aim of this evaluation is to
identify and consistently estimate the ATT assuming that both treatment status and
potential outcomes are affected by a set of observable characteristics, X. Problems may
arise because of the possible association between some of the unobservable variables
that affect the potential outcome in the case of no treatment and treatment indicator.
One of the assumptions that allows the identification of the ATT is strong ignorabil-
ity (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), which is the rationale behind common estimation
strategies such as regression modelling and matching. This assumption, when the ATT
is the only effect of interest, states that:
Y0 ⊥ T | X (2.2)
Pr(T = 1 | X) < 1 (2.3)
Condition 2.2, which is mentioned in the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA),
refers to “unconfoundedness” or “selection on observables” in this framework. It means
that, once I condition on observable characteristics, the assignment of the treatment is
independent of the potential outcome in the case of no treatment. The idea behind this
assumption is that Y0 does not have any impact in the selection into treatment while the
possibility that self-selection depends on the Y1 does not have to be ruled out (Ichino
et al., 2008). The rich set of the covariates included in the analysis makes plausible the
reliability of this assumption. Condition 2.3 is a (weak) overlap or common-support
condition which must hold in order to have at least a counterpart in the control group
for each treated individuals.18 If both assumptions hold, it is possible to consistently
estimate the ATT (Blundell and Dias, 2009).
2.3.2 Health shock indicators for treated and control groups
In this Section I define more specifically the treated and the control groups which are
depicted in Figure 2.1. For each country, I consider a three-year sequence in which all
18I use the min-max criterion so I exclude all the observations whose propensity score is smaller than
the minimum and larger than the maximum in the opposite group. This is the interval of propensity
score overlapping in the two groups.
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Table 2.1: Definition of treated and control groups
TREATED CONTROLS
Time Labour status Health status Time Labour status Health status
t1 Full time Good t1 Full time Good
t2 Full time Bad VS t2 Full time Good
t3 - Bad t3 - Good
individuals are employed full-time (at t1 and t2) and in good health at t1. Then, I
compare individuals who become “disabled” thereafter, thus declaring disability at t2
and t3. This requires individuals to be observed for at least three consecutive years.
This sequence allows me to observe a period antecedent to disability (t1) and some
periods after this event - when the situation should be stabilised - in order to gauge the
effects of the health shock on some relevant labour market outcomes. Two definitions
of health shocks are involved: (1) limitation in activities because of health problems
and (2) chronic diseases. The first is constructed using the responses to the question on
self-assessed health in the EU-SILC: Do you have any limitation in activities because
of health problems? From the 3 possible responses (yes, strongly limited; yes, limited;
not limited), I define the presence of an adverse health shock if they report having any
limitation, regardless of its strength, in any given period (t2 and t3). The second measure
is based on the yes/no question:Do you have any chronic (long-standing) illness? 19
Considering the first measure of health shock, the limitation is defined as the in-
dividual’s difficulties in performing daily activities. Limitations should be due to a
health-related cause and not to financial, cultural or other reasons. People with long
standing limitations have passed through a process of adaptation, which may have re-
sulted in a reduction of their activities. Thus, its main advantage is to capture the
presence of long-standing limitations when this is likely to strongly influence labour
market outcomes. This latter consideration makes the health indicator less heteroge-
neous and more specific with respect to the one widely used in the previous literature
(Hancock et al., 2014).
The idea is to evaluate whether a change in health status has any consequence on the
labour market outcomes. Since the aim is to rule out cases in which there is a potential
anticipation or simultaneity between a change in labour status and a change in self-
19I use this second measure for robustness checks and in order to make the analysis comparable to
the previous literature.
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reported health, the treatment and control groups, shown in Table 2.1, are constructed,
in detail, as follows:20
1. Consider a window of three years for each observed individual. At t1, the start of
the sequence, all the individuals report good health status and they are in full-time
employment in t1 and t2.
2. The treatment group is composed of individuals meeting selection criterion (1)
who report suffering from limitations in daily activities in t2 and t3. Which is to
say, those individuals who experienced a health shock after t1 and for whom this
adverse health condition persists at least over t3. alth shock.
3. The control group is composed of individuals meeting selection criterion (1) who
do not report a worsened health status after t1.
In the present context, the simultaneous determination of health and labour market
status may arise via two different mechanisms. On the one hand, individuals may stay
outside the labour market because they are recipients of benefits linked to disability
policies, thus reporting low level of self-assessed health status. On the other hand,
individuals may anticipate a transition out of employment and show a change in self-
assessed health one period in advance. The two mechanisms are likely to generate
reverse causality issues and lead to incorrect inference. Thus, selecting only healthy
individuals at t1 and in full-time job in t1 and t2, it should rule out or at least limit the
reverse causality issue. Moreover, how the measure of the limitation in daily activities
is constructed, it allows to get rid of some anticipation effects due to individuals who
foresee a transition out of employment and report a health change one period in advance.
In fact, the questionnaire is extremely precise in defining an individual as “hampered in
their usual activity” only if he/she is currently limited and has been limited in activities
for at least the last 6 months, eliminating or at least mitigating any possible anticipation
effects. For what concerns the second measure of health shock, it is necessary to assume
no contamination due to any anticipation effect. Furthermore, the comparison of these
two indicators may shed some light on the extent to which this anticipation effect might
be empirically relevant for the estimates.
20Similar strategy was used by Gomez and Nicolas (2006), Garcia-Gomez (2011) and Lechner and
Vazquez-Alvarez (2011).
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2.3.3 The plausibility of the CIA
It is possible to correctly estimate the ATT once the CIA is satisfied. Ideally, it needs
that all the relevant characteristics for the selection into the treatment are accounted
for and the unobservables, left out, are not potentially correlated with the treatment.21
The applicability of this assumption, which is not testable, heavily depends on the
availability of a detailed group of characteristics in order to match treated and controls
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The EU-SILC dataset used in this analysis points in
this direction.
I control for pre-treatment characteristics (demographics, educational attainments,
job characteristics and household composition) by including them in the propensity
score and by restricting the sample of controls to individuals who are as similar as
possible. Furthermore, the information for both groups are collected with the same
questionnaire, and individuals are drawn from the same local labour market. Heckman
et al. (1997) stressed the importance of satisfying these two conditions in order to
reduce the bias when matching estimators are involved. Again, it is crucial to underline
that a consistent estimation of the ATT crucially relies on the CIA. Therefore, if
the outcomes of the treated and the control individuals present systematic differences
between them, matching estimation will not produce the right parameter of interest.
However, assuming that these differences are time-invariant, it is possible to exploit the
panel dimension of the data in order to control for this kind of unobservables. In fact,
when restricting both the treated and the controls to be in full-time job in the first
and the second period, the ATT is identical to the ones obtained taking differences.
Therefore, in the presence of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity the parameters
of interest would be recovered (Garcia-Gomez, 2011). Finally, I follow the simulation
approach implemented by Nannicini (2007) and Ichino et al. (2008) in order to obtain
valuable information on the reliability of matching estimates in the case of extreme
simulated confounding factors which may affect the CIA.
2.3.4 Propensity score matching
Smoothing techniques are implemented because on the one hand, it is necessary to
condition on a large set of observables in order to make robust the reliability of the
21The full list of covariates is reported in Table ??.
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CIA. On the other hand, it is not trivial to estimate the ATT when conditioning on
many covariates. I use the propensity score matching techniques to overcome these
issues (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The authors define the propensity score p(X) as
the conditional probability of receiving the treatment, in this study an adverse health
shock, conditioning on pre-treatment characteristics (t1). The propensity must satisfy
the so-called “balancing property” which is to say that individuals with equal score have
the same distribution of observable covariates independently of the treatment status;
and more importantly, the exposure to the treatment and the control groups are random
for a given value of the score. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that if the
participation in the treatment is random, once conditioning on the multidimensional
vector X, it also has to be random within cells defined by the values of p(X). Using the
propensity score, the dimensionality problem is reduced and the ATT can be estimated
as follows.
ATT = E(Y1 | T = 1)− E(Y0 | T = 1) = (2.4)
= Ex [(E(Y1 | p(x), T = 1)− E(Y0 | p(x), T = 1)) | T = 1] = (2.5)
= Ex [(E(Y1 | p(x), T = 1)− E(Y0 | p(x), T = 0)) | T = 1] (2.6)
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of p(X)|T = 1. Once the “balancing
hypothesis” is satisfied, the ATT estimates are consistent: for a given propensity score,
the outcomes of the control group are on average the same of the treatment group. I
estimate the propensity score using a probit model, stratifying individuals in blocks
according to the propensity score and restricting the analysis to the common support
option. The final step of the estimation strategy is the use of the kernel algorithm
with replacement to identify the best match for each treated individual. Using the
kernel, all treated are matched with a weighted average of all controls with weights
that are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of treated
and controls.22 The kernel matching estimator defines G(·) the kernel function, hn the
bandwidth parameter, T the set of treated units and C the set of control units. Y Ti and
Y Cj are, respectively, the observed outcomes of the treated and control units while Ci
22The main results are fairly consistent when using the nearest neighbour algorithm. This approach
consists of taking each treated unit and searching for the control unit with the closest propensity score.
See Dehejia and Wahba (2002), Becker and Ichino (2002) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a
presentation of different matching algorithms.
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is the set of control units matched to the treated unit i with an estimated value of the
propensity score of pi. Finally, N
















2.4 Data and results
2.4.1 Dataset
I use longitudinal data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Con-
ditions dataset (henceforth EU-SILC) which provides seven waves of microdata. The
EU-SILC project was launched in 2003 on the basis of an agreement in 6 Member
States (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Austria), as well as in
Norway. The starting date for the EU-SILC was 2004 for the EU-15 countries, as well
as for Estonia, Norway and Iceland. The 10 new Member States with the exception of
Estonia started in 2005. New other Members - Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Switzer-
land - are considered from 2007. EU-SILC is the successor to the ECHP but strongly
differs from it in several important ways. Perhaps most importantly, the EU-SILC is
output-harmonised so the comparison between countries is much more credible. The
surveys also differ in their design: whereas the ECHP was a panel survey, in which
the same individuals were re-interviewed year after year, the EU-SILC takes the form
of a rotating panel, where individuals are interviewed usually for a maximum of four
years, and the sample is regularly refreshed with new members. However, the number
of rotational groups varies: the standard is four, but there are some exceptions (Iacovou
et al., 2012).23
This database has two main advantages. Firstly, the panel dimension assures to
account for the endogeneity issue mentioned in the previous sub-sections. Secondly,
being an harmonizing survey it enables a comparison among 27 European countries,
which, to the best of my knowledge, is a novelty. The sample consists of 197,549 indi-
viduals divided into 27 countries and over 7 years (2003-2009). Table 2.2 summarises,
country-by-country, the sample size divided by two groups: treated (individuals who
suffer a health shock) and controls (individuals who do not report a worsening in their
health status).24 The fundamental information, such as income, labour condition and
social status, is collected both at the personal and the household level (see Table B.5
for detailed descriptive statistics).
The outcome variables are the transitions from full-time employment to other five
23France (9-years panel); Norway (8-years panel) and Luxembourg (a “pure” panel).
24I also show the summary statistics for the whole sample and divided by treatment in the Table B.5
and in the Table B.6, respectively.
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Table 2.2: Treated and control groups
Country AT BE BG CY CZ DK EE ES FI
Controls 6,041 5,824 2,371 4,160 9,335 4,184 5,805 13,753 3,259
Treated 248 133 23 100 194 117 365 463 266
Total 6,289 5,957 2,394 4,260 9,529 4,301 6,170 14,216 3,525
Country FR GR HU IE IS IT LT LU LV
Controls 17,768 9,108 6,405 3,238 2,095 24,140 4,545 9,139 2,984
Treated 537 147 226 64 38 645 135 389 193
Total 18,305 9,255 6,631 3,302 2,133 24,785 4,680 9,528 3,177
Country NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
Controls 5,309 7,983 13,855 6,549 2,982 4,953 3,049 5,993 6,722
Treated 216 178 242 268 47 114 142 357 153
Total 5,525 8,161 14,097 6,817 3,029 5,067 3,191 6,350 6,875
Note: 27 European countries are included: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus
(CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR),
Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg
(LU), Latvia (LV), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PO), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO),
Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SL), Slovakia (SV), United Kingdom (UK).
different labour market statuses. Namely, full-time employment to full-time employment
(FT-to-FT), full-time employment to part-time employment (FT-to-PT), full-time em-
ployment to unemployment (FT-to-U), full-time employment to retirement (FT-to-R)
and full-time employment to inactivity (FT-to-I). Then I study the effect of a health
shock on the hours usually worked per week in the main job.25 Table B.8 summarises
the labour market transitions from full-time employment to the other statuses. The
Figure A.1 shows the proportion of the individuals respect to the different labour out-
come at t3 and it highlights the heterogeneity across country with respect of being FT,
PT, U, R and I at the period I measure the transitions
The pre-treatment characteristics are: health status, age, gender, marital status,
kind of consensual union, education, household size, total disposal household income,
self-employed or not, type of contract, occupation, disability, sickness, unemployment
benefits, amount of pension, waves, regional dummies, kind of dwelling and degree of
urbanization.26
25I do not look at other categories such as being a student, homemaker, looking after children (or
other persons). See the Table B.8 for the description of the outcome variables.
26For what concerns the occupation, I follow the ISCO-88 (COM) International Standard Classifica-
tion of Occupations and I define the variable as follows: (1) Legislators, senior officials and managers;
(2) Professionals; (3) Technicians and associate professionals; (4) Clerks; (5) Service workers and shop
and market sales workers; (6) Skilled agricultural and fishery workers; (7) Craft and related trades




In the first stage, I compute the propensity score for a dummy which defines the treat-
ment “health shock”. Then, I run a regression (probit) for the treatment variable on the
left hand side, and the all the pre-treatment covariates (t1) which determine selection
into the treatment on the right hand side. This is the same of doing a t-test between
treated and controls (Panel A in Table B.7). I estimate the predicted probability of
being treated considering the optimum number of blocks divided by percentiles using
pscore STATA command. Within each block I have individual with similar character-
istics as it is shown in Table B.7. In detail, the optimum number of blocks describe
the fact that there is no differences in the mean propensity score between treated and
controls (Panel B and Panel C in Table B.7). Next I focus on the common support
area where individuals have similar propensity score. Finally I use different matching
models.
Clearly, I estimate the propensity score for the individuals who undergo a change in
their health status using a probit model. The probability of belonging to the treated is
a function of the pre-treatment characteristics, as discussed in the previous sub-section
in detail.27 In order to satisfy the balancing hypothesis, I use a different specification
for each country. I split the dataset into k strata of the propensity score and within
each stratum, I test that the average propensity score of treated and controls does not
differ.28 Then, I restrict the analysis to the common support, improving the quality of
matches as explained by Becker and Ichino (2002). Thus, it implies that the test of the
balancing property is applied only to observations whose propensity score lies on the
intersection between the two supports of the propensity score of treated and controls.
The idea is to ensure that there are treated subjects which are comparable to the control
ones in terms of propensity scores. The Table B.7, in Appendix, presents the estimated
propensity score across European countries.29 The within-country distribution of scores
27The propensity score estimates are shown in Table B.7 in Appendix. Some variables have been
dropped because of collinearity.
28The balancing hypothesis is satisfied if the observables do not differ - on average - between treated
and control groups. See Table B.7 in Appendix for further details.
29I consider support overlap condition which states that there is no value of covariates for which
the probability of being treated is zero or one. The analysis only concerns values of X for which this
probability is strictly between zero and one. In practice, this is implemented by imposing constraints
on X such that this probability exceeds a threshold value strictly above zero and falls short of another
threshold value strictly below one.
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among the two groups is similar, giving support to the CIA.30
Figure 2.3 shows the main results for the whole sample (aged 16-65) using the kernel
matching estimator. The ATT measures the probability of transit to a different labour
market statuses at period t3.
31 Distinct colours are used in order to stress the differences
across countries. In most of the countries under analysis, individuals who undergo a
health shock at t1 exhibit a significant negative drop in the likelihood to remain in
full-time employment at t3 compared to those who do not.
Transition from full-time to full-time
In this Section I focus both (i) on the effect of health shocks on the probability of not
moving from full-time unemployment at t3, and (ii) on how the labour market outcomes
differ across countries. Figure 2.3(a) shows the negative effect of “bad” health on the
likelihood of being full-time employed at t3. The greatest negative effects are found in
Romania and Ireland, ranging from 23 to 21 percentage points less likely to remain in the
full-time position, respectively. The countries with a relatively low levels of integration
policy show a negative likelihood to stay in full-time job.32 This subgroup, covering also
the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Spain, has comparatively
underdeveloped employment and rehabilitation policies. They are characterized by a
strong compensation orientation and long sickness benefit payment duration which may
discourage disabled labour market participation. Austria, Poland and Hungary register
among the lowest effects in term of drop out from full-time. In Austria, for instance,
vocational rehabilitation became compulsory at the end of 1990s and each claim for
a disability benefit is automatically treated as a request for rehabilitation which, on
the other hand, may decrease the chances to drop out. In the past 15 years, Poland
has improved the initiatives to help disabled in order to integrate into the regular
labour market. Hungary follows, since 2008, a similar rehabilitation process. Thus, they
operate on the supply side of the labour market. It aims at increasing the productivity
of people with disability by restoring and developing their skills and capabilities so they
can participate in the general workforce (OECD, 2010).
30All the estimates are obtained under the common support assumption.
31The Figure 2.3 refers to the estiamtes in Table B.9 which are in Appendix. Each column presents
the estimated effect of a drop in health status on the probability of staying in full-time employment or
transit to part-time, unemployment, retirement, inactivity. Furthermore, I estimate also the drop in
the numbers of hours country-by-country.
32For clarity, Table B.4 and Figure 2.2 show the scores for each disability policy.
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Transition from full-time to the other labour market statuses
Norway and Sweden reveal that the exit from full-time as a result of a health shock leads
to part-time work with probabilities ranging between 9 and 10 more percentage points.
These countries have the most generous welfare system in Europe, but they also have
the strongest employment-orientated disability policy, encouraging, defacto, individuals
to stay in the labour market at least as part-time worker. Denmark and Finland show a
different pattern with respect to the other Nordic countries (Figure 2.3(b)). Differently
from the others, Denmark has expanded by a great amount all employment subsidies
for people with disability. The effectiveness of wage subsidies depends on the degree
of targeting and it is typically much higher with a more restrictive system (such as
in Finland) than with a generous system like the Danish one, which produces a large
deadweight loss and requires constant re-adjustment. Nevertheless, the effect in both
countries is positive but not statistically different from zero.
In the Czech Republic and France, estimates show that the drop from full-time is
paralleled by an increase in the probability of being unemployed. In both countries,
the exit from the labour market is a combined effect of people that transit either to
unemployment or to inactive status (Figure 2.3(c) and 2.3(e), respectively). In the
United Kingdom, the negative transition from full-time to unemployment may be par-
tially explained by the increase in promotion of work incentives for people on disability
benefits. This was a high priority in the UK, where a special tax credit was introduced
in 1999 which later on was merged into the general Working Tax Credit in addition to
a new temporary earnings supplement, the Return to Work Credit (2003). Both credits
constitute a wage top-up for people with disability in low paid employment to ensure
work pays.
The effect of the transition to retirement reveals a significant and positive impact in
Romania (around 20 percentage points more), in Hungary and in most of the Mediter-
ranean countries. Despite using a sample with people aged below 65 years old, I still
need to consider early retirement as an option even if it is not a well-defined state. For
that reason, I consider retirement and inactive status as separate categories (Bardasi
et al., 2000; Disney et al., 1994). The empirical analysis uncovers a significant and
positive probability of switching to inactivity across Europe. In the countries overlook-
ing the Mediterranean Sea, individuals who suffer from a health shock show a higher
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probability of being inactive at t3 than those who do not report a “bad” health status.
These countries are characterized by high sickness benefit duration, and a low score
in both work incentives and monitoring which may induce people to stay outside the
labour market due to the considerably high benefits.
I advance the hypothesis that the differences between countries in terms of likelihood
of staying in full-time employment after a health shock occurs may depend on the
generosity of disability benefits provided in different countries, as previously argued in
the literature. The effect of ATT seems to depend on the kind of policy under which
individuals suffering from a health shock receive generous benefits, i.e. they are more
likely to exit the labour market after a health shock occurs, unless good integration
policies are present in the country. This is the relationship I study in Section 2.5.33
Using the second measure of health shock - changes in chronic condition, the main
results are fairly consistent. This indicator helps to strengthen the analysis and make it
comparable to what has been already done in the literature (Garcia-Gomez, 2011). As
expected, the magnitude of the effect is smaller with respect to the previous one given
the fact that the former health shock measure rules out cases which are considered as
illnesses but do not strongly limit the usual work activity (Table B.10).
33I would need to follow individuals over time to see whether they go back to work or transit to
inactivity once the unemployment benefits expire. Unfortunately, the data at hand do not provide a
large enough sample size to perform this analysis.
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Figure 2.3: Transition from full-time job to:
(a) Full-time (b) Part-time (c) Unemployed
(d) Retired (e) % Inactive (f) Number of worked hours per week
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2.4.3 Robustness checks and subgroup analysis
In this Section, I consider various robustness checks. First, the estimates are fairly
stable even when I implement a different matching algorithm, the nearest neighbour.
The results for both measures of health shock appear consistent with respect to the
ones in the previous Section. All the results are in the Appendix, Table B.11 and Table
B.12, respectively.
Second, I split the sample into different subgroups in order to test whether possible
heterogenous effects are in place. I carry out the analysis (i) by gender in Table B.13 and
B.14 for male and female, correspondingly; (ii) by age in Table B.16 and B.15 for elderly
and young, respectively.34 For each subgroup I estimate the ATT on the probability
of remaining in full-time employment at t3. I do not find dramatic differences across
genders, although significance is reduced in a few cases, especially for females. Due to
the selection criteria, the male sample is generally larger than the female one. If women
tend to work more part-time than the men, selecting full-time workers at t1 leads to a
smaller female sub-sample. Nevertheless, I generally find a bigger effect for the female
who live in the Scandinavian countries and Baltic states where it seems more evident
the gender gap due to health related problems. As expected, I provide evidence on the
fact that the health shock has greater effect for older individuals.35
Third, following the idea that more educated individuals have a better health con-
dition later in life and better labour market prospects (Currie, 2009; Cutler and Lleras-
Muney, 2010), I investigate possible heterogenous effects due to (iii) different educational
achievement. I split the sample in two groups: the more educated one, namely tertiary
education or more, and the less educated one, with people who achieved lower levels
of schooling. Across European countries, the findings show that more educated people
are less affected by an health shock with only three exceptions: Ireland, Norway and
Romania (see Table B.17).
Finally, I consider some sensitivity checks about the reliability of CIA. By restricting
all the individuals to be full-time in the first period, the ATT estimates are identical
to the ones obtained taking differences. Therefore, in the presence of time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity the parameters of interest would be recovered. While the
34As in the related literature, I define an individual as being old if he/she is 49 years or more.
35In few cases, namely Denmark, Ireland and Slovakia, the effect is slightly higher for young people.
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presence of unobserved heterogeneity time-variant is tested through the creation of a
counfonding variables which show the sensitivity of the results. As a check, I follow the
simulation approach implemented by Nannicini (2007) and Ichino et al. (2008). They
suggest a sensitivity analysis - which is not a test of the CIA which is intrinsically non
testable because the data are uninformative about the distribution of Y0 for treated
units - that provides valuable information in order to draw conclusions on the reliability
of matching estimates. This form of sensitivity analysis makes assumptions about the
type of unobserved characteristics, such as the relation with the independent variable
of interest and the strength of the relation with the outcome, to estimate the true effect
of the treatment, correcting for the confounder. By changing these characteristics, the
plausibility of an unobserved covariate of sufficient strength to change the conclusions
regarding the treatment effect can be evaluated.
In this contest, I recreate different confounders that attempt to violate the CIA.
As recommended by (Nannicini, 2007), the results of this simulation based sensitivity
analysis should be read in terms of the deviation between point estimates rather than the
changing in significant levels. This analysis reveals that the results are generally robust
with respect to simulated confounders such as young, old, male and female confounders.
While this does not mean there are no unobserved heterogeneity issues, these tests do
indicate that the results are robust to almost implausibly strong confounders. Finally,
Groenwold et al. (2010) state that this method is a more conservative estimate due to
the fact the correlations between the unobserved covariates and the observed covariates
are not taken into account.36
36See Table B.18 for the estimates using the simulation approach by Nannicini (2007).
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2.5 Health shocks and integration policy
In Section 2.4, I investigate the relationship of suffering from a health shock and labour
market outcomes later on. Here I shed light on the fact that the ATT differences
across countries may be due to heterogeneity in the country-specific institutional setup.
As shown in Section 2.2, the 27 European countries under analysis exhibit differences
in both compensation and integration index scores. In what follows, I assess to which
extent such heterogeneity is able to explain cross-country distribution of estimated ATT .
I study whether it exists a relationship between ATT of leaving employment and the
disability policy indicators which are country-specific. Then I check the results using
the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to group some of these indicators according
to their similarity and differences. The main advantage of PCA is that, once these
patterns have been found, it is possible to reduce the number of dimensions of the index,
without loss of any information. PCA extracts orthogonal linear combinations from a
set of variables. This method is attractive for two reasons. Firstly, it is technically equal
to a rotation of the dimensional axes, such that one can minimize the variance from the
observations. The second reason is related to the fairly intuitive interpretation of the
PCA: the coefficient of each variable is related to how much information it provides
about the other variables.
First, I regress the ATT (of dropping out from full-time) on the 10 indicators of
the “compensation” disability policy. The strength of this association is investigated
through a standard OLS regression. I find a negative correlation between the estimated
ATT of remaining in full-time job and the sickness payment duration. The intuition be-
hind this is that individuals living in countries characterised by larger duration benefits
are the ones with a higher likelihood of dropping out from full-time employment after
a health shock occurs. These results hold when adding a rich set of country specific
controlling variables. Then, I repeat the same analysis with the 10 components of the
“integration” disability policy. The main result is that work incentives are positively
correlated with the ATT , i.e. the higher the work incentives, the higher the probability
of staying in full-time after a health shock. Also in this case the result is robust to
taking into account other covariates.
Second, I determine the number of principal components using the screeplot, which is
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Table 2.3: Drop out from FT and Policy integration sub-components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Compensation policy Integration policy Principal Component
Population Coverage -0.006 Consistency -0.026 PC1: Sickness payment -0.018* 0.023
(0.019) (0.032) (0.010) (0.020)
Min. required disability 0.008 Complexity of the benefits 0.001 PC2: Employment programmes 0.013 0.071*
(0.010) (0.024) (0.008) (0.038)
Work incapacity benefit -0.008 Employer obligations 0.040 PC3: Benefit coverage 0.014 -0.014
(0.016) (0.032) (0.009) (0.015)
Max. payment level -0.001 Supported employment -0.036 PC4: Low spending in rehabilitation -0.027* 0.001
(0.012) (0.034) (0.015) (0.015)
Permanence of benefit -0.002 Subsidised employment 0.025 PC5: Absence in monitoring -0.036*** -0.007
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.024)
Medical criteria -0.018 Sheltered employment -0.019 PC6: Inclusiveness in the programmes -0.043* -0.030
(0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026)
Vocational criteria 0.003 Comprehensiveness rehabilitation 0.028 PC7: Benefit duration -0.023** -0.034***
(0.009) (0.020) (0.010) (0.007)
Sickness payment 0.004 Timing rehabilitation -0.038
(0.013) (0.038)
Sickness payment duration -0.033** -0.038** Disability benefit suspension -0.007
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012)
Sickness monitoring -0.007 Work incentives 0.041* 0.022*
(0.007) (0.021) (0.012)
Economic Variables X X X
Social Expenditure X X X
Constant 0.077 0.163 -0.149 -0.022 -0.093*** -0.168
(0.117) (0.375) (0.161) (0.486) (0.013) (0.383)
Obs 19 19 19 19 19 19
R sq. 0.643 0.728 0.358 0.602 0.627 0.660
Note: ***Significant at the 1 %; **5%; *10% level. Standard Errors Clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is the ATTK estimates
of being full-time worker in t3. All the variables are from EUROSTAT (2009). PC is the principal component. Economic variables: gdp per capita, population, rate of
employment and unemployment (aged 15-64). Social expenditure variables: social protection, sickness/health care, disability, unemployment benefit. They are measured
as a percentage of GDP. I consider rate of unemployment and rate of employment with individuals aged 15 to 64 years old.
the plot of the eigenvalues ordered from the largest to the smallest, shown in Figure 2.4.
It visually demonstrates the proportion of total variance that each principal component
is accounting for. Figure 2.4 shows the screeplot for the 20 principal components. The
empirical rule to choose the principal components is to select the eigenvalues greater
than one, so the first 7 components.37
After isolating these 7 main components, I proceed to assess the relationship between
the estimated ATT of dropping out from full-time employment and the “new” indicators
of the disability policy drawn from the PCA. Table 2.3 presents the OLS results and
also in this case, the results confirm the previous findings. Without any controls in the
covariates, I find that the probability of remaning in full-time job negatively depends
on ammount of sickness payment, with low rehabilitation and benefit duration, as I
expect. After controlling for the economic and social country specific I still find negative
effect between full-time at t3 and duration of the disability benefit while the quality of
employment program supports to stay in full-time job. Encouraging work incentives for
disabled people has a positive impact on the ATT . In other words, individuals living
in countries characterised by higher work incentives within disability policies are less
likely to drop out from full-time employment after a health shock occurs, which confirm
37I use the cosine squared of each component shown in order to understand which are the most
important in terms of contribution. Components with a large value of cos2i explain a relatively large
portion of the total variance. I can interpret the first component in terms of vocational rehabilitation,
while the second one is more related to work incentives.
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This study contributes to the literature about the impact of health shock on labour
status. To the best of my knowledge, the only closely related paper is the one by
Garcia-Gomez (2011). This analysis strengthens and improves the understanding of
this branch of research by quantifying the effects of an adverse health shock on the
individual labour market transitions across Europe. Matching techniques are used to
control for the non-experimental nature of the data.
It contributes to the existing literature in three different ways. First, it deepens the
understanding of the relationship between health and labour market dynamics, using
a comparative empirical analysis among 27 European countries. Second, with respect
to previous literature and in particular to Garcia-Gomez (2011), a different measure of
health shock is used - limitation in daily activities. The purpose of using this indicator is
to isolate the presence of long-standing limitations, ruling out cases in which individuals
are affected by chronic illnesses that do not substantially limit their usual work activity.
Finally, it provides evidence on how heterogeneous effects of health shocks on labour
market outcomes depend on social security arrangements across Europe.
The question I empirically address is: what is the effect of a health shock on labour
market transitions across Europe? The empirical analysis reveals a significant causal
effect of a health shock on the likelihood of leaving full-time employment. Individuals
who incur an adverse health shock are significantly more likely to transit either into part-
time, unemployment or inactive status. The pooled effect across Europe is negative.
Nevertheless, results differ across countries depending on the country-specific social
security system. The largest effects are found in Romania and Ireland, ranging from
23% to 21% respectively. It is assessed as close to zero in Bulgaria and Austria.
I employ some ideas coming from the literature on the evaluation of active labour
market programmes and I adapt them to this particular panel data case. This non-
parametric approach has the key advantage that its validity does not depend on arbi-
trary functional form assumptions such as other conventional econometric models but
fully exploits the panel data dimension. In particular, I use the formal causal frame-
work suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and recently adapted by Lechner and
Vazquez-Alvarez (2011) and Garcia-Gomez (2011) for the health and labour case. The
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identification strategy involves matching individuals who undergo a health shock with
their counterparts in a control group, using the propensity score matching method.
Furthermore, I provide some insight on the real effectiveness of disability policies
in 27 European countries from 2003 and 2009, using the European Union Statistics
on Income and Living Conditions dataset (EU-SILC). I argue that these discrepancies
are explained through the heterogeneity in social security systems across Europe. In-
dividuals living in countries characterised by higher work incentives within integration
disability policies are less likely to drop out from full-time employment after a health
shock occurred. It is therefore of great interest to empirically investigate this type of
comparative analysis in view of the standardisation of EU policies.
This study proposes possible lines for future research. First, it would be of interest
to analyse transitions between the different non-employment statuses in order to better
understand an individual’s transition from unemployment to inactivity and/or to em-
ployment once unemployment benefits expire. Another possibility is to determine the
effect of disability within a household in order to evaluate the impact of the onset of dis-
ability, not only for the individuals but also for the economic situation of the household
(in terms of the labour supply of the members in good health).
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Appendix A
Figure A.1: Labour market statuses at t3 (mean)
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Table B.1: The sub-components of policy indicators
X Description
1 coverage
2 minimum degree of incapacity needed for benefit entitlement
3 degree of incapacity needed for a full benefit
4 disability benefit level (replacement rate for average earnings with a continuous work record)
5 permanence of benefits (from strictly permanent to strictly temporary)
6 medical assessment
7 vocational assessment (from strict own occupation assessment to all jobs available)
8 sickness benefit level (distinguishing short and long-term sickness absence)
9 sickness benefit duration (including the period of continued wage payment)
10 sickness monitoring (from no checks on sickness absence to strict steps for monitoring)
Y Description
1 coverage consistency (access to different programmes and possibility to combine them)
2 assessment structure (responsibility and consistency)
3 anti-discrimination legislation covering employer responsibility for work retention
4 supported employment programme (extent, permanence and flexibility)
5 subsidised employment programme (extent, permanence and flexibility)
6 sheltered employment sector (extent and transitory nature)
7 vocational rehabilitation programme (obligation and extent of spending)
8 timing of rehabilitation (from early intervention to late intervention)
9 benefit suspension regulations (from considerable duration to nonexistent)
10 additional work incentives (including possibilities to combine work and benefit receipt)
Source: compiled by the author using data from OECD (2010).
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Table B.2: OECD disability policy typology: classification of the compensation indicator scores
X 5 points 4 points 3 points 2 points 1 points 0 points
X1. Population Total population Some of those out of Labour force plus Labour force with Labour force Employees
coverage (residents) the labour force means-tested voluntary
non-contrib. scheme self-insurance
X2. Minimum required 0-25% 26-40% 41-55% 56-70% 71-85% 86-100%
disability
X3. Disability less 50% 50-61% 62-73% 74-85% 86-99% 100%
level for full benefit
X4. Maximum disability RR greater 85% RR (85 % and 75%) RR (75 % and 50%) RR (50 % and 35%) RR (35 % and 25%) RR less 20%
benefit payment level
X5. Permanence of benefit Strictly permanent De facto permanent Self-reported Regulated review Strictly temporary Strictly temporary
payments review only procedure unless fully (= 100%) in all cases
disabled
X6. Medical assessment Treating doctor Treating doctor Insurance doctor Insurance doctor Team of experts in Insurance team
criteria exclusively predominantly predominantly exclusively the insurance
X7. Vocational Strict own Previous Own-occupation Current labour All jobs available All jobs available
assessment earnings partial taken into account
criteria benefits strictly applied
X8. Sickness RR = 100% also RR = 100% RR = 75% 75 greater RR greater 50% RR greater 50% RR less 50% also
payment for long-term (short-term) greater 75% (short-term) greater 50% for any type of (short-term) ¡ 50% for short-term
level sickness (long-term) (long-term) sickness absence (long-term) sickness absence
absence sickness absence sickness absence sickness absence
X9. Sickness benefit One year or more One year or more Six-twelve months Six-twelve months Less than Less than
payment short or no significant short or no significant six months short six months
duration wage payment wage payment wage payment wage payment or no wage payment significant wage
period period period period period payment period
X10. Sickness absence Lenient sickness Sickness certificate Frequent sickness Strict follow-up steps Strict controls of Strict follow-up
monitoring certificate and occupational certificates with early sickness steps
requirements health service with intervention certificate
risk prevention
Source: compiled by the author using data from OECD (2010). Note: RR=replacement rate.
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Table B.3: OECD disability policy typology: classification of the integration indicator scores
Y 5 points 4 points 3 points 2 points 1 points 0 points
Y1. Consistency across supports All programmes Minor discrepancy Minor discrepancy Major discrepancy Major discrepancy Strong differences
in coverage rules accessible flexible mixture restricted mixture flexible mixture restricted mixture in eligibility
Y2. Complexity of the benefits and Same agency for One agency for Same agency One agency Different agencies Different agencies
supports systems assessment for all integration benefits for benefits and for integration for most for all kinds of
programmes co-ordinated vocational benefits not programmes assessments
rehabilitation co-ordinated
Y3. Employer obligations for their Major obligations Major obligations Some obligations Some obligations No obligations at all No obligations
employees and new hires towards employees towards employees towards employees towards employees but dismissal of any kind
and new applicants less for applicants and new applicants none for applicants protection
Y4. Supported employment Strong programme Strong programme Intermediary Intermediary only Very limited Not existent
programmes permanent option only time-limited also permanent time-limited programme
Y5. Subsidised employment Strong and flexible Strong and flexible Intermediary either Intermediary Very limited Not existent
programmes programme with programme permanent neither permanent programme
a permanent option but time-limited or flexible nor flexible
Y6. Sheltered employment Strong focus with Strong focus but Intermediary focus Intermediary focus Very limited Not existent
programmes significant largely permanent with some ”new” ”traditional” programme
transition rates employment attempts programme
Y7. Comprehensiveness of Compulsory Compulsory Intermediary view Intermediary view Voluntary Voluntary
vocational rehabilitation rehabilitation with rehabilitation with relatively large relatively low rehabilitation with rehabilitation with
large spending low spending spending spending large spending low spending
Y8. Timing of vocational In theory and In theory any time Early intervention Generally de facto After long-term Only for disability
rehabilitation practice any time in practice not increasingly relatively late sickness or for benefit recipients
(e.g. still at work) really early encouraged intervention disability recipients
Y9. Disability benefit suspension Two years or more At least one but More than three Up to three months Some but not None
option less than but less than for disability
two years 12 months benefits
Y10. Work incentives for Permanent in-work Benefit continued Income beyond Income up to Income up to Some additional
beneficiaries benefit provided for a considerable pre-disability level pre-disability level pre-disability level income allowed
(trial) period allowed also partial benefit no partial benefit
Source: compiled by the author using data from OECD (2010).
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Table B.4: Disability policy typology: country scores (2009)
Countries x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 X total
AT 2 3 4 2 1 1 4 3 2 2 24
BE 3 2 3 1 4 2 4 2 2 2 25
CZ 1 4 3 3 0 2 1 0 5 5 24
DK 5 2 1 3 4 4 2 4 3 0 28
FI 5 4 4 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 32
FR 3 2 1 3 1 2 4 2 5 2 25
GR 3 3 2 5 2 1 3 2 2 2 25
HU 1 3 2 3 2 1 4 3 5 4 28
IE 3 1 2 1 4 3 2 1 5 4 26
IT 3 2 0 3 1 1 3 3 5 5 26
LU 2 1 2 5 3 2 2 5 4 2 28
NL 4 4 2 3 2 1 0 4 4 0 24
NO 5 3 2 4 2 4 2 5 4 2 33
PL 3 3 4 4 0 1 3 3 2 2 25
PT 3 2 3 5 4 1 4 1 5 5 33
SK 1 4 3 2 4 2 1 2 5 2 26
ES 3 4 1 4 5 0 3 2 4 1 27
SE 5 5 1 5 4 3 1 4 4 5 37
UK 3 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 2 5 21
Countries y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8 y9 y10 Y total
AT 2 3 3 4 4 2 5 4 0 3 30
BE 3 3 3 1 5 2 2 3 2 0 24
CZ 3 1 4 1 1 3 1 4 0 3 21
DK 4 4 2 3 5 2 5 4 5 3 37
FI 2 2 4 3 3 3 4 4 5 2 32
FR 3 2 3 3 5 4 1 2 0 3 26
GR 3 2 3 0 2 3 0 1 0 2 16
HU 2 3 4 3 3 2 3 2 4 2 28
IE 3 2 2 1 3 2 0 1 1 2 17
IT 4 2 4 1 1 2 0 2 0 2 18
LU 2 4 3 2 4 3 2 3 0 1 24
NL 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 2 5 35
NO 4 5 4 2 4 4 5 4 5 0 37
PL 4 2 2 0 3 4 2 2 0 3 22
PT 3 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 16
SK 3 2 4 2 2 3 0 2 0 3 21
ES 4 3 3 1 2 3 2 2 0 2 22
SE 3 4 5 2 4 3 3 3 5 0 32
UK 4 4 4 3 1 2 1 3 5 5 32
Source: compiled by the author using data from OECD (2009).
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Table B.5: Summary statistics across Europe
Countries AUSTRIA BELGIUM BULGARIA CYPRUS CZECH REPUBLIC
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wave 2005 6289 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5957 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2394 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4260 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9529 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wave 2006 6289 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 5957 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 2394 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4260 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9529 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wave 2007 6289 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 5957 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 2394 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4260 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 9529 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Wave 2008 6289 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 5957 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 2394 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 4260 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 9529 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Wave 2009 6289 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 5957 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 2394 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 4260 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 9529 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
General Health
(good=0) 6288 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00 5957 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00 2393 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 4260 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00 9529 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00
(bad=1) 6288 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 5957 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 2393 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 4260 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 9529 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Age 6289 39.80 10.37 17.00 63.00 5957 40.38 9.97 16.00 63.00 2394 41.14 10.62 17.00 63.00 4260 40.44 10.72 17.00 63.00 9529 41.61 10.67 17.00 63.00
Age squared 6289 1691.52 810.15 289.00 3969.00 5957 1729.55 812.54 256.00 3969.00 2394 1804.76 869.74 289.00 3969.00 4260 1750.39 879.49 289.00 3969.00 9529 1845.10 885.61 289.00 3969.00
Sex
(female=0) 6289 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 5957 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 2394 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 4260 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 9529 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
(male=1) 6289 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00 5957 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 2394 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 4260 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 9529 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Marriage status 6286 1.79 0.58 1.00 3.00 5943 1.84 0.59 1.00 3.00 2389 1.87 0.54 1.00 3.00 4260 1.86 0.47 1.00 3.00 9529 1.93 0.58 1.00 3.00
1. Never 6286 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 5943 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 2389 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 4260 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 9529 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
2. Married 6286 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 5943 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 2389 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 4260 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 9529 0.66 0.48 0.00 1.00
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 6286 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 5943 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 2389 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 4260 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 9529 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
Consensual union
(no=0) 6281 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 5862 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 2391 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 4260 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 9529 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6281 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 5862 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 2391 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 4260 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 9529 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00
Education 6289 3.20 0.68 1.00 4.00 5804 3.35 0.81 1.00 4.00 2393 3.00 0.68 1.00 4.00 4257 3.01 1.01 1.00 4.00 9529 3.12 0.44 1.00 4.00
1. Primary 6289 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 5804 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 2393 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 4257 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 9529 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00
2. Low Secondary 6289 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 5804 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 2393 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 4257 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 9529 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
3. High Secondary 6289 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 5804 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 2393 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 4257 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 9529 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00
4. Tertiary 6289 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 5804 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 2393 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 4257 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 9529 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Occupations 6266 4.75 2.22 1.00 9.00 5878 4.20 2.42 1.00 9.00 2369 5.71 2.55 1.00 9.00 4260 4.78 2.46 1.00 9.00 9529 4.97 2.35 1.00 9.00
1. Manager 6266 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 5878 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 2369 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 4260 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 9529 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
2. Professionals 6266 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 5878 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 2369 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 4260 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 9529 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
3. Technicians and associate professionals 6266 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 5878 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 2369 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 4260 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 9529 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
4. Clerical support workers 6266 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 5878 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 2369 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 4260 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 9529 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
5. Service and sales workers 6266 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 5878 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 2369 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 4260 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 9529 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 6266 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 5878 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 2369 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 4260 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 9529 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
7. Craft and related trades 6266 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 5878 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 2369 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 9529 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
8. Plant and machine operators 6266 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 5878 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 2369 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 4260 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 9529 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
9. Unskilled operators 6266 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 5878 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 2369 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 4260 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 9529 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Type of contract 5514 1.06 0.23 1.00 2.00 5269 1.09 0.28 1.00 2.00 2109 1.11 0.32 1.00 2.00 3657 1.11 0.31 1.00 2.00 8472 1.12 0.33 1.00 2.00
1. Permanent 5514 0.94 0.23 0.00 1.00 5269 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 2109 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00 3657 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 8472 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00
2. Temporary 5514 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 5269 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 2109 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 3657 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 8472 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Self-employed
(yes=1) 6289 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 5931 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 2379 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 4260 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 9529 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 6289 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 5931 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 2379 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00 4260 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00 9529 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00
Cash income (Log) 6289 8.56 3.14 0.00 12.52 5957 8.67 3.18 0.00 12.03 2394 6.40 2.42 0.00 9.42 4260 9.81 0.62 7.48 11.64 9529 7.52 2.74 0.00 10.79
NON-cash income (Log) 5356 0.03 0.28 0.00 9.83 5060 0.29 0.82 0.00 14.30 2394 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.23
Cash employee income
(no=0) 6289 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 5957 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 2394 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 4260 0.19 0.31 0.00 1.00 9529 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6289 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00 5957 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 2394 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 4260 0.81 0.31 0.00 1.00 9529 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00
NON-cash employee income
(no=0) 6289 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 5957 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 2394 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 4260 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9529 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(yes=1) 6289 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 5957 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 2394 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 4260 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9529 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Benefit
1. Disability (Log) 6289 0.01 0.29 0.00 10.31 5957 0.01 0.27 0.00 12.00 2394 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.10 4260 0.00 0.07 0.00 2.96 9529 0.02 0.26 0.00 8.06
2. Sickness (Log) 6289 0.01 0.22 0.00 8.80 5957 0.02 0.33 0.00 13.20 2394 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.42 4260 0.01 0.21 0.00 11.71 9529 0.03 0.16 0.00 3.56
3. Unemployment (Log) 6289 0.15 0.89 0.00 19.20 5957 0.27 1.43 0.00 41.00 2394 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.72 4260 0.14 2.43 0.00 152.32 9529 0.01 0.10 0.00 2.89
Disability
(no=0) 6289 1.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 5957 1.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 2394 0.99 0.08 0.00 1.00 4260 1.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 9529 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6289 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 5957 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 2394 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 4260 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 9529 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00
Sickness 6289 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 5957 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 2394 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 4260 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 9529 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 6289 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 5957 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 2394 1.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 4260 0.99 0.09 0.00 1.00 9529 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6289 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 5957 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 2394 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 4260 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 9529 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Unemployment 6289 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 5957 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 2394 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 4260 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 9529 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 6289 0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00 5957 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 2394 0.99 0.09 0.00 1.00 4260 0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00 9529 0.97 0.16 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6289 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 5957 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 2394 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 4260 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 9529 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Family size 6289 2.46 1.03 1.00 7.00 5957 2.30 0.90 1.00 7.00 2394 3.12 1.27 1.00 10.00 4260 2.89 1.14 1.00 7.00 9529 2.49 0.99 1.00 7.00
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 6289 38.10 24.06 -3.40 313.49 5957 38.69 24.48 -40.31 486.60 2394 3.80 3.18 -1.71 72.52 4260 37.83 22.79 -3.71 421.96 9529 10.97 6.94 -0.06 162.42
H. income minus other transfers 6289 40.28 24.98 -4.40 323.49 5957 39.39 24.36 -40.31 486.60 2394 4.23 3.19 -0.06 72.52 4260 39.24 23.65 -0.11 421.96 9529 11.40 6.93 -0.01 162.42
H. income 6289 44.27 24.99 0.02 330.35 5957 42.59 24.39 0.06 507.00 2394 4.39 3.19 0.08 72.63 4260 41.62 24.29 0.00 421.96 9529 12.11 6.83 0.78 163.89
Urban area 6289 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 5957 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 2394 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 4260 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 9529 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Dwelling type
(detached house=0) 6289 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 5957 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 2394 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 4260 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 9529 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
(apartment=1) 6289 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 5957 0.84 0.36 0.00 1.00 2394 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 4260 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 9529 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
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Countries DENMARK ESTONIA SPAIN FINLAND FRANCE
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wave 2005 4301 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 6170 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14216 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3525 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18305 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wave 2006 4301 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 6170 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 14216 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 3525 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 18305 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Wave 2007 4301 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 6170 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 14216 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 3525 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 18305 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Wave 2008 4301 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 6170 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 14216 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 3525 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 18305 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Wave 2009 4301 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 6170 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 14216 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 3525 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 18305 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
General Health
(good=0) 4301 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00 6170 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 14215 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00 3525 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 18303 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00
(bad=1) 4301 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 6170 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 14215 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 3525 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 18303 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Age 4301 43.88 9.95 17.00 63.00 6170 40.63 10.79 17.00 63.00 14216 40.43 10.49 17.00 71.00 3525 43.28 10.66 18.00 63.00 18305 41.22 10.01 17.00 63.00
Age squared 4301 2024.44 873.38 289.00 3969.00 6170 1767.16 871.97 289.00 3969.00 14216 1744.79 858.32 289.00 5041.00 3525 1986.35 902.06 324.00 3969.00 18305 1799.01 821.04 289.00 3969.00
Sex
(female=0) 4301 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 6170 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 14216 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 3525 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 18305 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
(male=1) 4301 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 6170 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 14216 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 3525 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 18305 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Marriage status 4300 1.84 0.54 1.00 3.00 5793 1.83 0.61 1.00 3.00 14211 1.75 0.54 1.00 3.00 3525 1.82 0.61 1.00 3.00 18303 1.76 0.59 1.00 3.00
1. Never 4300 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 5793 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 14211 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 3525 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 18303 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
2. Married 4300 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 5793 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 14211 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 3525 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 18303 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 4300 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 5793 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 14211 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 3525 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 18303 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Consensual union
(no=0) 4301 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 6162 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 14165 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 3525 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 18305 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 4301 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 6162 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 14165 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 3525 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 18305 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00
Education 4286 3.22 0.69 1.00 4.00 6166 3.31 0.64 1.00 4.00 14122 2.81 1.09 1.00 4.00 3519 3.26 0.79 1.00 4.00 17287 3.16 0.80 1.00 4.00
1. Primary 4286 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 6166 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 14122 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 3519 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 17287 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
2. Low Secondary 4286 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 6166 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 14122 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 3519 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 17287 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
3. High Secondary 4286 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 6166 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 14122 0.24 0.42 0.00 1.00 3519 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 17287 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
4. Tertiary 4286 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 6166 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 14122 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 3519 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 17287 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Occupations 4272 4.12 2.31 1.00 9.00 6161 4.94 2.73 1.00 9.00 14186 5.05 2.56 1.00 9.00 3523 3.92 2.44 1.00 9.00 18226 4.52 2.51 1.00 9.00
1. Manager 4272 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 6161 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 14186 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 3523 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 18226 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
2. Professionals 4272 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 6161 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 14186 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 3523 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 18226 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
3. Technicians and associate professionals 4272 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 6161 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 14186 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 3523 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 18226 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
4. Clerical support workers 4272 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 6161 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 14186 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 3523 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 18226 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
5. Service and sales workers 4272 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 6161 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 14186 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 3523 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 18226 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 4272 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 6161 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 14186 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 3523 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 18226 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
7. Craft and related trades 4272 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 6161 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 14186 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 18226 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
8. Plant and machine operators 4272 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 6161 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 14186 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 3523 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 18226 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
9. Unskilled operators 4272 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 6161 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 14186 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 3523 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 18226 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Type of contract 3925 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 5681 1.03 0.16 1.00 2.00 11629 1.25 0.43 1.00 2.00 2522 1.13 0.34 1.00 2.00 16225 1.12 0.32 1.00 2.00
1. Permanent 3925 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 5681 0.97 0.16 0.00 1.00 11629 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 2522 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 16225 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00
2. Temporary 3925 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5681 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 11629 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 2522 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 16225 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Self-employed
(yes=1) 4301 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 6169 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 14212 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 3525 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 18304 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 4301 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 6169 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00 14212 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 3525 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 18304 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00
Cash income (Log) 6170 7.64 2.13 0.00 10.69 14216 7.74 3.71 0.00 11.63 18305 8.87 2.83 0.00 12.33
NON-cash income (Log) 5223 0.08 0.33 0.00 3.77 12316 0.09 0.71 0.00 40.00 4552 0.02 0.26 0.00 9.60
Cash employee income
(no=0) 4301 0.13 0.32 0.00 1.00 6170 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 14216 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 3525 0.70 0.78 0.00 1.00 18305 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 4301 0.87 0.32 0.00 1.00 6170 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 14216 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 3525 0.30 0.22 0.00 1.00 18305 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
NON-cash employee income
(no=0) 4301 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6170 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 14216 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 3525 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 18305 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 4301 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 6170 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 14216 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 3525 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 18305 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00
Benefit
1. Disability (Log) 6170 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.61 14216 0.01 0.24 0.00 16.80 18305 0.02 0.55 0.00 41.58
2. Sickness (Log) 6170 0.02 0.07 0.00 1.53 14216 0.02 0.39 0.00 17.50 18305 0.08 0.99 0.00 54.15
3. Unemployment (Log) 6170 0.01 0.17 0.00 6.77 14216 0.11 0.66 0.00 12.60 18305 0.27 1.88 0.00 106.94
Disability
(no=0) 6170 0.99 0.11 0.00 1.00 14216 1.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 18305 1.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6170 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 14216 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 18305 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Sickness 6170 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 14216 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 18305 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 6170 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 14216 0.99 0.08 0.00 1.00 18305 0.96 0.19 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6170 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 14216 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 18305 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Unemployment 6170 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 14216 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 18305 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 6170 0.98 0.12 0.00 1.00 14216 0.96 0.20 0.00 1.00 18305 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6170 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 14216 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 18305 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00
Family size 6170 2.74 1.08 1.00 8.00 14216 2.67 1.05 1.00 8.00 18305 2.29 0.87 1.00 7.00
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 4301 48.74 33.34 -618.13 1210.60 6170 8.59 7.54 -9.34 385.07 14195 27.71 18.79 -14.34 426.64 3525 40.12 40.29 -2.95 1474.55 18305 34.90 21.55 -90.10 488.80
H. income minus other transfers 4301 48.91 33.35 -618.13 1210.60 6170 9.01 7.53 -7.62 385.87 14195 29.38 18.83 -10.65 426.64 3525 40.79 40.23 -2.95 1474.55 18305 36.06 21.80 -41.61 488.80
H. income 4301 52.13 32.88 2.78 1211.12 6170 9.56 7.59 0.36 385.92 14195 30.28 18.85 0.64 426.64 3525 43.88 40.08 0.95 1474.55 18305 39.28 21.57 12.74 494.98
Urban area 6170 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 14216 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 3525 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 18305 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Dwelling type
(detached house=0) 4301 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 6170 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 14216 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 3525 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 18305 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
(apartment=1) 4301 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 6170 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 14216 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 3525 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 18305 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
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Countries GREECE HUNGARY IRELAND ICELAND ITALY
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wave 2005 9255 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 6631 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3302 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2133 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24785 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wave 2006 9255 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 6631 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3302 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 2133 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 24785 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Wave 2007 9255 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 6631 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 3302 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 2133 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 24785 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Wave 2008 9255 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 6631 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 3302 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 2133 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 24785 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Wave 2009 9255 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 6631 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 3302 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 2133 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 24785 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
General Health
(good=0) 9255 0.97 0.17 0.00 1.00 6618 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 3302 0.97 0.17 0.00 1.00 2132 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00 24781 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00
(bad=1) 9255 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 6618 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 3302 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 2132 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 24781 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Age 9255 40.86 10.39 17.00 63.00 6631 39.89 10.22 18.00 63.00 3302 43.18 10.84 16.00 67.00 2133 42.57 11.18 17.00 63.00 24785 40.21 10.09 17.00 63.00
Age squared 9255 1777.82 863.91 289.00 3969.00 6631 1695.17 820.84 324.00 3969.00 3302 1982.34 907.23 256.00 4489.00 2133 1936.85 946.05 289.00 3969.00 24785 1718.75 817.67 289.00 3969.00
Sex
(female=0) 9255 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 6631 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 3302 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 2133 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 24785 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
(male=1) 9255 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 6631 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 3302 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00 2133 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 24785 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
Marriage status 9255 1.79 0.51 1.00 3.00 6631 1.87 0.63 1.00 3.00 3302 1.80 0.54 1.00 3.00 2129 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 24785 1.75 0.56 1.00 3.00
1. Never 9255 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 6631 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 3302 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 2129 0.29 0.40 0.00 1.00 24785 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
2. Married 9255 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 6631 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 3302 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 2129 0.62 0.40 0.00 1.00 24785 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 9255 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 6631 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 3302 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 2129 0.09 0.20 0.00 1.00 24785 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Consensual union
(no=0) 9255 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 6631 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 3302 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 2129 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 24781 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 9255 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 6631 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 3302 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 2129 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 24781 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00
Education 9225 2.68 1.16 1.00 4.00 6631 3.14 0.63 1.00 4.00 3279 2.98 1.06 1.00 4.00 2129 2.80 0.82 1.00 4.00 24746 2.79 0.87 1.00 4.00
1. Primary 9225 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 6631 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 3279 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 2129 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 24746 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
2. Low Secondary 9225 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 6631 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 3279 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 2129 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 24746 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
3. High Secondary 9225 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 6631 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 3279 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 2129 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 24746 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
4. Tertiary 9225 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 6631 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 3279 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 2129 0.25 0.49 0.00 1.00 24746 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Occupations 9255 4.87 2.41 1.00 9.00 6618 4.95 2.55 1.00 9.00 3302 4.13 2.69 1.00 9.00 2115 4.02 2.45 1.00 9.00 24651 4.63 2.48 1.00 9.00
1. Manager 9255 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 6618 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 3302 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 2115 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24651 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
2. Professionals 9255 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 6618 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 3302 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 2115 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 24651 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
3. Technicians and associate professionals 9255 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 6618 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 3302 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 2115 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 24651 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
4. Clerical support workers 9255 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 6618 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 3302 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 2115 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 24651 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
5. Service and sales workers 9255 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 6618 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 3302 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 2115 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 24651 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 9255 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 6618 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 3302 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 2115 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 24651 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
7. Craft and related trades 9255 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 6618 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 3302 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00 2115 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 24651 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
8. Plant and machine operators 9255 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 6618 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 3302 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 2115 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 24651 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
9. Unskilled operators 9255 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 6618 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 3302 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 2115 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24651 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Type of contract 5752 1.21 0.40 1.00 2.00 5827 1.08 0.27 1.00 2.00 2629 1.05 0.22 1.00 2.00 1811 1.09 0.28 1.00 2.00 18473 1.13 0.33 1.00 2.00
1. Permanent 5752 0.79 0.40 0.00 1.00 5827 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00 2629 0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00 1811 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 18473 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00
2. Temporary 5752 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 5827 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 2629 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 1811 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18473 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Self-employed
(yes=1) 9255 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 6572 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 3302 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 2133 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 24708 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 9255 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 6572 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 3302 0.82 0.38 0.00 1.00 2133 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 24708 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00
Cash income (Log) 9255 5.76 4.55 0.00 11.74 3302 8.25 3.79 0.00 13.46 24785 7.26 4.14 0.00 12.68
NON-cash income (Log) 9255 0.03 0.21 0.00 5.37 3302 0.18 1.46 0.00 51.60 24785 0.08 0.40 0.00 13.44
Cash employee income 6631 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
(no=0) 9255 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 6572 0.20 0.30 0.00 1.00 3302 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 2133 0.25 0.37 0.00 1.00 24785 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 9255 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 6572 0.80 0.30 0.00 1.00 3302 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 2133 0.75 0.37 0.00 1.00 24785 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00
NON-cash employee income
(no=0) 9255 0.98 0.15 0.00 1.00 6631 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3302 0.96 0.19 0.00 1.00 2133 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 24785 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 9255 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 6631 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 3302 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 2133 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24785 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Benefit
1. Disability (Log) 9255 0.00 0.15 0.00 7.42 3302 0.07 0.57 0.00 12.11 2133 2.21 0.82 1.00 6.00 24785 0.04 0.50 0.00 20.80
2. Sickness (Log) 9255 0.00 0.09 0.00 7.50 3302 0.00 0.10 0.00 3.34 2133 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
3. Unemployment (Log) 9255 0.06 0.38 0.00 14.68 3302 0.39 3.84 0.00 169.18 24785 0.40 2.21 0.00 139.47
Disability
(no=0) 9255 1.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 3302 0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00 2133 1.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 24785 0.99 0.11 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 9255 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 3302 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 2133 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 24785 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
Sickness 9255 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 3302 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 2133 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 24785 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
(no=0) 9255 1.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 3302 1.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 2133 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 24785 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(yes=1) 9255 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 3302 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 2133 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 24785 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Unemployment 9255 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 3302 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 24785 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 9255 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 3302 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 24785 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 9255 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 3302 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 24785 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Family size 9255 2.68 1.06 1.00 10.00 3302 2.31 0.83 1.00 6.00 24785 2.58 1.03 1.00 7.00
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 9255 22.29 17.59 -34.25 356.37 6631 8.76 7.09 -15.15 105.62 3302 9.76 9.09 -12.15 1105.68 2129 1.70 0.58 1.00 3.00 24785 34.02 25.84 -81.08 928.69
H. income minus other transfers 9255 24.17 17.84 -34.25 356.37 6631 9.44 7.19 -15.15 105.62 3302 52.30 51.21 -26.48 1502.60 2129 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 24785 37.28 26.73 -68.85 928.69
H. income 9255 24.73 17.82 14.25 359.41 6631 10.38 7.12 0.15 107.45 3302 56.75 51.39 5.22 1510.76 2132 62.67 39.49 -10.52 512.98 24785 38.93 27.03 8.25 928.69
Urban area 9255 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 6631 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 3302 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 24785 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Dwelling type
(detached house=0) 9255 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 6631 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 3302 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 2133 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 24785 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
(apartment=1) 9255 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 6631 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 3302 0.99 0.11 0.00 1.00 2133 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 24785 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
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Countries LITHUANIA LUXEMBOURG LATVIA NETHERLAND NORWAY
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wave 2005 4680 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9528 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 3177 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5525 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8161 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Wave 2006 4680 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9528 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 3177 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5525 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8161 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Wave 2007 4680 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 9528 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 3177 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 5525 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 8161 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Wave 2008 4680 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 9528 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 3177 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 5525 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 8161 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Wave 2009 4680 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 9528 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 3177 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 5525 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 8161 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
General Health
(good=0) 4680 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 9527 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00 3177 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 5523 0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00 8160 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00
(bad=1) 4680 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 9527 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 3177 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 5523 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 8160 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
Age 4680 43.10 10.25 17.00 78.00 9528 39.04 10.10 17.00 64.00 3177 40.35 11.26 17.00 63.00 5525 41.90 9.79 17.00 63.00 8161 41.95 10.89 18.00 63.00
Age squared 4680 1962.41 866.76 289.00 6084.00 9528 1626.02 812.06 289.00 4096.00 3177 1755.12 915.37 289.00 3969.00 5525 1851.35 828.27 289.00 3969.00 8161 1878.07 925.03 324.00 3969.00
Sex
(female=0) 4680 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 9528 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 3177 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 5525 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 8161 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
(male=1) 4680 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 9528 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 3177 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 5525 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 8161 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Marriage status 4680 1.97 0.50 1.00 3.00 9528 1.81 0.61 1.00 3.00 3176 1.95 0.68 1.00 3.00 5525 1.80 0.60 1.00 3.00 8161 1.73 0.62 1.00 3.00
1. Never 4680 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 9528 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 3176 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 5525 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 8161 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
2. Married 4680 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 9528 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 3176 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 5525 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 8161 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 4680 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 9528 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 3176 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 5525 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 8161 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Consensual union
(no=0) 4680 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 9526 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 3177 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 5525 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 8161 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 4680 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 9526 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 3177 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 5525 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 8161 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00
Education 4679 3.59 0.59 1.00 4.00 9467 2.88 1.09 1.00 4.00 3177 3.23 0.72 1.00 4.00 5463 3.28 0.78 1.00 4.00 8072 3.35 0.63 1.00 4.00
1. Primary 4679 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 9467 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 3177 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 5463 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 8072 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00
2. Low Secondary 4679 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 9467 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 3177 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 5463 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 8072 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
3. High Secondary 4679 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 9467 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 3177 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 5463 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 8072 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
4. Tertiary 4679 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 9467 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 3177 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 5463 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 8072 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Occupations 4680 4.88 2.71 1.00 9.00 9522 4.37 2.49 1.00 9.00 3174 4.99 2.62 1.00 9.00 5411 3.57 2.15 1.00 9.00 7830 3.92 2.21 1.00 9.00
1. Manager 4680 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 9522 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 3174 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 5411 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 7830 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00
2. Professionals 4680 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 9522 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 3174 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 5411 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 7830 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
3. Technicians and associate professionals 4680 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 9522 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 3174 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 5411 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 7830 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
4. Clerical support workers 4680 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 9522 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 3174 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 5411 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 7830 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
5. Service and sales workers 4680 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 9522 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 3174 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 5411 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 7830 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 4680 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 9522 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 3174 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 5411 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 7830 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
7. Craft and related trades 4680 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 9522 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 3174 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 7830 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
8. Plant and machine operators 4680 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 9522 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 3174 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 5411 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 7830 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
9. Unskilled operators 4680 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 9522 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 3174 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 5411 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 7830 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Type of contract 4212 1.05 0.23 1.00 2.00 8676 1.09 0.29 1.00 2.00 2889 1.07 0.25 1.00 2.00 4995 1.10 0.29 1.00 2.00 7428 1.09 0.28 1.00 2.00
1. Permanent 4212 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00 8676 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 2889 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 4995 0.90 0.29 0.00 1.00 7428 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
2. Temporary 4212 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 8676 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 2889 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 4995 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 7428 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Self-employed
(yes=1) 4680 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 9528 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 3176 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 5502 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 8146 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 4680 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 9528 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 3176 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 5502 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 8146 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00
Cash income (Log) 4680 7.13 2.60 0.00 10.74 9528 9.66 2.45 0.00 13.25 3177 7.17 2.49 0.00 11.12
NON-cash income (Log) 8810 0.09 1.59 0.00 136.30 2649 0.02 0.16 0.00 3.45
Cash employee income
(no=0) 4680 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 9528 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 3177 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 5411 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 7428 0.80 0.34 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 4680 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 9528 0.94 0.23 0.00 1.00 3177 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 5411 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 7428 0.20 0.34 0.00 1.00
NON-cash employee income
(no=0) 4680 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9528 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 3177 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 5525 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8161 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(yes=1) 4680 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9528 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 3177 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 5525 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 8161 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Benefit
1. Disability (Log) 9528 0.08 2.30 0.00 200.00 3177 0.01 0.10 0.00 2.10
2. Sickness (Log) 1020 0.05 0.18 0.00 2.55 9528 0.00 0.24 0.00 21.60 3177 0.01 0.08 0.00 2.48
3. Unemployment (Log) 3819 0.01 0.10 0.00 3.76 9528 0.16 1.61 0.00 53.02 3177 0.03 0.23 0.00 6.32
Disability
(no=0) 4680 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9528 0.99 0.09 0.00 1.00 3177 0.99 0.09 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 4680 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 9528 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 3177 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
Sickness 4680 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 9528 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 3177 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 4680 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 9528 1.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 3177 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 4680 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 9528 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 3177 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Unemployment 4680 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 9528 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 3177 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 4680 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 9528 0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00 3177 0.96 0.21 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 4680 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 9528 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 3177 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00
Family size 4680 2.57 0.95 1.00 7.00 9528 2.38 1.01 1.00 8.00 3177 2.60 1.16 1.00 8.00
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 4680 7.26 5.08 -0.85 59.14 9528 59.01 41.14 -178.77 766.77 3177 7.29 6.15 -1.48 79.01 5525 37.26 22.49 -71.12 560.72 8160 54.83 59.44 -382.76 2717.94
H. income minus other transfers 4680 7.73 5.14 -0.02 59.14 9528 61.97 41.16 -178.77 766.77 3177 7.81 6.23 -1.48 79.01 5525 37.86 22.31 -71.12 560.72 8160 55.52 59.35 -382.76 2717.94
H. income 4680 8.08 5.16 0.01 59.14 9528 67.84 41.56 0.31 766.77 3177 8.23 6.34 0.83 79.25 5525 39.66 22.13 69.29 563.91 8161 61.38 58.96 2.76 2717.94
Urban area 4680 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 9528 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 3177 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 8161 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Dwelling type
(detached house=0) 4680 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 9528 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 3177 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 5525 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 8161 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
(apartment=1) 4680 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 9528 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 3177 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 5525 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00 8161 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00
Continued on next page
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Countries POLAND PORTUGAL ROMANIA SWEDEN SLOVENIA
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wave 2005 14097 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6817 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3029 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5067 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3191 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wave 2006 14097 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6817 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 3029 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5067 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 3191 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wave 2007 14097 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 6817 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 3029 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5067 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 3191 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
Wave 2008 14097 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 6817 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 3029 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5067 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 3191 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Wave 2009 14097 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 6817 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 3029 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 5067 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 3191 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
General Health
(good=0) 14097 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 6816 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 3029 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 4966 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00 3191 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00
(bad=1) 14097 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 6816 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 3029 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 4966 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 3191 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Age 14097 40.01 10.05 17.00 63.00 6817 40.08 11.27 1.00 80.00 3029 39.52 10.39 17.00 63.00 5067 42.33 11.30 18.00 63.00 3191 40.73 9.43 18.00 63.00
Age squared 14097 1701.57 805.40 289.00 3969.00 6817 1732.97 916.62 1.00 6400.00 3029 1669.60 837.28 289.00 3969.00 5067 1919.38 966.11 324.00 3969.00 3191 1747.49 771.43 324.00 3969.00
Sex
(female=0) 14097 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 6817 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 3029 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 5067 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 3191 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
(male=1) 14097 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 6817 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 3029 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 5067 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 3191 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Marriage status 14097 1.87 0.48 1.00 3.00 6817 1.81 0.53 1.00 3.00 3029 1.85 0.53 1.00 3.00 5067 1.95 0.87 1.00 3.00 3184 1.70 0.56 1.00 3.00
1. Never 14097 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 6817 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 3029 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 5067 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 3184 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
2. Married 14097 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 6817 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 3029 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 5067 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 3184 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 14097 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 6817 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 3029 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 5067 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 3184 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00
Consensual union
(no=0) 14097 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 6817 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 3029 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 5067 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 3183 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 14097 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 6817 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 3029 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 5067 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00 3183 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00
Education 14095 3.08 0.76 1.00 4.00 6628 1.94 1.10 1.00 4.00 3022 2.98 0.70 1.00 4.00 5062 3.29 0.73 1.00 4.00 3187 3.09 0.76 1.00 4.00
1. Primary 14095 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 6628 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 3022 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 5062 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 3187 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00
2. Low Secondary 14095 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 6628 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 3022 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 5062 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 3187 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00
3. High Secondary 14095 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 6628 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 3022 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 5062 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 3187 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
4. Tertiary 14095 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 6628 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 3022 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 5062 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 3187 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Occupations 14076 5.20 2.41 1.00 9.00 6817 5.41 2.46 1.00 9.00 3029 5.56 2.32 1.00 9.00 5043 4.21 2.27 1.00 9.00 3068 4.74 2.45 1.00 9.00
1. Manager 14076 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 6817 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 3029 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00 5043 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 3068 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00
2. Professionals 14076 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 6817 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 3029 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 5043 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 3068 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
3. Technicians and associate professionals 14076 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 6817 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 3029 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 5043 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 3068 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
4. Clerical support workers 14076 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 6817 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 3029 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 5043 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 3068 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
5. Service and sales workers 14076 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 6817 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 3029 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 5043 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 3068 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 14076 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 6817 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 3029 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 5043 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 3068 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
7. Craft and related trades 14076 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 6817 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 3029 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 5043 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 3068 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
8. Plant and machine operators 14076 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 6817 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 3029 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 5043 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 3068 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
9. Unskilled operators 14076 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 6817 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 3029 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 5043 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 3068 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Type of contract 10905 1.25 0.43 1.00 2.00 5493 1.17 0.38 1.00 2.00 2252 1.03 0.18 1.00 2.00 4452 1.06 0.24 1.00 2.00 2936 1.12 0.32 1.00 2.00
1. Permanent 10905 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 5493 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 2252 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 4452 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00 2936 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00
2. Temporary 10905 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 5493 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 2252 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 4452 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 2936 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Self-employed
(yes=1) 14097 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 6817 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 3029 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 5063 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 3177 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 14097 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 6817 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 3029 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 5063 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 3177 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00
Cash income (Log) 14097 6.19 3.49 0.00 11.98 6817 7.19 3.62 0.00 12.49 3029 5.74 3.39 0.00 10.06 5067 9.40 2.07 0.00 11.81 3191 8.49 2.36 0.00 11.01
NON-cash income (Log) 11677 0.03 0.20 0.00 8.37 1394 0.07 0.53 0.00 9.10 3027 0.06 0.98 0.00 27.54 4469 0.23 0.82 0.00 16.35 2616 0.05 0.35 0.00 9.94
Cash employee income
(no=0) 14097 0.24 0.42 0.00 1.00 6817 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 3029 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 5067 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 3191 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 14097 0.76 0.42 0.00 1.00 6817 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 3029 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 5067 0.96 0.20 0.00 1.00 3191 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00
NON-cash employee income
(no=0) 14097 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 6817 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 3029 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 5067 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 3191 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 14097 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 6817 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 3029 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 5067 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 3191 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Benefit
1. Disability (Log) 14097 0.01 0.15 0.00 7.08 6817 0.00 0.10 0.00 3.64 3029 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.93 5067 0.05 0.53 0.00 11.07 3191 0.02 0.22 0.00 6.71
2. Sickness (Log) 14097 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.86 6815 0.01 0.17 0.00 9.00 3029 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.43 5067 0.25 0.98 0.00 17.98 3191 0.10 0.48 0.00 12.35
3. Unemployment (Log) 14097 0.02 0.15 0.00 3.53 6817 0.07 0.62 0.00 18.40 3029 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.02 5067 0.29 1.32 0.00 14.33 3191 0.02 0.23 0.00 5.43
Disability
(no=0) 14097 0.99 0.07 0.00 1.00 6817 1.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 3029 1.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 5067 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 3191 0.99 0.08 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 14097 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00 6817 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 3029 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 5067 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 3191 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Sickness 14097 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 6817 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 3029 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 5067 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 3191 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 14097 1.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 6817 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 3029 1.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 5067 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 3191 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 14097 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 6817 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 3029 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 5067 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 3191 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Unemployment 14097 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 6817 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 3029 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 5067 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 3191 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 14097 0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00 6817 0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00 3029 1.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 5067 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00 3191 0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 14097 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 6817 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 3029 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 5067 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 3191 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Family size 14097 2.93 1.19 1.00 9.00 6817 2.87 1.11 1.00 8.00 3029 2.75 1.15 1.00 8.00 5067 1.93 0.69 1.00 6.00 3191 2.75 1.03 1.00 8.00
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 14097 7.20 5.99 -2.78 178.94 6817 19.18 16.91 -1.03 266.00 3029 4.26 3.99 -1.46 60.03 5067 36.94 21.33 -12.16 503.72 3191 22.27 12.33 -1.51 130.42
H. income minus other transfers 14097 8.06 6.03 -0.56 178.94 6817 20.72 17.27 -0.30 275.90 3026 4.61 4.01 -1.46 60.03 5067 37.63 21.42 -12.16 503.72 3191 23.61 12.35 -1.51 130.42
H. income 14097 8.56 5.92 0.03 178.94 6817 21.71 17.20 0.04 275.90 3029 4.86 4.01 1.46 60.03 5067 41.81 21.07 0.82 505.15 3191 25.59 12.04 0.77 133.13
Urban area 14097 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 6817 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 3029 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 5067 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Dwelling type
(detached house=0) 14097 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 6817 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 3029 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 5067 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 3191 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
(apartment=1) 14097 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 6817 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 3029 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 5067 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 3191 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
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Countries SLOVAKIA UNITED KINGDOM
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wave 2005 6350 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6875 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wave 2006 6350 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6875 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wave 2007 6350 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 6875 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Wave 2008 6350 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 6875 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Wave 2009 6350 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 6875 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
General Health
(good=0) 6348 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 6875 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00
(bad=1) 6348 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 6875 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Age 6350 39.16 10.59 19.00 67.00 6875 42.70 11.10 16.00 63.00
Age squared 6350 1645.27 832.88 361.00 4489.00 6875 1946.46 939.83 256.00 3969.00
Sex
(female=0) 6350 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 6875 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
(male=1) 6350 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 6875 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Marriage status 6348 1.80 0.53 1.00 3.00 6875 1.88 0.61 1.00 3.00
1. Never 6348 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 6875 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
2. Married 6348 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 6875 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 6348 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 6875 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Consensual union
(no=0) 6334 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 6875 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6334 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 6875 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
Education 6350 3.18 0.45 1.00 4.00 6850 3.30 0.67 2.00 4.00
1. Primary 6350 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 6850 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. Low Secondary 6350 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 6850 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
3. High Secondary 6350 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 6850 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
4. Tertiary 6350 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 6850 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Occupations 6315 4.91 2.45 1.00 9.00 6789 4.11 2.49 1.00 9.00
1. Manager 6315 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6789 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. Professionals 6315 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 6789 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
3. Technicians and associate professionals 6315 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 6789 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
4. Clerical support workers 6315 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 6789 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
5. Service and sales workers 6315 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 6789 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 6315 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 6789 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
7. Craft and related trades 6315 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 6789 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00
8. Plant and machine operators 6315 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 6789 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
9. Unskilled operators 6315 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 6789 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Type of contract 5710 1.13 0.33 1.00 2.00 5946 1.03 0.18 1.00 2.00
1. Permanent 5710 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00 5946 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00
2. Temporary 5710 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 5946 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Self-employed
(yes=1) 6348 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 6872 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 6348 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 6872 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00
Cash income (Log) 3669 8.76 3.24 0.00 12.64
NON-cash income (Log) 3669 0.40 1.60 0.00 29.40
Cash employee income
(no=0) 6348 0.10 0.20 0.00 1.00 6875 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6348 0.90 0.20 0.00 1.00 6875 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00
NON-cash employee income
(no=0) 6350 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6875 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6350 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 6875 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
Benefit
1. Disability (Log) 3669 0.03 0.38 0.00 12.08
2. Sickness (Log) 3669 0.03 0.72 0.00 38.02
3. Unemployment (Log) 3669 0.00 0.13 0.00 4.29
Disability
(no=0) 6875 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6875 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Sickness 6875 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 6875 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6875 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Unemployment 6875 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
(no=0) 6875 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
(yes=1) 6875 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Family size 6875 2.13 0.74 1.00 6.00
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 6350 8.67 5.44 -4.11 77.53 6839 48.92 54.53 -6.00 2400.33
H. income minus other transfers 6350 9.34 5.62 -4.11 79.94 6839 50.77 55.10 -6.00 2403.02
H. income 6350 9.93 5.55 2.96 79.94 6839 53.06 54.83 0.46 2404.87
Urban area 6350 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 6654 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Dwelling type
(detached house=0) 6350 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 6875 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
(apartment=1) 6350 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 6875 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
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Table B.6: Treated and controls summary statistics across Europe
AUSTRIA BELGIUM BULGARIA CYPRUS CZECH REPUBLIC
Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls
Variable Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std.
Wave 2005 248 0.000 0.000 6041 0.000 0.000 133 0.000 0.000 5824 0.000 0.000 23 0.000 0.000 2371 0.000 0.000 100 0.000 0.000 4160 0.000 0.000 194 0.000 0.000 9335 0.000 0.000
Wave 2006 248 0.266 0.443 6041 0.219 0.413 133 0.180 0.386 5824 0.172 0.377 23 0.000 0.000 2371 0.000 0.000 100 0.000 0.000 4160 0.000 0.000 194 0.000 0.000 9335 0.000 0.000
Wave 2007 248 0.286 0.453 6041 0.309 0.462 133 0.263 0.442 5824 0.243 0.429 23 0.000 0.000 2371 0.000 0.000 100 0.320 0.469 4160 0.335 0.472 194 0.294 0.457 9335 0.216 0.412
Wave 2008 248 0.165 0.372 6041 0.234 0.424 133 0.286 0.453 5824 0.290 0.454 23 0.000 0.000 2371 0.476 0.500 100 0.380 0.488 4160 0.346 0.476 194 0.376 0.486 9335 0.418 0.493
Wave 2009 248 0.282 0.451 6041 0.238 0.426 133 0.271 0.446 5824 0.295 0.456 23 1.000 0.000 2371 0.524 0.500 100 0.300 0.461 4160 0.319 0.466 194 0.330 0.471 9335 0.365 0.482
General Health 248 0.274 0.447 6040 0.045 0.207 133 0.278 0.450 5824 0.057 0.232 23 0.565 0.507 2370 0.166 0.372 100 0.340 0.476 4160 0.047 0.211 194 0.521 0.501 9335 0.167 0.373
Age 248 45.819 9.256 6041 39.553 10.337 133 45.609 8.844 5824 40.256 9.961 23 48.870 10.146 2371 41.060 10.595 100 50.050 8.579 4160 40.210 10.663 194 48.258 9.125 9335 41.471 10.653
Age squared 248 2184.673 806.846 6041 1671.279 803.907 133 2157.805 773.810 5824 1719.765 810.831 23 2486.696 888.841 2371 1798.148 867.118 100 2577.870 816.456 4160 1730.496 871.417 194 2411.639 820.768 9335 1833.325 883.106
Sex 248 0.573 0.496 6041 0.574 0.495 133 0.556 0.499 5824 0.549 0.498 23 0.522 0.511 2371 0.535 0.499 100 0.630 0.485 4160 0.546 0.498 194 0.505 0.501 9335 0.537 0.499
Consensual union 248 0.798 0.403 6034 0.712 0.453 132 0.727 0.447 5730 0.750 0.433 23 0.565 0.507 2368 0.750 0.433 100 0.900 0.302 4160 0.774 0.418 194 0.691 0.463 9335 0.717 0.451
Self-employed 248 1.851 0.357 6041 1.879 0.326 133 1.887 0.318 5798 1.888 0.315 23 2.000 0.000 2356 1.918 0.275 100 1.810 0.394 4160 1.860 0.347 194 1.881 0.324 9335 1.890 0.313
Cash employee income 248 8.391 3.308 6041 8.571 3.129 133 8.667 3.147 5824 8.670 3.179 23 6.489 2.107 2371 6.398 2.427 100 10.142 0.532 4160 9.798 0.626 194 7.320 2.677 9335 7.524 2.737
NON-cash employee income 214 0.034 0.397 5142 0.032 0.272 114 0.181 0.498 4946 0.289 0.827 23 0.032 0.082 2371 0.027 0.120
Disability (Log) 248 0.020 0.232 6041 0.014 0.296 133 0.125 0.748 5824 0.010 0.252 23 0.061 0.219 2371 0.004 0.054 100 0.000 0.000 4160 0.002 0.072 194 0.122 0.522 9335 0.020 0.252
Sickness (Log) 248 0.093 0.702 6041 0.011 0.169 133 0.099 0.590 5824 0.021 0.326 23 0.000 0.000 2371 0.000 0.009 100 0.020 0.111 4160 0.010 0.215 194 0.120 0.349 9335 0.030 0.148
Unemployment (Log) 248 0.196 0.947 6041 0.150 0.893 133 0.283 1.392 5824 0.267 1.430 23 0.000 0.000 2371 0.003 0.035 100 0.140 0.615 4160 0.139 2.462 194 0.034 0.162 9335 0.013 0.101
Family size 248 2.383 1.003 6041 2.459 1.034 133 2.226 0.901 5824 2.299 0.896 23 2.739 1.137 2371 3.123 1.272 100 2.860 1.119 4160 2.887 1.139 194 2.423 0.969 9335 2.494 0.993
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 248 33.439 25.871 6041 38.293 23.969 133 36.034 42.885 5824 38.752 23.893 23 3.171 2.328 2371 3.807 3.189 100 31.711 16.004 4160 37.979 22.909 194 9.644 8.721 9335 10.993 6.895
H. income minus other transfers 248 35.268 26.076 6041 40.489 24.915 133 36.444 42.803 5824 39.456 23.773 23 3.495 2.245 2371 4.241 3.200 100 35.773 29.862 4160 39.325 23.478 194 10.152 8.696 9335 11.429 6.885
H. income 248 39.234 26.258 6041 44.473 24.922 133 40.173 44.076 5824 42.648 23.757 23 3.691 2.255 2371 4.400 3.199 100 38.310 29.588 4160 41.700 24.145 194 11.056 8.669 9335 12.133 6.781
Marriage status 248 1.935 0.528 6038 1.789 0.583 133 2.053 0.594 5810 1.832 0.590 23 2.174 0.650 2366 1.864 0.534 100 1.980 0.317 4160 1.859 0.475 194 2.144 0.593 9335 1.922 0.582
1. Never 248 0.173 0.379 6038 0.297 0.457 133 0.150 0.359 5810 0.272 0.445 23 0.130 0.344 2366 0.219 0.414 100 0.060 0.239 4160 0.193 0.395 194 0.113 0.318 9335 0.211 0.408
2. Married 248 0.718 0.451 6038 0.616 0.486 133 0.647 0.480 5810 0.624 0.484 23 0.565 0.507 2366 0.697 0.460 100 0.900 0.302 4160 0.755 0.430 194 0.629 0.484 9335 0.656 0.475
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 248 0.109 0.312 6038 0.086 0.281 133 0.203 0.404 5810 0.104 0.305 23 0.304 0.470 2366 0.084 0.277 100 0.040 0.197 4160 0.052 0.223 194 0.258 0.439 9335 0.133 0.340
Education 248 3.060 0.697 6041 3.204 0.678 129 3.054 0.860 5675 3.355 0.803 23 3.000 0.603 2370 3.000 0.682 99 2.293 1.100 4158 3.027 1.000 194 3.052 0.475 9335 3.118 0.444
1. Primary 248 0.008 0.090 6041 0.008 0.092 129 0.062 0.242 5675 0.035 0.185 23 0.043 0.209 2370 0.019 0.135 99 0.364 0.483 4158 0.135 0.342 194 0.000 0.000 9335 0.000 0.010
2. Low Secondary 248 0.190 0.393 6041 0.123 0.329 129 0.155 0.363 5675 0.101 0.302 23 0.043 0.209 2370 0.177 0.382 99 0.111 0.316 4158 0.081 0.273 194 0.088 0.283 9335 0.046 0.210
3. High Secondary 248 0.536 0.500 6041 0.524 0.499 129 0.450 0.499 5675 0.336 0.472 23 0.783 0.422 2370 0.591 0.492 99 0.394 0.491 4158 0.405 0.491 194 0.773 0.420 9335 0.789 0.408
4. Tertiary 248 0.266 0.443 6041 0.344 0.475 129 0.333 0.473 5675 0.528 0.499 23 0.130 0.344 2370 0.214 0.410 99 0.131 0.339 4158 0.378 0.485 194 0.139 0.347 9335 0.165 0.371
Occupations 245 5.008 2.354 6021 4.737 2.217 133 4.541 2.569 5745 4.193 2.420 23 6.304 2.670 2346 5.701 2.552 100 6.120 2.371 4160 4.744 2.457 194 5.361 2.412 9335 4.962 2.346
1. Manager 245 0.008 0.090 6021 0.005 0.069 133 0.015 0.122 5745 0.002 0.044 23 0.000 0.000 2346 0.005 0.068 100 0.000 0.000 4160 0.014 0.119 194 0.000 0.000 9335 0.004 0.063
2. Professionals 245 0.065 0.248 6021 0.059 0.236 133 0.075 0.265 5745 0.101 0.301 23 0.087 0.288 2346 0.056 0.230 100 0.010 0.100 4160 0.020 0.139 194 0.041 0.199 9335 0.042 0.201
3. Technicians and associate professionals 245 0.053 0.225 6021 0.093 0.290 133 0.165 0.373 5745 0.207 0.405 23 0.043 0.209 2346 0.108 0.311 100 0.070 0.256 4160 0.172 0.378 194 0.113 0.318 9335 0.094 0.292
4. Clerical support workers 245 0.159 0.367 6021 0.156 0.363 133 0.143 0.351 5745 0.139 0.346 23 0.043 0.209 2346 0.082 0.274 100 0.110 0.314 4160 0.196 0.397 194 0.129 0.336 9335 0.245 0.430
5. Service and sales workers 245 0.163 0.370 6021 0.183 0.387 133 0.180 0.386 5745 0.207 0.405 23 0.043 0.209 2346 0.063 0.242 100 0.110 0.314 4160 0.128 0.334 194 0.119 0.324 9335 0.089 0.285
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 245 0.196 0.398 6021 0.200 0.400 133 0.128 0.335 5745 0.093 0.291 23 0.174 0.388 2346 0.145 0.352 100 0.110 0.314 4160 0.140 0.347 194 0.124 0.330 9335 0.125 0.331
7. Craft and related trades 245 0.053 0.225 6021 0.041 0.197 133 0.023 0.149 5745 0.011 0.103 23 0.000 0.000 2346 0.038 0.192 100 0.040 0.197 4160 0.018 0.134 194 0.026 0.159 9335 0.018 0.132
8. Plant and machine operators 245 0.139 0.346 6021 0.140 0.347 133 0.083 0.276 5745 0.102 0.303 23 0.217 0.422 2346 0.194 0.395 100 0.210 0.409 4160 0.139 0.346 194 0.222 0.416 9335 0.209 0.407
9. Unskilled operators 245 0.033 0.178 6021 0.043 0.202 133 0.060 0.239 5745 0.057 0.232 23 0.087 0.288 2346 0.164 0.370 100 0.120 0.327 4160 0.051 0.221 194 0.134 0.342 9335 0.118 0.323
Permanent contract 210 0.962 0.192 5304 0.942 0.234 118 0.966 0.182 5151 0.911 0.285 23 0.652 0.487 2086 0.890 0.313 81 0.914 0.283 3576 0.888 0.316 171 0.854 0.354 8301 0.880 0.325
Temporary contract 210 0.038 0.192 5304 0.058 0.234 118 0.034 0.182 5151 0.089 0.285 23 0.348 0.487 2086 0.110 0.313 81 0.086 0.283 3576 0.112 0.316 171 0.146 0.354 8301 0.120 0.325
Disability
(no=0) 248 0.992 0.090 6041 0.997 0.053 133 0.962 0.191 5824 0.998 0.049 23 0.913 0.288 2371 0.994 0.079 100 1.000 0.000 4160 0.999 0.031 194 0.943 0.232 9335 0.991 0.093
(yes=1) 248 0.008 0.090 6041 0.003 0.053 133 0.038 0.191 5824 0.002 0.049 23 0.087 0.288 2371 0.006 0.079 100 0.000 0.000 4160 0.001 0.031 194 0.057 0.232 9335 0.009 0.093
Sickness
(no=0) 248 0.964 0.187 6041 0.992 0.091 133 0.962 0.191 5824 0.991 0.095 23 1.000 0.000 2371 0.999 0.036 100 0.960 0.197 4160 0.993 0.086 194 0.789 0.409 9335 0.914 0.281
(yes=1) 248 0.036 0.187 6041 0.008 0.091 133 0.038 0.191 5824 0.009 0.095 23 0.000 0.000 2371 0.001 0.036 100 0.040 0.197 4160 0.007 0.086 194 0.211 0.409 9335 0.086 0.281
Unemployment
(no=0) 248 0.927 0.260 6041 0.951 0.215 133 0.917 0.276 5824 0.933 0.250 23 1.000 0.000 2371 0.992 0.089 100 0.930 0.256 4160 0.952 0.214 194 0.938 0.242 9335 0.975 0.158
(yes=1) 248 0.073 0.260 6041 0.049 0.215 133 0.083 0.276 5824 0.067 0.250 23 0.000 0.000 2371 0.008 0.089 100 0.070 0.256 4160 0.048 0.214 194 0.062 0.242 9335 0.025 0.158
Urban area 248 0.298 0.458 6041 0.277 0.447 133 0.466 0.501 5824 0.486 0.500 23 0.522 0.511 2371 0.372 0.483 100 0.520 0.502 4160 0.569 0.495 194 0.263 0.441 9335 0.279 0.448
Dwelling type 248 0.601 0.491 6041 0.656 0.475 133 0.82 0.39 5824 0.84 0.36 23 0.348 0.487 2371 0.592 0.492 100 0.890 0.314 4160 0.811 0.391 194 0.546 0.499 9335 0.502 0.500
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Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls
Variable Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std.
Wave 2005 117 0.085 0.281 4184 0.126 0.332 365 0.000 0.000 5805 0.000 0.000 463 0.000 0.000 13753 0.000 0.000 266 0.000 0.000 3259 0.000 0.000 537 0.000 0.000 17768 0.000 0.000
Wave 2006 117 0.214 0.412 4184 0.232 0.422 365 0.482 0.500 5805 0.304 0.460 463 0.227 0.419 13753 0.211 0.408 266 0.361 0.481 3259 0.253 0.435 537 0.196 0.397 17768 0.246 0.431
Wave 2007 117 0.205 0.406 4184 0.239 0.427 365 0.214 0.410 5805 0.205 0.404 463 0.227 0.419 13753 0.242 0.428 266 0.316 0.466 3259 0.225 0.418 537 0.257 0.437 17768 0.259 0.438
Wave 2008 117 0.239 0.429 4184 0.207 0.405 365 0.167 0.374 5805 0.204 0.403 463 0.257 0.437 13753 0.258 0.438 266 0.135 0.343 3259 0.239 0.427 537 0.248 0.432 17768 0.248 0.432
Wave 2009 117 0.256 0.439 4184 0.195 0.396 365 0.137 0.344 5805 0.287 0.453 463 0.289 0.454 13753 0.289 0.453 266 0.188 0.391 3259 0.284 0.451 537 0.300 0.459 17768 0.247 0.431
General Health 117 0.291 0.456 4184 0.066 0.249 365 0.499 0.501 5805 0.182 0.386 463 0.369 0.483 13752 0.104 0.306 266 0.207 0.406 3259 0.078 0.268 537 0.400 0.490 17766 0.091 0.288
Age 117 45.658 9.824 4184 43.830 9.952 365 47.014 10.256 5805 40.228 10.697 463 45.773 10.032 13753 40.253 10.457 266 45.064 10.280 3259 43.130 10.677 537 45.248 9.643 17768 41.096 9.993
Age squared 117 2180.359 871.144 4184 2020.079 873.150 365 2315.195 906.458 5805 1732.696 858.214 463 2195.605 887.401 13753 1729.609 853.218 266 2136.041 892.496 3259 1974.136 901.871 537 2140.171 823.854 17768 1788.698 818.771
Sex 117 0.299 0.460 4184 0.521 0.500 365 0.529 0.500 5805 0.502 0.500 463 0.564 0.496 13753 0.617 0.486 266 0.474 0.500 3259 0.546 0.498 537 0.482 0.500 17768 0.538 0.499
Consensual union 117 0.812 0.392 4184 0.821 0.383 365 0.786 0.410 5797 0.710 0.454 460 0.780 0.414 13705 0.703 0.457 266 0.722 0.449 3259 0.754 0.431 537 0.778 0.416 17768 0.796 0.403
Self-employed 117 1.915 0.281 4184 1.913 0.283 365 1.918 0.275 5804 1.930 0.256 463 1.771 0.421 13749 1.822 0.383 266 1.665 0.473 3259 1.744 0.436 537 1.912 0.283 17767 1.916 0.277
Cash employee income 365 7.385 2.197 5805 7.655 2.127 463 7.185 4.027 13753 7.762 3.695 537 8.764 2.882 17768 8.878 2.826
NON-cash employee income 313 0.060 0.282 4910 0.078 0.333 399 0.081 0.784 11917 0.089 0.708 161 0.030 0.295 4391 0.016 0.260
Disability (Log) 365 0.018 0.134 5805 0.006 0.070 463 0.068 0.605 13753 0.006 0.214 537 0.034 0.411 17768 0.016 0.550
Sickness (Log) 365 0.029 0.099 5805 0.015 0.072 463 0.049 0.486 13753 0.020 0.387 537 0.220 1.353 17768 0.075 0.982
Unemployment (Log) 365 0.012 0.112 5805 0.011 0.169 463 0.056 0.379 13753 0.108 0.664 537 0.238 1.720 17768 0.273 1.882
Family size 117 1.897 0.532 4184 1.974 0.588 365 2.712 1.156 5805 2.745 1.076 463 2.607 1.059 13753 2.675 1.050 266 1.880 0.701 3259 1.914 0.659 537 2.313 0.870 17768 2.289 0.871
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 117 54.050 109.402 4184 48.591 28.456 365 6.877 4.964 5805 8.698 7.661 460 24.963 20.844 13735 27.807 18.708 266 35.426 22.609 3259 40.499 41.375 537 30.964 21.290 17768 35.014 21.544
H. income minus other transfers 117 54.263 109.373 4184 48.763 28.473 365 7.393 5.078 5805 9.113 7.646 460 26.556 21.083 13735 29.471 18.747 266 35.902 22.596 3259 41.191 41.313 537 32.299 21.240 17768 36.173 21.805
H. income 117 58.546 108.860 4184 51.947 27.956 365 7.953 5.143 5805 9.665 7.712 460 27.653 21.025 13735 30.364 18.771 266 38.770 22.732 3259 44.292 41.150 537 35.794 20.975 17768 39.382 21.577
Marriage status 117 1.897 0.547 4183 1.838 0.541 339 1.988 0.516 5454 1.817 0.619 463 1.877 0.534 13748 1.748 0.537 266 1.868 0.645 3259 1.813 0.609 537 1.873 0.604 17766 1.752 0.584
1. Never 117 0.205 0.406 4183 0.241 0.428 339 0.139 0.346 5454 0.300 0.458 463 0.212 0.409 13748 0.302 0.459 266 0.282 0.451 3259 0.297 0.457 537 0.253 0.435 17766 0.325 0.468
2. Married 117 0.692 0.464 4183 0.681 0.466 339 0.735 0.442 5454 0.584 0.493 463 0.700 0.459 13748 0.648 0.478 266 0.568 0.496 3259 0.594 0.491 537 0.620 0.486 17766 0.597 0.490
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 117 0.103 0.305 4183 0.079 0.269 339 0.127 0.333 5454 0.117 0.321 463 0.089 0.284 13748 0.050 0.218 266 0.150 0.358 3259 0.110 0.312 537 0.127 0.333 17766 0.078 0.268
Education 117 3.171 0.723 4169 3.219 0.691 364 3.228 0.643 5802 3.311 0.641 455 2.378 1.185 13667 2.820 1.088 265 3.004 0.859 3254 3.282 0.777 480 2.883 0.890 16807 3.171 0.791
1. Primary 117 0.000 0.000 4169 0.000 0.022 364 0.003 0.052 5802 0.005 0.068 455 0.330 0.471 13667 0.151 0.358 265 0.091 0.288 3254 0.037 0.190 480 0.108 0.311 16807 0.050 0.219
2. Low Secondary 117 0.188 0.392 4169 0.152 0.359 364 0.110 0.313 5802 0.084 0.278 455 0.215 0.412 13667 0.245 0.430 265 0.094 0.293 3254 0.088 0.284 480 0.135 0.343 16807 0.091 0.288
3. High Secondary 117 0.453 0.500 4169 0.476 0.499 364 0.544 0.499 5802 0.507 0.500 455 0.202 0.402 13667 0.237 0.426 265 0.536 0.500 3254 0.429 0.495 480 0.521 0.500 16807 0.495 0.500
4. Tertiary 117 0.359 0.482 4169 0.372 0.483 364 0.343 0.475 5802 0.404 0.491 455 0.253 0.435 13667 0.367 0.482 265 0.279 0.449 3254 0.445 0.497 480 0.235 0.425 16807 0.363 0.481
Occupations 117 4.154 2.062 4155 4.121 2.312 363 5.587 2.697 5798 4.901 2.722 463 5.551 2.715 13723 5.038 2.555 265 4.340 2.461 3258 3.884 2.439 536 5.409 2.622 17690 4.492 2.499
1. Manager 117 0.000 0.000 4155 0.006 0.077 363 0.006 0.074 5798 0.006 0.077 463 0.011 0.103 13723 0.009 0.094 265 0.008 0.087 3258 0.008 0.091 536 0.007 0.086 17690 0.014 0.118
2. Professionals 117 0.017 0.130 4155 0.069 0.253 363 0.099 0.299 5798 0.130 0.336 463 0.086 0.281 13723 0.061 0.239 265 0.155 0.362 3258 0.182 0.386 536 0.062 0.241 17690 0.080 0.271
3. Technicians and associate professionals 117 0.222 0.418 4155 0.202 0.402 363 0.091 0.288 5798 0.131 0.338 463 0.099 0.299 13723 0.149 0.356 265 0.151 0.359 3258 0.199 0.399 536 0.091 0.288 17690 0.152 0.359
4. Clerical support workers 117 0.265 0.443 4155 0.252 0.434 363 0.107 0.310 5798 0.134 0.340 463 0.063 0.243 13723 0.108 0.311 265 0.121 0.326 3258 0.148 0.355 536 0.146 0.353 17690 0.194 0.395
5. Service and sales workers 117 0.103 0.305 4155 0.112 0.315 363 0.030 0.172 5798 0.048 0.213 463 0.076 0.265 13723 0.120 0.325 265 0.049 0.216 3258 0.060 0.237 536 0.093 0.291 17690 0.129 0.335
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 117 0.188 0.392 4155 0.113 0.317 363 0.096 0.296 5798 0.119 0.324 463 0.160 0.367 13723 0.150 0.357 265 0.151 0.359 3258 0.130 0.337 536 0.132 0.339 17690 0.111 0.314
7. Craft and related trades 117 0.017 0.130 4155 0.022 0.146 363 0.058 0.234 5798 0.030 0.170 463 0.065 0.246 13723 0.033 0.179 265 0.151 0.359 3258 0.085 0.278 536 0.041 0.199 17690 0.041 0.197
8. Plant and machine operators 117 0.103 0.305 4155 0.102 0.302 363 0.196 0.397 5798 0.161 0.368 463 0.160 0.367 13723 0.162 0.369 265 0.113 0.317 3258 0.089 0.285 536 0.138 0.345 17690 0.108 0.310
9. Unskilled operators 117 0.043 0.203 4155 0.065 0.247 363 0.187 0.391 5798 0.160 0.366 463 0.058 0.235 13723 0.082 0.275 265 0.045 0.208 3258 0.057 0.232 536 0.123 0.329 17690 0.090 0.286
Permanent contract 107 1.000 0.000 3818 1.000 0.000 335 0.973 0.162 5346 0.972 0.165 357 0.768 0.423 11272 0.753 0.431 169 0.882 0.324 2353 0.867 0.340 475 0.903 0.296 15750 0.882 0.323
Temporary contract 107 0.000 0.000 3818 0.000 0.000 335 0.027 0.162 5346 0.028 0.165 357 0.232 0.423 11272 0.247 0.431 169 0.118 0.324 2353 0.133 0.340 475 0.097 0.296 15750 0.118 0.323
Disability
(no=0) 117 0.000 0.000 4184 0.000 0.000 365 0.973 0.163 5805 0.990 0.101 463 0.985 0.122 13753 0.999 0.034 266 0.000 0.000 3259 0.000 0.000 537 0.989 0.105 17768 0.997 0.054
(yes=1) 117 1.000 0.000 4184 1.000 0.000 365 0.027 0.163 5805 0.010 0.101 463 0.015 0.122 13753 0.001 0.034 266 1.000 0.000 3259 1.000 0.000 537 0.011 0.105 17768 0.003 0.054
Sickness
(no=0) 117 0.000 0.000 4184 0.000 0.000 365 0.819 0.385 5805 0.907 0.290 463 0.978 0.146 13753 0.994 0.080 266 0.000 0.000 3259 0.000 0.000 537 0.929 0.257 17768 0.966 0.182
(yes=1) 117 1.000 0.000 4184 1.000 0.000 365 0.181 0.385 5805 0.093 0.290 463 0.022 0.146 13753 0.006 0.080 266 1.000 0.000 3259 1.000 0.000 537 0.071 0.257 17768 0.034 0.182
Unemployment
(no=0) 117 0.000 0.000 4184 0.000 0.000 365 0.970 0.171 5805 0.986 0.118 463 0.970 0.171 13753 0.957 0.202 266 0.000 0.000 3259 0.000 0.000 537 0.953 0.211 17768 0.945 0.228
(yes=1) 117 1.000 0.000 4184 1.000 0.000 365 0.030 0.171 5805 0.014 0.118 463 0.030 0.171 13753 0.043 0.202 266 1.000 0.000 3259 1.000 0.000 537 0.047 0.211 17768 0.055 0.228
Urban area 117 0.333 0.473 4184 0.319 0.466 365 0.200 0.401 5805 0.350 0.477 463 0.467 0.499 13753 0.469 0.499 266 0.214 0.411 3259 0.249 0.433 537 0.436 0.496 17768 0.450 0.497
Dwelling type 117 0.786 0.412 4184 0.824 0.381 365 0.479 0.500 5805 0.404 0.491 463 0.400 0.490 13753 0.367 0.482 266 0.714 0.453 3259 0.737 0.440 537 0.702 0.458 17768 0.697 0.460
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Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls
Variables Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std.
Wave 2005 147 0.197 0.399 9108 0.212 0.409 226 0.000 0.000 6405 0.000 0.000 64 0.000 0.000 3238 0.000 0.000 38 0.000 0.000 2095 0.000 0.000 645 0.000 0.000 24140 0.000 0.000
Wave 2006 147 0.231 0.423 9108 0.188 0.391 226 0.000 0.000 6405 0.000 0.000 64 0.234 0.427 3238 0.254 0.435 38 0.342 0.481 2095 0.286 0.452 645 0.160 0.367 24140 0.294 0.456
Wave 2007 147 0.082 0.275 9108 0.190 0.392 226 0.252 0.435 6405 0.296 0.457 64 0.328 0.473 3238 0.276 0.447 38 0.079 0.273 2095 0.238 0.426 645 0.327 0.470 24140 0.254 0.435
Wave 2008 147 0.211 0.409 9108 0.212 0.409 226 0.416 0.494 6405 0.343 0.475 64 0.250 0.436 3238 0.238 0.426 38 0.184 0.393 2095 0.232 0.422 645 0.276 0.447 24140 0.230 0.421
Wave 2009 147 0.279 0.450 9108 0.198 0.399 226 0.332 0.472 6405 0.361 0.480 64 0.188 0.393 3238 0.232 0.422 38 0.395 0.495 2095 0.244 0.430 645 0.237 0.426 24140 0.222 0.416
General Health 147 0.306 0.462 9108 0.027 0.162 225 0.702 0.458 6393 0.269 0.443 64 0.141 0.350 3238 0.028 0.164 38 0.395 0.495 2094 0.054 0.226 645 0.512 0.500 24136 0.167 0.373
Age 147 49.340 9.022 9108 40.727 10.357 226 45.717 9.327 6405 39.679 10.185 64 46.875 10.150 3238 43.111 10.844 38 46.737 11.354 2095 42.492 11.162 645 45.191 9.520 24140 40.079 10.070
Age squared 147 2515.299 834.557 9108 1765.920 859.245 226 2176.628 804.884 6405 1678.176 816.287 64 2298.688 911.433 3238 1976.086 906.173 38 2309.842 1007.923 2095 1930.079 943.789 645 2132.685 824.725 24140 1707.688 814.614
Sex 147 0.551 0.499 9108 0.620 0.485 226 0.487 0.501 6405 0.545 0.498 64 0.594 0.495 3238 0.571 0.495 38 0.474 0.506 2095 0.553 0.497 645 0.532 0.499 24140 0.606 0.489
Consensual union 147 0.837 0.371 9108 0.721 0.448 226 0.788 0.410 6405 0.680 0.467 64 0.766 0.427 3238 0.790 0.407 37 0.757 0.435 2092 0.787 0.409 645 0.701 0.458 24136 0.642 0.480
Self-employed 147 1.483 0.501 9108 1.624 0.484 225 1.902 0.298 6347 1.899 0.301 64 1.797 0.406 3238 1.823 0.381 38 1.816 0.393 2095 1.851 0.357 645 1.743 0.438 24063 1.748 0.434
Cash employee income 147 4.458 4.654 9108 5.786 4.541 64 7.607 4.105 3238 8.258 3.785 645 7.158 4.168 24140 7.260 4.142
NON-cash employee income 147 0.001 0.010 9108 0.026 0.212 64 0.115 0.517 3238 0.185 1.475 645 0.063 0.288 24140 0.079 0.402
Disability (Log) 147 0.085 0.671 9108 0.003 0.121 64 0.273 1.153 3238 0.061 0.548 645 0.223 1.168 24140 0.036 0.465
Sickness (Log) 147 0.000 0.000 9108 0.002 0.092 64 0.000 0.000 3238 0.004 0.098
Unemployment (Log) 147 0.064 0.292 9108 0.060 0.385 64 0.697 2.515 3238 0.387 3.866 645 0.381 1.689 24140 0.400 2.226
Family size 147 2.878 1.104 9108 2.673 1.061 226 2.699 1.027 6405 2.699 1.059 64 2.125 0.826 3238 2.311 0.834 38 1.947 0.769 2095 2.213 0.819 645 2.581 0.990 24140 2.580 1.027
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 147 19.066 16.880 9108 22.340 17.592 226 7.427 5.748 6405 8.806 7.129 64 32.383 20.002 3238 50.702 51.262 38 45.899 23.457 2094 58.096 39.653 645 32.478 23.417 24140 34.057 25.897
H. income minus other transfers 147 21.347 17.080 9108 24.211 17.850 226 8.160 5.911 6405 9.487 7.224 64 34.488 20.878 3238 52.656 51.571 38 46.989 22.672 2094 59.452 40.094 645 35.647 23.771 24140 37.320 26.804
H. income 147 22.397 16.958 9108 24.770 17.832 226 9.129 5.864 6405 10.421 7.155 64 43.249 35.572 3238 57.020 51.622 38 49.684 22.034 2094 62.907 39.698 645 37.564 24.029 24140 38.970 27.104
Marriage status 147 1.980 0.460 9108 1.784 0.505 226 2.062 0.546 6405 1.867 0.635 64 1.953 0.653 3238 1.797 0.540 37 1.838 0.646 2092 1.699 0.576 645 1.864 0.549 24140 1.744 0.557
1. Never 147 0.116 0.321 9108 0.259 0.438 226 0.119 0.325 6405 0.277 0.447 64 0.234 0.427 3238 0.268 0.443 37 0.297 0.463 2092 0.362 0.481 645 0.228 0.420 24140 0.316 0.465
2. Married 147 0.789 0.409 9108 0.698 0.459 226 0.699 0.460 6405 0.579 0.494 64 0.578 0.498 3238 0.667 0.471 37 0.568 0.502 2092 0.577 0.494 645 0.681 0.467 24140 0.624 0.484
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 147 0.095 0.295 9108 0.043 0.203 226 0.181 0.386 6405 0.144 0.351 64 0.188 0.393 3238 0.065 0.247 37 0.135 0.347 2092 0.061 0.239 645 0.091 0.289 24140 0.060 0.238
Education 145 2.021 1.175 9080 2.692 1.152 226 3.049 0.605 6405 3.143 0.626 64 2.484 1.113 3215 2.987 1.054 38 2.553 0.724 2091 2.805 0.816 641 2.596 0.917 24105 2.800 0.863
1. Primary 145 0.510 0.502 9080 0.249 0.432 226 0.004 0.067 6405 0.007 0.084 64 0.234 0.427 3215 0.124 0.330 38 0.000 0.000 2091 0.005 0.069 641 0.117 0.322 24105 0.067 0.250
2. Low Secondary 145 0.124 0.331 9080 0.118 0.323 226 0.146 0.354 6405 0.114 0.317 64 0.297 0.460 3215 0.188 0.391 38 0.579 0.500 2091 0.435 0.496 641 0.353 0.478 24105 0.292 0.455
3. High Secondary 145 0.200 0.401 9080 0.325 0.468 226 0.646 0.479 6405 0.608 0.488 64 0.219 0.417 3215 0.263 0.441 38 0.289 0.460 2091 0.310 0.463 641 0.348 0.477 24105 0.416 0.493
4. Tertiary 145 0.166 0.373 9080 0.308 0.462 226 0.204 0.404 6405 0.271 0.445 64 0.250 0.436 3215 0.424 0.494 38 0.132 0.343 2091 0.250 0.433 641 0.183 0.387 24105 0.225 0.418
Occupations 147 5.279 2.254 9108 4.865 2.409 225 5.471 2.608 6393 4.934 2.547 64 5.109 2.778 3238 4.111 2.683 37 4.216 2.382 2078 4.015 2.451 644 5.143 2.530 24007 4.617 2.481
1. Manager 147 0.000 0.000 9108 0.010 0.099 225 0.009 0.094 6393 0.012 0.110 64 0.000 0.000 3238 0.002 0.050 37 0.000 0.000 2078 0.000 0.000 644 0.006 0.079 24007 0.012 0.110
2. Professionals 147 0.102 0.304 9108 0.078 0.269 225 0.053 0.225 6393 0.077 0.267 64 0.125 0.333 3238 0.212 0.408 37 0.189 0.397 2078 0.159 0.366 644 0.081 0.273 24007 0.084 0.278
3. Technicians and associate professionals 147 0.082 0.275 9108 0.159 0.365 225 0.111 0.315 6393 0.139 0.346 64 0.141 0.350 3238 0.188 0.391 37 0.108 0.315 2078 0.204 0.403 644 0.068 0.252 24007 0.108 0.310
4. Clerical support workers 147 0.034 0.182 9108 0.071 0.258 225 0.124 0.331 6393 0.137 0.344 64 0.063 0.244 3238 0.059 0.235 37 0.135 0.347 2078 0.157 0.364 644 0.177 0.382 24007 0.226 0.418
5. Service and sales workers 147 0.068 0.253 9108 0.104 0.305 225 0.084 0.279 6393 0.084 0.277 64 0.078 0.270 3238 0.131 0.338 37 0.108 0.315 2078 0.083 0.276 644 0.118 0.323 24007 0.121 0.326
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 147 0.129 0.337 9108 0.132 0.338 225 0.124 0.331 6393 0.127 0.333 64 0.188 0.393 3238 0.138 0.345 37 0.108 0.315 2078 0.123 0.328 644 0.102 0.304 24007 0.101 0.301
7. Craft and related trades 147 0.293 0.456 9108 0.148 0.355 225 0.027 0.161 6393 0.027 0.161 64 0.000 0.000 3238 0.005 0.072 37 0.108 0.315 2078 0.051 0.219 644 0.053 0.224 24007 0.024 0.152
8. Plant and machine operators 147 0.170 0.377 9108 0.160 0.367 225 0.164 0.372 6393 0.200 0.400 64 0.125 0.333 3238 0.107 0.310 37 0.162 0.374 2078 0.117 0.321 644 0.179 0.383 24007 0.161 0.368
9. Unskilled operators 147 0.054 0.228 9108 0.072 0.259 225 0.169 0.375 6393 0.129 0.335 64 0.141 0.350 3238 0.068 0.252 37 0.081 0.277 2078 0.049 0.215 644 0.099 0.299 24007 0.091 0.288
Permanent contract 147 0.704 0.460 5681 0.794 0.404 198 0.919 0.273 5629 0.918 0.274 49 0.959 0.200 2580 0.947 0.224 30 0.933 0.254 1781 0.914 0.281 479 0.860 0.347 17994 0.874 0.332
Temporary contract 147 0.296 0.460 5681 0.206 0.404 198 0.081 0.273 5629 0.082 0.274 49 0.041 0.200 2580 0.053 0.224 30 0.067 0.254 1781 0.086 0.281 479 0.140 0.347 17994 0.126 0.332
Disability
(no=0) 147 0.980 0.142 9108 0.999 0.026 226 0.000 0.000 6405 0.000 0.000 64 0.875 0.333 3238 0.952 0.213 38 0.000 0.000 2095 0.000 0.000 645 0.943 0.233 24140 0.988 0.107
(yes=1) 147 0.020 0.142 9108 0.001 0.026 226 1.000 0.000 6405 1.000 0.000 64 0.125 0.333 3238 0.048 0.213 38 1.000 0.000 2095 1.000 0.000 645 0.057 0.233 24140 0.012 0.107
Sickness
(no=0) 147 1.000 0.000 9108 0.998 0.047 226 0.000 0.000 6405 0.000 0.000 64 1.000 0.000 3238 0.997 0.055 38 0.000 0.000 2095 0.000 0.000 645 0.000 0.000 24140 0.000 0.000
(yes=1) 147 0.000 0.000 9108 0.002 0.047 226 1.000 0.000 6405 1.000 0.000 64 0.000 0.000 3238 0.003 0.055 38 1.000 0.000 2095 1.000 0.000 645 1.000 0.000 24140 1.000 0.000
Unemployment
(no=0) 147 0.946 0.228 9108 0.966 0.181 226 0.000 0.000 6405 0.000 0.000 64 0.906 0.294 3238 0.933 0.250 38 0.000 0.000 2095 0.000 0.000 645 0.868 0.339 24140 0.868 0.339
(yes=1) 147 0.054 0.228 9108 0.034 0.181 226 1.000 0.000 6405 1.000 0.000 64 0.094 0.294 3238 0.067 0.250 38 1.000 0.000 2095 1.000 0.000 645 0.132 0.339 24140 0.132 0.339
Urban area 147 0.272 0.447 9108 0.356 0.479 226 0.265 0.443 6405 0.316 0.465 64 0.266 0.445 3238 0.300 0.458 38 0.500 0.507 2095 0.590 0.492 645 0.302 0.460 24140 0.332 0.471
Dwelling type 147 0.592 0.493 9108 0.491 0.500 226 0.71 0.45 6405 0.68 0.47 64 1.000 0.000 3238 0.989 0.106 38 0.553 0.504 2095 0.600 0.490 645 0.498 0.500 24140 0.492 0.500
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Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls
Variables Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std.
Wave 2005 135 0.000 0.000 4545 0.000 0.000 389 0.206 0.405 9139 0.178 0.382 193 0.000 0.000 2984 0.000 0.000 216 0.000 0.000 5309 0.000 0.000 178 0.298 0.459 7983 0.214 0.410
Wave 2006 135 0.000 0.000 4545 0.000 0.000 389 0.172 0.378 9139 0.193 0.395 193 0.000 0.000 2984 0.000 0.000 216 0.000 0.000 5309 0.000 0.000 178 0.208 0.407 7983 0.210 0.407
Wave 2007 135 0.400 0.492 4545 0.284 0.451 389 0.198 0.399 9139 0.204 0.403 193 0.415 0.494 2984 0.287 0.453 216 0.241 0.429 5309 0.381 0.486 178 0.242 0.429 7983 0.211 0.408
Wave 2008 135 0.281 0.451 4545 0.335 0.472 389 0.270 0.444 9139 0.219 0.413 193 0.316 0.466 2984 0.316 0.465 216 0.273 0.447 5309 0.323 0.468 178 0.112 0.317 7983 0.204 0.403
Wave 2009 135 0.319 0.468 4545 0.381 0.486 389 0.154 0.362 9139 0.206 0.405 193 0.269 0.445 2984 0.396 0.489 216 0.486 0.501 5309 0.296 0.456 178 0.140 0.348 7983 0.161 0.368
General Health 135 0.696 0.462 4545 0.376 0.484 389 0.316 0.466 9138 0.068 0.252 193 0.741 0.439 2984 0.379 0.485 215 0.321 0.468 5308 0.038 0.191 178 0.376 0.486 7982 0.076 0.265
Age 135 49.556 8.988 4545 42.905 10.227 389 43.010 10.004 9139 38.870 10.069 193 47.155 10.687 2984 39.915 11.151 216 45.574 10.111 5309 41.751 9.743 178 44.303 11.140 7983 41.893 10.883
Age squared 135 2535.941 830.644 4545 1945.374 862.080 389 1949.704 838.278 9139 1612.242 808.105 193 2337.259 935.771 2984 1717.472 901.334 216 2178.759 887.363 5309 1838.028 823.114 178 2086.191 958.914 7983 1873.426 923.786
Sex 135 0.452 0.500 4545 0.483 0.500 389 0.535 0.499 9139 0.606 0.489 193 0.420 0.495 2984 0.486 0.500 216 0.440 0.498 5309 0.552 0.497 178 0.455 0.499 7983 0.563 0.496
Consensual union 135 0.830 0.377 4545 0.751 0.432 389 0.219 0.414 9137 0.292 0.455 193 0.617 0.487 2984 0.618 0.486 216 0.639 0.481 5309 0.745 0.436 178 0.747 0.436 7983 0.759 0.428
Self-employed 135 1.881 0.324 4545 1.901 0.299 389 1.913 0.283 9139 1.914 0.281 193 1.865 0.342 2983 1.914 0.281 215 1.916 0.278 5287 1.911 0.285 178 1.916 0.279 7968 1.919 0.274
Cash employee income 135 7.018 2.555 4545 7.137 2.602 389 9.492 2.547 9139 9.667 2.447 193 6.719 2.742 2984 7.204 2.468
NON-cash employee income 366 0.046 0.376 8444 0.088 1.626 156 0.005 0.038 2493 0.022 0.163
Disability (Log) 389 0.100 1.029 9139 0.080 2.336 193 0.051 0.257 2984 0.005 0.077
Sickness (Log) 118 0.043 0.103 992 0.053 0.186 389 0.000 0.000 9139 0.005 0.247 193 0.021 0.094 2984 0.011 0.080
Unemployment (Log) 118 0.006 0.060 3701 0.006 0.101 389 0.263 2.054 9139 0.150 1.588 193 0.041 0.185 2984 0.026 0.233
Family size 135 2.274 0.805 4545 2.578 0.949 389 2.509 1.062 9139 2.374 1.003 193 2.306 1.028 2984 2.623 1.162 216 1.787 0.696 5309 1.906 0.630 178 1.955 0.679 7983 1.944 0.684
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 135 6.681 5.070 4545 7.279 5.082 389 52.169 34.220 9139 59.298 41.383 193 5.261 4.705 2984 7.425 6.206 216 33.582 19.351 5309 37.410 22.597 178 56.272 77.125 7982 54.802 58.994
H. income minus other transfers 135 6.978 5.071 4545 7.755 5.139 389 55.426 34.103 9139 62.249 41.410 193 5.696 4.703 2984 7.945 6.295 216 34.330 19.360 5309 38.006 22.414 178 57.880 76.746 7982 55.471 58.910
H. income 135 7.308 5.111 4545 8.099 5.159 389 61.749 33.948 9139 68.103 41.832 193 6.081 4.734 2984 8.365 6.409 216 36.555 19.027 5309 39.785 22.244 178 64.706 76.218 7983 61.305 58.518
Marriage status 135 2.052 0.411 4545 1.971 0.498 389 1.938 0.602 9139 1.803 0.610 192 2.104 0.663 2984 1.937 0.684 216 1.884 0.682 5309 1.794 0.593 178 1.826 0.590 7983 1.728 0.619
1. Never 135 0.059 0.237 4545 0.139 0.346 389 0.213 0.410 9139 0.304 0.460 192 0.172 0.378 2984 0.268 0.443 216 0.296 0.458 5309 0.300 0.458 178 0.275 0.448 7983 0.365 0.481
2. Married 135 0.830 0.377 4545 0.751 0.432 389 0.635 0.482 9139 0.589 0.492 192 0.552 0.499 2984 0.528 0.499 216 0.523 0.501 5309 0.606 0.489 178 0.624 0.486 7983 0.542 0.498
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 135 0.111 0.315 4545 0.110 0.313 389 0.152 0.359 9139 0.107 0.309 192 0.276 0.448 2984 0.204 0.403 216 0.181 0.386 5309 0.094 0.292 178 0.101 0.302 7983 0.093 0.290
Education 135 3.563 0.581 4544 3.596 0.593 384 2.487 1.152 9083 2.892 1.089 193 3.031 0.756 2984 3.240 0.714 212 3.142 0.842 5251 3.285 0.777 174 3.328 0.610 7898 3.349 0.631
1. Primary 135 0.000 0.000 4544 0.002 0.044 384 0.310 0.463 9083 0.183 0.387 193 0.052 0.222 2984 0.028 0.166 212 0.038 0.191 5251 0.023 0.149 174 0.006 0.076 7898 0.002 0.042
2. Low Secondary 135 0.044 0.207 4544 0.050 0.217 384 0.120 0.325 9083 0.102 0.303 193 0.114 0.319 2984 0.078 0.268 212 0.179 0.384 5251 0.131 0.337 174 0.057 0.233 7898 0.080 0.271
3. High Secondary 135 0.348 0.478 4544 0.299 0.458 384 0.344 0.476 9083 0.353 0.478 193 0.585 0.494 2984 0.519 0.500 212 0.387 0.488 5251 0.384 0.486 174 0.540 0.500 7898 0.486 0.500
4. Tertiary 135 0.607 0.490 4544 0.650 0.477 384 0.227 0.419 9083 0.361 0.480 193 0.249 0.433 2984 0.375 0.484 212 0.396 0.490 5251 0.462 0.499 174 0.397 0.491 7898 0.433 0.495
Occupations 135 5.252 2.602 4545 4.870 2.708 389 5.072 2.648 9133 4.337 2.478 193 5.472 2.698 2981 4.961 2.607 208 4.106 2.375 5203 3.547 2.137 168 4.196 2.131 7662 3.912 2.208
1. Manager 135 0.000 0.000 4545 0.003 0.051 389 0.000 0.000 9133 0.006 0.078 193 0.000 0.000 2981 0.002 0.048 208 0.000 0.000 5203 0.004 0.065 168 0.000 0.000 7662 0.002 0.050
2. Professionals 135 0.044 0.207 4545 0.095 0.293 389 0.051 0.221 9133 0.065 0.247 193 0.093 0.292 2981 0.085 0.278 208 0.106 0.308 5203 0.119 0.324 168 0.071 0.258 7662 0.123 0.329
3. Technicians and associate professionals 135 0.207 0.407 4545 0.209 0.407 389 0.147 0.354 9133 0.205 0.403 193 0.114 0.319 2981 0.140 0.347 208 0.202 0.402 5203 0.265 0.441 168 0.155 0.363 7662 0.171 0.377
4. Clerical support workers 135 0.074 0.263 4545 0.096 0.295 389 0.198 0.399 9133 0.223 0.416 193 0.098 0.299 2981 0.169 0.375 208 0.188 0.391 5203 0.226 0.418 168 0.274 0.447 7662 0.255 0.436
5. Service and sales workers 135 0.059 0.237 4545 0.060 0.237 389 0.100 0.301 9133 0.119 0.323 193 0.057 0.232 2981 0.052 0.222 208 0.144 0.352 5203 0.134 0.341 168 0.054 0.226 7662 0.073 0.260
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 135 0.141 0.349 4545 0.104 0.306 389 0.080 0.271 9133 0.089 0.285 193 0.098 0.299 2981 0.138 0.345 208 0.125 0.332 5203 0.090 0.286 168 0.208 0.407 7662 0.161 0.367
7. Craft and related trades 135 0.067 0.250 4545 0.048 0.214 389 0.049 0.216 9133 0.029 0.169 193 0.083 0.276 2981 0.035 0.183 208 0.019 0.138 5203 0.011 0.104 168 0.060 0.237 7662 0.029 0.167
8. Plant and machine operators 135 0.163 0.371 4545 0.166 0.372 389 0.134 0.341 9133 0.112 0.315 193 0.192 0.395 2981 0.163 0.369 208 0.072 0.259 5203 0.070 0.255 168 0.071 0.258 7662 0.097 0.296
9. Unskilled operators 135 0.111 0.315 4545 0.112 0.315 389 0.069 0.254 9133 0.054 0.226 193 0.083 0.276 2981 0.108 0.311 208 0.087 0.282 5203 0.050 0.218 168 0.083 0.277 7662 0.064 0.244
Permanent contract 119 0.958 0.201 4093 0.946 0.227 354 0.924 0.266 8322 0.908 0.288 166 0.910 0.288 2723 0.936 0.245 195 0.872 0.335 4800 0.905 0.293 162 0.895 0.307 7266 0.911 0.284
Temporary contract 119 0.042 0.201 4093 0.054 0.227 354 0.076 0.266 8322 0.092 0.288 166 0.090 0.288 2723 0.064 0.245 195 0.128 0.335 4800 0.095 0.293 162 0.105 0.307 7266 0.089 0.284
Disability
(no=0) 135 0.000 0.000 4545 0.000 0.000 389 0.982 0.133 9139 0.993 0.083 193 0.953 0.211 2984 0.995 0.073 216 0.000 0.000 5309 0.000 0.000 178 0.000 0.000 7983 0.000 0.000
(yes=1) 135 1.000 0.000 4545 1.000 0.000 389 0.018 0.133 9139 0.007 0.083 193 0.047 0.211 2984 0.005 0.073 216 1.000 0.000 5309 1.000 0.000 178 1.000 0.000 7983 1.000 0.000
Sickness
(no=0) 135 0.156 0.364 4545 0.174 0.379 389 1.000 0.000 9139 0.999 0.030 193 0.896 0.306 2984 0.936 0.244 216 0.000 0.000 5309 0.000 0.000 178 0.000 0.000 7983 0.000 0.000
(yes=1) 135 0.844 0.364 4545 0.826 0.379 389 0.000 0.000 9139 0.001 0.030 193 0.104 0.306 2984 0.064 0.244 216 1.000 0.000 5309 1.000 0.000 178 1.000 0.000 7983 1.000 0.000
Unemployment
(no=0) 135 0.867 0.341 4545 0.807 0.395 389 0.977 0.151 9139 0.981 0.137 193 0.927 0.260 2984 0.957 0.202 216 0.000 0.000 5309 0.000 0.000 178 0.000 0.000 7983 0.000 0.000
(yes=1) 135 0.133 0.341 4545 0.193 0.395 389 0.023 0.151 9139 0.019 0.137 193 0.073 0.260 2984 0.043 0.202 216 1.000 0.000 5309 1.000 0.000 178 1.000 0.000 7983 1.000 0.000
Urban area 135 0.578 0.496 4545 0.494 0.500 389 0.506 0.501 9139 0.457 0.498 193 0.415 0.494 2984 0.492 0.500 178 0.466 0.500 7983 0.520 0.500
Dwelling type 135 0.333 0.473 4545 0.382 0.486 389 0.692 0.462 9139 0.652 0.476 193 0.295 0.457 2984 0.342 0.474 216 0.819 0.386 5309 0.837 0.370 178 0.888 0.317 7983 0.833 0.373
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Variables Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std. Obs Mean Std.
Wave 2005 242 0.000 0.000 13855 0.000 0.000 268 0.000 0.000 6549 0.000 0.000 47 0.000 0.000 2982 0.000 0.000 114 0.000 0.000 4953 0.000 0.000 142 0.000 0.000 3049 0.000 0.000
Wave 2006 242 0.000 0.000 13855 0.000 0.000 268 0.198 0.399 6549 0.238 0.426 47 0.000 0.000 2982 0.000 0.000 114 0.237 0.427 4953 0.251 0.434 142 0.000 0.000 3049 0.000 0.000
Wave 2007 242 0.426 0.495 13855 0.331 0.471 268 0.198 0.399 6549 0.244 0.430 47 0.000 0.000 2982 0.000 0.000 114 0.439 0.498 4953 0.233 0.423 142 0.303 0.461 3049 0.346 0.476
Wave 2008 242 0.302 0.460 13855 0.337 0.473 268 0.321 0.468 6549 0.315 0.464 47 0.000 0.000 2982 0.000 0.000 114 0.184 0.389 4953 0.235 0.424 142 0.366 0.483 3049 0.330 0.470
Wave 2009 242 0.273 0.446 13855 0.332 0.471 268 0.284 0.452 6549 0.202 0.402 47 1.000 0.000 2982 1.000 0.000 114 0.140 0.349 4953 0.280 0.449 142 0.331 0.472 3049 0.325 0.468
General Health 242 0.682 0.467 13855 0.254 0.435 268 0.634 0.483 6548 0.273 0.446 47 0.489 0.505 2982 0.080 0.271 113 0.319 0.468 4853 0.067 0.251 142 0.585 0.495 3049 0.203 0.402
Age 242 46.802 8.597 13855 39.889 10.032 268 47.231 10.999 6549 39.783 11.180 47 49.638 8.845 2982 39.358 10.335 114 43.895 11.847 4953 42.294 11.282 142 43.634 9.064 3049 40.590 9.426
Age squared 242 2264.000 761.389 13855 1691.748 802.679 268 2351.321 994.124 6549 1707.667 904.426 47 2540.532 817.904 2982 1655.872 830.432 114 2065.860 1023.029 4953 1916.008 964.605 142 1985.493 768.702 3049 1736.404 769.895
Sex 242 0.537 0.500 13855 0.542 0.498 268 0.493 0.501 6549 0.561 0.496 47 0.553 0.503 2982 0.581 0.493 114 0.535 0.501 4953 0.533 0.499 142 0.528 0.501 3049 0.525 0.499
Consensual union 242 0.839 0.368 13855 0.766 0.424 268 0.728 0.446 6549 0.718 0.450 47 0.787 0.414 2982 0.728 0.445 114 0.939 0.241 4953 0.874 0.331 141 0.766 0.425 3042 0.731 0.444
Self-employed 242 1.686 0.465 13855 1.775 0.417 268 1.728 0.446 6549 1.812 0.391 47 1.574 0.500 2982 1.746 0.435 114 1.912 0.284 4949 1.903 0.296 142 1.951 0.217 3035 1.924 0.265
Cash employee income 242 5.710 3.736 13855 6.193 3.490 268 6.263 4.022 6549 7.232 3.594 47 3.977 3.810 2982 5.764 3.378 114 9.435 1.562 4953 9.396 2.077 142 8.688 1.769 3049 8.484 2.383
NON-cash employee income 242 0.022 0.206 11469 0.029 0.204 76 0.038 0.332 1318 0.071 0.536 47 0.000 0.000 2980 0.065 0.987 102 0.113 0.522 4367 0.232 0.830 118 0.023 0.172 2498 0.046 0.359
Disability (Log) 242 0.157 0.740 13855 0.007 0.115 268 0.047 0.385 6549 0.001 0.062 47 0.035 0.168 2982 0.000 0.017 114 0.081 0.556 4953 0.046 0.526 142 0.035 0.309 3049 0.015 0.213
Sickness (Log) 242 0.004 0.035 13855 0.001 0.028 268 0.047 0.389 6547 0.008 0.159 47 0.000 0.000 2982 0.001 0.013 114 0.953 2.207 4953 0.234 0.931 142 0.236 0.674 3049 0.098 0.463
Unemployment (Log) 242 0.021 0.165 13855 0.017 0.148 268 0.143 0.766 6549 0.068 0.615 47 0.013 0.087 2982 0.002 0.037 114 0.274 1.265 4953 0.292 1.325 142 0.020 0.237 3049 0.023 0.227
Family size 242 2.971 1.270 13855 2.927 1.185 268 2.761 0.965 6549 2.879 1.113 47 2.787 1.382 2982 2.749 1.145 114 1.868 0.759 4953 1.926 0.687 142 2.873 0.995 3049 2.745 1.030
H. income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 242 6.949 5.167 13855 7.206 5.999 268 13.549 10.161 6549 19.410 17.094 47 3.335 3.402 2982 4.277 3.997 114 31.553 15.682 4953 37.069 21.425 142 19.658 10.102 3049 22.397 12.411
H. income minus other transfers 242 7.823 5.567 13855 8.061 6.042 268 15.527 10.580 6549 20.932 17.460 47 3.680 3.270 2979 4.624 4.021 114 32.572 16.009 4953 37.749 21.512 142 20.565 10.555 3049 23.748 12.416
H. income 242 8.489 5.454 13855 8.566 5.927 268 16.554 10.614 6549 21.916 17.385 47 3.935 3.237 2982 4.874 4.018 114 37.389 15.083 4953 41.910 21.178 142 22.884 9.818 3049 25.712 12.116
Marriage status 242 2.000 0.427 13855 1.870 0.479 268 1.929 0.539 6549 1.800 0.524 47 2.043 0.464 2982 1.844 0.535 114 2.035 0.921 4953 1.953 0.866 141 1.801 0.600 3043 1.697 0.561
1. Never 242 0.091 0.288 13855 0.188 0.391 268 0.183 0.387 6549 0.257 0.437 47 0.085 0.282 2982 0.233 0.423 114 0.404 0.493 4953 0.399 0.490 141 0.298 0.459 3043 0.355 0.479
2. Married 242 0.818 0.386 13855 0.753 0.431 268 0.705 0.457 6549 0.686 0.464 47 0.787 0.414 2982 0.689 0.463 114 0.158 0.366 4953 0.249 0.432 141 0.603 0.491 3043 0.593 0.491
3. Separated/Widowed/Divorced 242 0.091 0.288 13855 0.058 0.234 268 0.112 0.316 6549 0.057 0.232 47 0.128 0.337 2982 0.077 0.267 114 0.439 0.498 4953 0.352 0.478 141 0.099 0.300 3043 0.052 0.221
Education 242 3.012 0.733 13854 3.083 0.759 253 1.498 0.862 6375 1.958 1.103 47 2.543 0.690 2976 2.983 0.696 114 3.096 0.752 4948 3.292 0.725 141 2.887 0.820 3046 3.098 0.756
1. Primary 242 0.087 0.283 13854 0.083 0.275 253 0.696 0.461 6375 0.489 0.500 47 0.065 0.250 2976 0.020 0.141 114 0.035 0.185 4948 0.027 0.163 141 0.092 0.290 3046 0.063 0.243
2. Low Secondary 242 0.000 0.000 13854 0.003 0.054 253 0.162 0.369 6375 0.205 0.404 47 0.370 0.488 2976 0.190 0.392 114 0.132 0.340 4948 0.077 0.267 141 0.121 0.327 3046 0.052 0.222
3. High Secondary 242 0.726 0.447 13854 0.664 0.472 253 0.091 0.288 6375 0.165 0.371 47 0.522 0.505 2976 0.577 0.494 114 0.535 0.501 4948 0.472 0.499 141 0.596 0.492 3046 0.609 0.488
4. Tertiary 242 0.187 0.390 13854 0.251 0.433 253 0.051 0.221 6375 0.141 0.348 47 0.043 0.206 2976 0.213 0.410 114 0.298 0.460 4948 0.424 0.494 141 0.191 0.395 3046 0.276 0.447
Occupations 242 5.415 2.240 13835 5.195 2.415 268 5.963 2.401 6549 5.390 2.459 47 6.213 1.853 2982 5.553 2.326 113 4.788 2.403 4930 4.198 2.264 137 5.270 2.496 2931 4.715 2.446
1. Manager 242 0.004 0.064 13835 0.003 0.058 268 0.000 0.000 6549 0.006 0.078 47 0.000 0.000 2982 0.005 0.073 113 0.000 0.000 4930 0.005 0.070 137 0.007 0.085 2931 0.004 0.066
2. Professionals 242 0.025 0.156 13835 0.052 0.223 268 0.067 0.251 6549 0.069 0.254 47 0.000 0.000 2982 0.026 0.161 113 0.027 0.161 4930 0.052 0.221 137 0.022 0.147 2931 0.047 0.213
3. Technicians and associate professionals 242 0.124 0.331 13835 0.148 0.355 268 0.037 0.190 6549 0.089 0.285 47 0.064 0.247 2982 0.117 0.322 113 0.195 0.398 4930 0.234 0.423 137 0.102 0.304 2931 0.159 0.365
4. Clerical support workers 242 0.095 0.294 13835 0.108 0.311 268 0.075 0.263 6549 0.090 0.287 47 0.043 0.204 2982 0.114 0.318 113 0.195 0.398 4930 0.214 0.410 137 0.219 0.415 2931 0.211 0.408
5. Service and sales workers 242 0.091 0.289 13835 0.070 0.255 268 0.082 0.275 6549 0.100 0.300 47 0.021 0.146 2982 0.042 0.201 113 0.062 0.242 4930 0.081 0.272 137 0.117 0.322 2931 0.115 0.319
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 242 0.083 0.276 13835 0.103 0.304 268 0.138 0.346 6549 0.159 0.366 47 0.149 0.360 2982 0.114 0.318 113 0.186 0.391 4930 0.163 0.370 137 0.088 0.284 2931 0.122 0.327
7. Craft and related trades 242 0.212 0.409 13835 0.151 0.359 268 0.108 0.311 6549 0.054 0.226 47 0.298 0.462 2982 0.171 0.377 113 0.009 0.094 4930 0.022 0.146 137 0.007 0.085 2931 0.017 0.130
8. Plant and machine operators 242 0.195 0.397 13835 0.176 0.381 268 0.209 0.407 6549 0.223 0.416 47 0.191 0.398 2982 0.192 0.394 113 0.115 0.320 4930 0.106 0.308 137 0.161 0.368 2931 0.120 0.325
9. Unskilled operators 242 0.091 0.289 13835 0.107 0.309 268 0.086 0.281 6549 0.087 0.282 47 0.106 0.312 2982 0.116 0.320 113 0.159 0.368 4930 0.094 0.292 137 0.182 0.388 2931 0.139 0.346
Permanent contract 242 0.801 0.400 10739 0.750 0.433 195 0.872 0.335 5298 0.829 0.377 47 0.926 0.267 2225 0.968 0.177 102 0.951 0.217 4350 0.937 0.243 135 0.904 0.296 2801 0.881 0.324
Temporary contract 242 0.199 0.400 10739 0.250 0.433 195 0.128 0.335 5298 0.171 0.377 47 0.074 0.267 2225 0.032 0.177 102 0.049 0.217 4350 0.063 0.243 135 0.096 0.296 2801 0.119 0.324
Disability 242
(no=0) 242 0.938 0.242 13855 0.996 0.066 268 0.985 0.121 6549 1.000 0.021 47 0.957 0.204 2982 1.000 0.018 114 0.965 0.185 4953 0.990 0.102 142 0.979 0.144 3049 0.993 0.081
(yes=1) 242 0.062 0.242 13855 0.004 0.066 268 0.015 0.121 6549 0.000 0.021 47 0.043 0.204 2982 0.000 0.018 114 0.035 0.185 4953 0.010 0.102 142 0.021 0.144 3049 0.007 0.081
Sickness 242
(no=0) 242 0.988 0.111 13855 0.996 0.067 268 0.970 0.170 6549 0.991 0.093 47 1.000 0.000 2982 0.998 0.041 114 0.588 0.494 4953 0.741 0.438 142 0.711 0.455 3049 0.841 0.366
(yes=1) 242 0.012 0.111 13855 0.004 0.067 268 0.030 0.170 6549 0.009 0.093 47 0.000 0.000 2982 0.002 0.041 114 0.412 0.494 4953 0.259 0.438 142 0.289 0.455 3049 0.159 0.366
Unemployment 242
(no=0) 242 0.975 0.156 13855 0.981 0.138 268 0.963 0.190 6549 0.980 0.139 47 0.979 0.146 2982 0.997 0.058 114 0.912 0.284 4953 0.920 0.272 142 0.986 0.118 3049 0.981 0.138
(yes=1) 242 0.025 0.156 13855 0.019 0.138 268 0.037 0.190 6549 0.020 0.139 47 0.021 0.146 2982 0.003 0.058 114 0.088 0.284 4953 0.080 0.272 142 0.014 0.118 3049 0.019 0.138
Urban area 242 0.343 0.476 13855 0.321 0.467 268 0.310 0.463 6549 0.338 0.473 47 0.426 0.500 2982 0.404 0.491 114 0.219 0.416 4953 0.210 0.407
Dwelling type 242 0.579 0.495 13855 0.570 0.495 268 0.73 0.44 6549 0.69 0.46 47 0.638 0.486 2982 0.551 0.497 114 0.640 0.482 4953 0.638 0.481 142 0.613 0.489 3049 0.708 0.455
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Table B.7: Propensity score: summary statistics
Panel A: Propensity score estimates AUSTRIA BELGIUM BULGARIA CYPRUS CZECH REPUBLIC DENMARK ESTONIA
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Wave 2005 -0.250 0.165
Wave 2006 -0.228 0.137 0.180 0.082
Wave 2007 -0.111 0.096 -0.095 0.135 0.104 0.094 -0.216 0.133
Wave 2008 -0.387 0.150 -0.195 0.159 0.045 0.128 -0.064 0.082 -0.040 0.129 -0.452 0.181
Wave 2009 0.002 0.101 -0.188 0.145 -0.014 0.136 -0.497 0.105
General Health (bad=1) 0.796 0.108 0.755 0.130 0.655 0.244 0.815 0.137 0.509 0.075 0.885 0.116 0.517 0.074
Age 0.002 0.029 0.028 0.046 0.052 0.103 0.071 0.055 0.045 0.033 0.015 0.040 -0.043 0.027
Age sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Male -0.056 0.091 -0.029 0.112 0.184 0.258 0.103 0.129 0.146 0.086 -0.382 0.107 0.113 0.085
Consensual union -0.107 0.158 -0.283 0.142 -4.993 0.304 -0.083 0.147 0.101 0.176 0.000 0.127
Cash employee income 0.051 0.073 0.115 0.131 -0.369 0.256 -0.927 1.286 -0.238 0.085 1.602 1.809 -0.125 0.069
No-cash employee income 0.132 0.142 -0.110 0.129 -1.128 1.707 -0.122 0.164
Disability benefits -0.225 0.414 -0.032 0.139 0.365 2.556 -0.070 0.194 0.871 0.313
Sickness benefits 0.109 0.132 -0.001 0.164 0.351 0.159 -0.067 0.471
Unemployment benefits -0.009 0.054 -0.122 0.081 -0.007 0.045 0.203 0.437 -0.196 0.297
Family size 0.009 0.051 -0.063 0.060 -0.039 0.130 -0.073 0.058 0.026 0.046 -0.219 0.113 -0.013 0.036
HH income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 0.002 0.007 0.021 0.020 0.155 0.210 -0.010 0.005 -0.006 0.027 -0.038 0.036
HH income minus other transfers -0.014 0.010 -0.047 0.023 -0.110 0.522 0.009 0.015 0.018 0.028 -0.010 0.028 -0.008 0.061
HH income 0.006 0.009 0.028 0.012 0.012 0.464 0.001 0.015 -0.039 0.041 0.018 0.007 0.046 0.051
Never Married -0.109 0.078 0.092 0.089 0.169 0.258 -0.077 0.164 0.013 0.034 -0.034 0.096 0.049 0.073
Married 0.094 0.152 -0.043 0.137 0.098 0.177 0.073 0.071 0.040 0.131 0.025 0.118
Primary 0.141 0.170 -0.098 0.078 0.046 0.271 -0.131 0.078 -0.099 0.145 -0.098 0.081 0.042 0.176
Low Secondary 0.505 0.344 -0.044 0.184 -0.935 0.659 0.158 0.190 -0.008 0.097 0.128 0.363
High Secondary 0.207 0.182 0.093 0.116 -0.084 0.360 0.158 0.142 -0.029 0.097 -0.063 0.100 0.170 0.184
Manager -0.025 0.047 -0.105 0.060 0.015 0.065 0.110 0.137 -0.009 0.031 0.036 0.019
Professionals -0.676 0.483 -1.380 0.512 -0.072 0.140
Technicians -0.504 0.361 -1.045 0.433 -1.120 0.646 0.144 0.396 0.187 0.204 0.682 0.390 -0.221 0.132
Clerical support workers -0.153 0.289 -0.869 0.375 -0.780 0.571 -0.117 0.360 -0.154 0.171 0.664 0.385 -0.207 0.183
Service and sales workers -0.190 0.249 -0.880 0.317 -0.516 0.516 0.019 0.385 0.195 0.167 0.545 0.401 -0.115 0.126
Skilled agricultural -0.212 0.210 -0.587 0.284 -0.571 0.385 -0.162 0.442 0.019 0.154 0.695 0.398 0.144 0.260
Craft and related trades -0.773 0.237 -0.384 0.337 -0.006 0.253 0.206 0.921 -0.100 0.115
Machine operators -0.091 0.159 -0.565 0.245 -0.793 0.398 -0.394 0.629 -0.091 0.135 0.782 0.407 -0.165 0.118
Elementary occ. -0.231 0.205 -0.257 0.238 0.682 0.284 -0.395 0.753 -0.018 0.147 0.439 0.434
Permanent contract -0.059 0.190 -0.156 0.219 0.562 0.379 -0.098 0.207 0.029 0.108 0.196 0.239
Disability benefits -0.433 0.307 -1.024 0.695 0.591 1.859 -0.645 0.435 -0.253 0.158
Sickness benefits 1.332 1.514 -0.422 0.457 -0.336 0.118 -0.375 0.120
Unemployment benefits -0.438 0.338 0.434 0.263 -0.194 0.224 0.299 0.285 0.252 0.315
Urban area -0.023 0.241 -0.131 0.098 0.079 0.281 -0.035 0.115 0.047 0.086 0.081 0.098 -0.442 0.085
Dwelling type 0.092 0.084 0.009 0.148 0.525 0.306 0.220 0.167 0.095 0.078 -0.019 0.075
ConstantAˆ -2.484 1.179 0.214 1.516 -4.219 2.275 -4.218 1.364 -0.866 1.096 -2.290 0.966 -1.482 0.897
Log Likelihood -650.730 -401.286 -176.438 -312.265 -716.022 -438.429 -826.705
R2 0.123 0.144 0.312 0.186 0.142 0.104 0.168
Obs 4555 4197 1073 3590 8346 3859 4407
Panel B: Region of common support [.00457931, .64351347] [.00211046, .64813166] [.00334683, .64953804] [.00181679, .66059875] [.00257233, .53311529] [.00334528, .66650913] [.00439767, .67343377]
Estimated propensity score Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest
1% 0.005 0.005 1% 0.002 0.002 1% 0.003 0.003 1% 0.002 0.002 1% 0.003 0.003 1% 0.004 0.003 1% 0.005 0.004
5% 0.007 0.005 5% 0.003 0.002 5% 0.004 0.003 5% 0.002 0.002 5% 0.003 0.003 5% 0.006 0.003 5% 0.007 0.004
10% 0.009 0.005 10% 0.004 0.002 10% 0.004 0.003 10% 0.003 0.002 10% 0.004 0.003 10% 0.007 0.003 10% 0.008 0.004
25% 0.014 0.005 25% 0.007 0.002 25% 0.007 0.003 25% 0.006 0.002 25% 0.006 0.003 25% 0.011 0.003 25% 0.016 0.004
50% 0.025 50% 0.014 50% 0.017 50% 0.013 50% 0.012 50% 0.020 50% 0.037
Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest
75% 0.044 0.426 75% 0.027 0.496 75% 0.043 0.432 75% 0.027 0.325 75% 0.025 0.389 75% 0.032 0.258 75% 0.080 0.544
90% 0.082 0.480 90% 0.050 0.541 90% 0.101 0.527 90% 0.061 0.344 90% 0.054 0.392 90% 0.052 0.268 90% 0.158 0.562
95% 0.130 0.538 95% 0.085 0.584 95% 0.160 0.585 95% 0.101 0.406 95% 0.078 0.402 95% 0.094 0.271 95% 0.224 0.627
99% 0.266 0.644 99% 0.186 0.648 99% 0.353 0.650 99% 0.252 0.661 99% 0.159 0.533 99% 0.176 0.667 99% 0.377 0.673
Variance 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.006
Skewness 3.885 6.228 4.333 4.577 4.443 4.592 2.560
Kurtosis 25.020 65.011 27.403 34.455 35.916 46.331 11.389
Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore
Panel C: Inferior of blocks Obs = 4,384 0 1 Obs = 3,938 0 1 Obs = 530 0 1 Obs = 2,949 0 1 Obs = 7,428 0 1 Obs = 3,967 0 1 Obs = 4,038 0 1
0.0045793 3,380 74 0.0021105 1,752 12 0.0033468 406 7 0.0018168 2,093 22 0.0025723 3,830 26 0.0033453 1,154 11 0.0043977 1,459 20
0.05 562 43 0.0125 1,046 17 0.05 59 4 0.025 442 13 0.0125 1,653 31 0.0125 1,321 30 0.025 894 33
0.1 206 26 0.025 689 28 0.1 29 5 0.05 205 22 0.025 1,005 39 0.025 995 36 0.05 799 67
0.2 57 30 0.05 227 17 0.2 10 1 0.1 94 10 0.05 587 32 0.05 228 11 0.1 444 60
0.4 3 1 0.1 103 14 0.3 1 4 0.2 33 11 0.1 153 33 0.1 138 24 0.2 167 67
0.6 1 1 0.2 19 6 0.4 1 1 0.4 1 1 0.2 28 8 0.2 13 4 0.4 11 13
0.4 2 4 0.6 1 1 0.6 1 1 0.4 1 2 0.6 1 1 0.6 2 2
0.6 1 1
Total 4,209 175 Total 3,839 99 Total 507 23 Total 2,869 80 Total 7,257 171 Total 3,850 117 Total 3,776 262
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Panel A: Propensity score estimates SPAIN FINLAND FRANCE GREECE HUNGARY IRELAND ICELAND
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Wave 2005 -0.347 0.161
Wave 2006 0.113 0.074 0.988 0.412 0.014 0.191 0.288 0.295
Wave 2007 1.002 0.412 -0.506 0.184 0.132 0.200 -0.476 0.404
Wave 2008 0.095 0.081 0.653 0.388 0.299 0.162 -0.325 0.158 0.134 0.085
Wave 2009 0.061 0.071 1.002 0.412 0.173 0.064 -0.132 0.148 -0.007 0.089 -0.009 0.198 0.416 0.273
General Health (bad=1) 0.648 0.058 0.492 0.128 0.853 0.099 1.062 0.155 0.675 0.073 0.792 0.221 1.302 0.234
Age 0.034 0.027 0.060 0.033 -0.013 0.035 0.079 0.051 -0.010 0.033 0.004 0.048 0.049 0.074
Age sq. -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Male -0.123 0.060 -0.275 0.100 -0.082 0.100 -0.146 0.128 -0.003 0.077 0.112 0.172 -0.415 0.232
Consensual union 0.386 0.098 -0.036 0.140 0.058 0.136 0.775 0.232 -0.025 0.142 -0.135 0.235 0.296 0.327
Cash employee income -0.030 0.056 0.162 0.525 0.015 0.080 -0.079 0.114 0.023 0.027 -0.016 0.128
No-cash employee income -0.032 0.162 -6.706 9.641 -0.878 1.334 -0.078 0.124
Disability benefits -0.129 0.133 -0.186 0.174 0.292 0.707
Sickness benefits -0.092 0.066 0.008 0.032
Unemployment benefits -0.077 0.081 -0.004 0.016 -0.546 0.303
Family size -0.033 0.029 0.036 0.091 0.026 0.049 0.059 0.056 -0.005 0.039 -0.024 0.094 -0.206 0.173
HH income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits -0.008 0.005 0.021 0.019 0.012 0.010 -0.005 0.010 -0.028 0.022 -0.013 0.010 0.009 0.030
HH income minus other transfers -0.010 0.009 -0.013 0.021 -0.027 0.012 -0.047 0.028 0.000 0.033 -0.006 0.010 0.044 0.047
HH income 0.016 0.007 0.017 0.008 0.052 0.027 0.011 0.004
Never Married 0.100 0.054 0.016 0.072 0.056 0.079 0.035 0.129 -0.014 0.072 0.192 0.119 0.061 0.170
Married -0.266 0.093 -0.170 0.118 -0.213 0.118 -0.734 0.216 0.151 0.136 -0.197 0.208 -0.217 0.284
Primary -0.110 0.030 -0.177 0.069 -0.079 0.068 -0.060 0.065 0.152 0.151 0.025 0.082 0.024 0.144
Low Secondary -0.162 0.065 -0.349 0.200 0.103 0.145 -0.138 0.187 0.214 0.305 0.111 0.175
High Secondary -0.036 0.067 0.056 0.104 0.052 0.106 -0.015 0.135 0.194 0.167 -0.014 0.172 -0.369 0.241
Manager -0.042 0.056 -0.065 0.460 -0.107 0.054 0.350 0.349 0.121 0.051 0.007 0.058
Professionals -0.155 0.280 -0.116 0.340 -0.018 0.029 0.052 0.025
Technicians -0.210 0.241 -0.280 0.284 -0.131 0.202 -0.630 0.276 0.099 0.164 0.607 0.365 -0.653 0.310
Clerical support workers -0.335 0.241 -0.318 0.245 -0.099 0.168 -0.653 0.293 0.023 0.147 0.679 0.366 -0.505 0.284
Service and sales workers -0.316 0.239 -0.539 0.253 -0.148 0.172 -0.406 0.216 0.019 0.151 0.149 0.313 -0.451 0.343
Skilled agricultural -0.153 0.236 -0.162 0.184 0.118 0.153 -0.161 0.186 -0.044 0.138 0.475 0.253 -0.926 0.398
Craft and related trades -0.261 0.314 0.136 0.339 -0.290 0.427 -0.176 0.508 0.058 0.262 -0.020 0.540
Machine operators -0.206 0.235 -0.405 0.246 0.088 0.166 -0.008 0.246 -0.280 0.128 0.145 0.251 -0.401 0.398
Elementary occ. -0.039 0.065 -0.203 0.218 0.049 0.165 0.064 0.226 -0.120 0.129 0.149 0.235
Permanent contract -0.024 0.078 0.070 0.132 -0.234 0.159 0.203 0.137 -0.026 0.129 -0.167 0.326 0.091 0.440
Disability benefits -1.837 0.662 -0.014 0.012 1.256 0.601 0.236 4.908 0.339 0.204
Sickness benefits 0.843 0.267 -0.953 0.376 0.165 0.185
Unemployment benefits -0.102 0.208 0.260 0.190 0.201 0.239 -0.920 0.464 0.269 0.289
Urban area 0.026 0.055 -0.026 0.103 0.100 0.101 -0.189 0.118 -0.022 0.088 0.047 0.149 -0.309 0.224
Dwelling type 0.030 0.057 0.145 0.103 -0.039 0.110 -0.070 0.118 -0.009 0.087 0.120 0.231
ConstantAˆ 0.352 0.737 -1.802 0.764 -2.049 0.847 -2.323 5.237 -3.224 0.905 -1.294 1.425 -2.490 1.682
Log Likelihood -1424.925 -557.904 -517.628 -311.583 -766.709 -204.077 -107.169
R2 0.088 0.096 0.135 0.183 0.113 0.157 0.268
Obs 11472 2515 3857 5636 5822 5822 1680
Panel B: Region of common support [.00395696, .4806206] [.00622267, .36242498] [.00395696, .4806206] [.00292569, .58352627] [.00536802, .21601084] [.00310029, .58391206] [.00378998, .62192785]
Estimated propensity score Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest
1% 0.005 0.005 1% 0.008 0.006 1% 0.005 0.004 1% 0.003 0.003 1% 0.006 0.005 1% 0.003 0.003 1% 0.004 0.004
5% 0.008 0.005 5% 0.013 0.006 5% 0.007 0.004 5% 0.003 0.003 5% 0.006 0.005 5% 0.004 0.003 5% 0.004 0.004
10% 0.010 0.005 10% 0.018 0.006 10% 0.008 0.004 10% 0.004 0.003 10% 0.007 0.005 10% 0.005 0.003 10% 0.005 0.004
25% 0.014 0.005 25% 0.032 0.006 25% 0.012 0.004 25% 0.005 0.003 25% 0.011 0.005 25% 0.007 0.003 25% 0.007 0.004
50% 0.020 50% 0.057 50% 0.021 50% 0.009 50% 0.018 50% 0.014 50% 0.014
Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest
75% 0.033 0.458 75% 0.094 0.333 75% 0.037 0.413 75% 0.017 0.382 75% 0.052 0.206 75% 0.026 0.348 75% 0.032 0.372
90% 0.064 0.463 90% 0.141 0.339 90% 0.075 0.451 90% 0.034 0.403 90% 0.094 0.215 90% 0.048 0.370 90% 0.074 0.398
95% 0.092 0.477 95% 0.181 0.354 95% 0.139 0.460 95% 0.064 0.422 95% 0.114 0.215 95% 0.083 0.534 95% 0.119 0.567
99% 0.166 0.532 99% 0.267 0.362 99% 0.255 0.481 99% 0.171 0.584 99% 0.159 0.216 99% 0.174 0.584 99% 0.327 0.622
Variance 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
Skewness 4.216 1.674 3.736104 6.418845 1.632718 6.305019 4.770277
Kurtosis 32.697 6.583 20.78949 63.59037 5.185242 66.0449 33.44537
Panel C: Inferior of blocks Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore
Obs = 11,338 0 1 Obs = 2,327 0 1 Obs = 3,800 0 1 Obs = 3,773 0 1 Obs = 5,499 0 1 Obs = 1,985 0 1 Obs = 859 0 1
0.0051464 2,223 21 0.0062227 984 29 0.003957 2,189 33 0.0029257 2,408 18 0.005368 3,333 46 0.0031003 1424 18 0.00379 710 12
0.0125 4,930 95 0.05 737 62 0.025 931 32 0.0125 755 15 0.025 680 22 0.025 341 11 0.05 75 6
0.025 1,688 41 0.1 282 32 0.05 311 20 0.025 237 3 0.05 889 67 0.05 114 10 0.1 29 4
0.0375 665 35 0.15 95 25 0.1 175 28 0.0375 85 9 0.1 397 59 0.1 46 6 0.2 16 5
0.05 1,087 85 0.2 61 20 0.2 53 22 0.05 124 11 0.2 2 4 0.2 10 3 0.4 0 1
0.1 355 57 0.4 2 4 0.1 78 8 0.4 1 1 0.6 0 1
0.2 39 13 0 13 6
0.4 2 2 0.4 2 1
Total 10,989 349 Total 2,159 168 Total 3,661 139 Total 3,702 71 Total 5,301 198 Total 1,936 49 Total 830 29
Continued on next page
69
Panel A: Propensity score estimates ITALY LITHUANIA LUX. LATVIA NETHERLAND NORWAY POLAND
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Wave 2005
Wave 2006 -0.111 0.088 -0.105 0.107
Wave 2007 0.399 0.062 0.373 0.231 -0.057 0.084 0.173 0.131 -0.430 0.089 -0.084 0.105 0.054 0.098
Wave 2008 0.373 0.064 -0.236 0.104 0.069 0.083 0.136 0.114 -0.305 0.088 -0.273 0.118
Wave 2009 0.396 0.069 -0.013 0.230 -0.119 0.106 -0.135 0.138 -0.191 0.119 -0.115 0.111
General Health (bad=1) 0.677 0.045 0.385 0.093 0.801 0.069 0.482 0.100 1.213 0.101 0.883 0.087 0.661 0.079
Age 0.019 0.018 0.008 0.036 0.027 0.023 -0.021 0.033 0.020 0.032 0.004 0.027 0.032 0.037
Age sq. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Male -0.202 0.046 -0.078 0.102 -0.163 0.063 -0.003 0.115 -0.264 0.082 -0.262 0.084 0.039 0.088
Consensual union -0.013 0.089 0.089 0.125 -0.116 0.082 -0.062 0.175 -0.103 0.140 -0.287 0.136 0.089 0.238
Cash employee income -0.881 0.382 -0.090 0.082 0.016 0.094 0.201 0.164
No-cash employee income 0.062 0.035 -0.106 0.763
Disability benefits -0.010 0.025 0.350 0.564 0.907 0.477
Sickness benefits -1.137 2.587
Unemployment benefits 0.004 0.024 0.052 0.239 -0.812 0.581
Family size 0.006 0.024 -0.149 0.060 0.064 0.032 -0.017 0.052 -0.009 0.079 0.016 0.065 0.009 0.036
HH income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 0.002 0.003 0.086 0.054 -0.001 0.003 0.049 0.055 0.030 0.016 -0.001 0.009 -0.015 0.023
HH income minus other transfers -0.005 0.005 -0.124 0.081 0.001 0.004 -0.043 0.086 -0.043 0.019 -0.006 0.010 0.022 0.051
HH income 0.004 0.004 0.034 0.065 -0.001 0.004 -0.009 0.069 0.013 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.048
Never Married 0.049 0.106 -0.122 0.107 0.013 0.052 0.008 0.167 0.009 0.064 0.038 0.073 -0.037 0.095
Married 0.122 0.177 -0.046 0.065 -0.084 0.080 -0.137 0.117 0.222 0.115 -0.053 0.231
Primary 0.046 0.034 0.004 0.107 -0.116 0.037 0.026 0.080 -0.128 0.194 0.046 0.068
Low Secondary 0.068 0.065 -0.022 0.095 0.407 0.189 0.135 0.172 -0.619 0.414 0.070 0.104
High Secondary -0.017 0.055 0.144 0.129 0.062 0.070 0.233 0.109 0.081 0.104 -0.152 0.203
Manager -0.205 0.215 0.035 0.030 -0.001 0.021 0.020 0.030 0.003 0.027 0.009 0.036 -0.053 0.051
Professionals -0.251 0.174 -0.074 0.051 0.170 0.130 -1.298 0.539
Technicians -0.403 0.112 0.233 0.190 -0.042 0.137 -0.003 0.214 -0.235 0.134 0.294 0.151 -0.440 0.362
Clerical support workers -0.233 0.083 0.095 0.206 -0.074 0.116 -0.142 0.192 -0.200 0.127 0.282 0.137 -0.363 0.311
Service and sales workers -0.179 0.085 0.188 0.211 -0.214 0.121 -0.099 0.233 -0.249 0.137 0.072 0.193 -0.144 0.272
Skilled agricultural -0.134 0.090 0.319 0.170 -0.229 0.122 -0.485 0.192 -0.023 0.151 0.288 0.165 -0.130 0.231
Craft and related trades -0.010 0.187 0.407 0.359 0.262 0.264 0.242 0.285 0.201 0.342 0.493 0.379
Machine operators -0.037 0.082 0.054 0.147 -0.031 0.105 -0.061 0.145 -0.006 0.189 0.274 0.238 -0.112 0.152
Elementary occ. -0.104 0.089 0.058 0.169 0.024 0.125 -0.395 0.181 0.150 0.202 0.458 0.256 -0.191 0.156
Permanent contract 0.121 0.067 -0.091 0.210 -0.042 0.105 -0.151 0.171 -0.174 0.121 -0.121 0.123 0.004 0.102
Disability benefits 0.765 0.113 0.572 0.694 -0.336 0.973
Sickness benefits -0.181 0.242 0.988 0.989
Unemployment benefits 0.009 0.062 -0.347 0.240 -0.099 0.274 -0.387 0.230 -0.756 0.415
Urban area -0.030 0.047 0.121 0.095 0.082 0.057 -0.210 0.102 -0.008 0.077 -0.063 0.090
Dwelling type -0.003 0.044 -0.053 0.101 0.119 0.069 -0.288 0.114 -0.025 0.105 0.204 0.122 -0.045 0.086
ConstantAˆ -3.211 0.536 -2.579 0.894 -2.226 0.605 -1.389 0.794 -2.121 0.759 -2.067 0.996 -2.515 1.009
Log Likelihood -1966.143 -484.684 -1221.408 -442.473 -672.605 -643.848 -611.666
R2 0.109 0.104 0.102 0.138 0.151 0.108 0.141
Obs 18388 4193 7877 2391 4854 7038 8921
Panel B: Region of common support [.00362863, .40939544] [.00314552, .16288064] [.00501148, .381804] [.00777046, .5037135] [.00773011, .58498012] [.00136814, .25171304] [.00215838, .78999446]
Estimated propensity score Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest
1% 0.004 0.004 1% 0.003 0.003 1% 0.007 0.005 1% 0.008 0.008 1% 0.008 0.008 1% 0.002 0.001 1% 0.002 0.002
5% 0.005 0.004 5% 0.004 0.003 5% 0.009 0.005 5% 0.010 0.008 5% 0.009 0.008 5% 0.003 0.001 5% 0.003 0.002
10% 0.006 0.004 10% 0.006 0.003 10% 0.012 0.005 10% 0.012 0.008 10% 0.011 0.008 10% 0.005 0.001 10% 0.003 0.002
25% 0.010 0.004 25% 0.010 0.003 25% 0.017 0.005 25% 0.019 0.008 25% 0.015 0.008 25% 0.008 0.001 25% 0.004 0.002
50% 0.016 50% 0.020 50% 0.027 50% 0.039 50% 0.025 50% 0.014 50% 0.008
Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest
75% 0.028 0.354 75% 0.042 0.156 75% 0.045 0.360 75% 0.081 0.484 75% 0.043 0.538 75% 0.023 0.214 75% 0.019 0.472
90% 0.069 0.358 90% 0.071 0.158 90% 0.082 0.369 90% 0.140 0.493 90% 0.079 0.572 90% 0.038 0.233 90% 0.049 0.498
95% 0.096 0.360 95% 0.092 0.159 95% 0.136 0.380 95% 0.189 0.496 95% 0.139 0.584 95% 0.076 0.240 95% 0.062 0.667
99% 0.145 0.409 99% 0.129 0.163 99% 0.253 0.382 99% 0.312 0.504 99% 0.349 0.585 99% 0.156 0.252 99% 0.087 0.790
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001
3.344 1.644 3.243 2.471 4.284 3.683 5.873
20.391 5.574 15.675 11.807 25.107 18.953 42.840
Panel C: Inferior of blocks Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore
Obs = 17,344 0 1 Obs = 3,831 0 1 Obs = 7,842 0 1 Obs = 2,128 0 1 Obs = 4,349 0 1 Obs = 6,966 0 1 Obs = 7,850 0 1
0.0036286 1,844 7 0.0031455 3,037 49 0.0050115 3,531 59 0.0077705 1,210 32 0.0077301 2,185 38 0.0013681 3,141 24 0.0021584 3,076 11
0.00625 4,290 45 0.05 556 48 0.025 2,487 86 0.05 460 34 0.025 1,219 41 0.0125 2,208 37 0.00625 2,040 20
0.0125 5,954 103 0.1 119 22 0.05 757 42 0.1 261 41 0.05 515 42 0.025 1,028 33 0.0125 994 25
0.025 2,588 103 0.075 258 35 0.2 41 5 0.1 138 21 0.05 242 16 0.025 924 30
0.05 1,536 114 0.1 349 65 0.25 13 9 0.2 95 30 0.1 193 37 0.05 659 42
0.1 613 90 0.2 133 40 0.3 6 8 0.4 10 15 0.2 5 2 0.1 15 3
0.2 44 12 0.4 4 4 0.3 2 3
0.4 0 1 0.6 2 4
Total 16,869 475 Total 3,712 119 Total 7,515 327 Total 1,995 133 Total 4,162 187 Total 6,817 149 Total 7,712 138
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Panel A: Propensity score estimates PORTUGAL ROMANIA SWEDEN SLOVENIA SLOVAKIA UNITED KINGDOM
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Wave 2005 -0.323 0.113
Wave 2006
Wave 2007 -0.232 0.117 -0.026 0.120
Wave 2008 -0.412 0.237 -0.021 0.117 -0.273 0.082
Wave 2009 -0.523 0.193 0.238 0.070
General Health (bad=1) 0.290 0.156 0.787 0.098 0.630 0.063 0.853 0.137
Age 0.049 0.042 -0.024 0.060 -0.028 0.034 -0.003 0.046 0.022 0.027 0.106 0.051
Age sq. 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001
Male -0.454 0.172 0.102 0.160 0.036 0.115 0.042 0.100 -0.187 0.068 -0.307 0.145
Consensual union 0.091 0.323 0.024 0.422 0.317 0.269 0.031 0.152 -4.592 . 0.230 0.192
Cash employee income -0.086 0.153 -0.388 0.184 -0.135 0.119 0.005 0.019 0.079 0.063
No-cash employee income 0.190 0.213 0.661 1.343 0.064 0.118 0.167 0.120 0.039 0.142
Disability benefits 147.826 5542.595 -0.063 0.134
Sickness benefits 0.140 0.221 0.122 0.034 -0.053 0.295
Unemployment benefits 0.213 0.269
Family size 0.009 0.085 0.015 0.067 -0.031 0.089 0.137 0.053 -0.081 0.030 0.085 0.095
HH income minus old-age and survivor’s benefits 0.010 0.026 -0.013 0.012 0.007 0.018 -0.014 0.020 -0.009 0.006
HH income minus other transfers -0.071 0.041 0.014 0.016 -0.026 0.024 -0.021 0.039 0.020 0.020
HH income 0.048 0.035 0.013 0.025 -0.007 0.012 0.038 0.035 -0.020 0.020
Never Married -0.135 0.150 0.069 0.162 -0.064 0.063 0.149 0.098 -0.030 0.073 -0.018 0.101
Married -0.376 0.316 5.230 0.179 -0.104 0.214 -0.146 0.140 4.657 0.081 -0.254 0.163
Primary -0.200 0.139 0.433 0.350 -0.007 0.103 -0.002 0.081 -0.008 0.090 0.035 0.103
Low Secondary 0.104 0.213 0.297 0.175 0.390 0.228 0.265 0.203
High Secondary 0.210 0.291 -0.932 0.446 0.169 0.136 0.073 0.123 -0.062 0.091 -0.033 0.134
Manager -0.038 0.064 -0.177 0.171 0.073 0.063 0.208 0.660 0.016 0.021 -0.008 0.034
Professionals
Technicians 0.466 0.787 0.487 0.396 0.187 0.310 -0.187 0.137 0.152 0.189
Clerical support workers -0.139 0.358 -0.384 0.359 0.415 0.346 0.253 0.301 -0.106 0.115 0.076 0.185
Service and sales workers -0.791 0.406 -0.360 0.446 0.203 0.334 0.111 0.323 -0.032 0.127 -0.263 0.207
Skilled agricultural -0.468 0.299 0.279 0.274 0.005 0.329 -0.092 0.119 -0.237 0.210
Craft and related trades -0.391 0.391 0.182 0.506 -0.016 0.349 0.441 0.282 0.884 0.572
Machine operators -0.132 0.232 0.187 0.480 -0.012 0.261 0.030 0.323 0.038 0.109 0.179 0.259
Elementary occ. -0.371 0.313 0.293 0.652 0.143 0.253 0.050 0.324 -0.128 0.123 -0.143 0.306
Permanent contract 0.007 0.226 0.042 0.233 0.090 0.163 0.114 0.092 -0.058 0.375
Disability benefits 133.795 1.579 0.176 0.351 1.275 0.545
Sickness benefits -0.530 0.998 -0.201 0.120 0.341 0.104 0.632 1.710
Unemployment benefits -0.257 0.942 0.051 0.174 -0.509 0.456
Urban area 0.017 0.168 0.511 0.222 0.002 0.131 0.049 0.073 -0.131 0.121
Dwelling type 0.082 0.182 0.090 0.218 -0.067 0.116 -0.155 0.097 -0.078 0.067 0.050 0.219
ConstantAˆ -1.009 1.566 -2.654 0.732 -2.117 1.450 -2.521 1.028 -2.494 0.658 -4.155 1.701
Log Likelihood -178.282 -186.547 -386.109 -456.973 -1089.387 -274.808
R2 0.137 0.210 0.096 0.130 0.125 0.121
Obs 1041 2897 3855 2781 5663 2971
Panel B: Region of common support [.00533821, .39059288] [.00011095, 0.6635987] [.00180206, .3371419] [.00545477, .41272149] [.00207154, .38485282] [.00586981, .33258437]
Estimated propensity score Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest
1% 0.006 0.005 1% 0.002 0.001 1% 0.002 0.002 1% 0.007 0.005 1% 0.003 0.002 1% 0.006 0.006
5% 0.008 0.005 5% 0.004 0.001 5% 0.004 0.002 5% 0.008 0.005 5% 0.006 0.002 5% 0.007 0.006
10% 0.011 0.005 10% 0.008 0.001 10% 0.005 0.002 10% 0.010 0.006 10% 0.009 0.002 10% 0.007 0.006
25% 0.018 0.005 25% 0.020 0.001 25% 0.008 0.002 25% 0.015 0.006 25% 0.017 0.002 25% 0.010 0.006
50% 0.034 50% 0.058 50% 0.016 50% 0.026 50% 0.035 50% 0.016
Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest Largest
75% 0.065 0.343 75% 0.030 0.328 75% 0.030 0.264 75% 0.057 0.335 75% 0.074 0.370 75% 0.027 0.244
90% 0.128 0.378 90% 0.064 0.347 90% 0.050 0.276 90% 0.126 0.338 90% 0.146 0.371 90% 0.055 0.253
95% 0.179 0.378 95% 0.104 0.409 95% 0.067 0.294 95% 0.168 0.339 95% 0.187 0.374 95% 0.097 0.283
99% 0.293 0.391 99% 0.255 0.664 99% 0.123 0.337 99% 0.256 0.413 99% 0.270 0.385 99% 0.161 0.333
Variance 0.003 Variance 0.001 Variance 0.001 Variance 0.003 Variance 0.004 Variance 0.001
Skewness 2.435 Skewness 14.242 Skewness 4.053 Skewness 2.251 Skewness 1.850 Skewness 3.499
Kurtosis 10.063 Kurtosis 346.454 Kurtosis 30.507 Kurtosis 8.622 Kurtosis 6.540 Kurtosis 18.893
Panel C: Inferior of blocks Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore Inferior of block of pscore
Obs = 953 0 1 Obs = 2,709 0 1 Obs = 3,730 0 1 Obs = 2,689 0 1 Obs = 5,646 0 1 Obs = 2,396 0 1
0.01 602 14 0.001109 1,834 6 0.0018021 2,468 26 0.0054548 1,280 19 0.0021 2,105 36 0.00587 2,099 37
0.05 188 16 0.025 348 6 0.025 827 36 0.025 609 25 0.025 1,343 41 0.05 137 14
0.1 86 10 0.05 266 11 0.05 297 17 0.05 342 24 0.05 1,023 78 0.1 89 10
0.2 25 12 0.1 160 13 0.1 37 7 0.1 269 41 0.1 437 54 0.2 6 4
0.2 53 6 0.2 11 4 0.2 59 20 0.15 244 56
0.4 1 2 0.4 0 1 0.2 169 60
0.6 1 2
Total 901 52 Total 2,663 46 Total 3,640 90 Total 2,559 130 Total 5,321 325 Total 2,331 65
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Table B.8: Mean labour market outcomes and health status across Europe
ALL SAMPLE LIMITATION = YES ALL SAMPLE LIMITATION = YES ALL SAMPLE LIMITATION = YES
All Young Old All Young Old All Young Old All Young Old All Young Old All Young Old
AT FR NL
Full-time 0.767 0.776 0.726 0.718 0.757 0.660 0.807 0.818 0.773 0.709 0.741 0.664 0.583 0.603 0.522 0.435 0.433 0.438
Part-time 0.176 0.179 0.166 0.149 0.155 0.140 0.146 0.150 0.131 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.392 0.383 0.420 0.486 0.512 0.449
Unemployed 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.036 0.034 0.040 0.021 0.022 0.018 0.052 0.047 0.060 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.019 0.008 0.034
Retired 0.016 0.000 0.084 0.060 0.007 0.140 0.017 0.001 0.070 0.024 0.000 0.060 0.008 0.000 0.032 0.005 0.000 0.011
Inactive 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.020 0.027 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.005 0.000 0.011
hour worked 3.995 4.049 3.759 3.778 4.027 3.410 3.750 3.795 3.604 3.217 3.319 3.066 3.428 3.524 3.129 2.856 2.953 2.719
BE GR NO
Full-time 0.753 0.779 0.653 0.609 0.683 0.490 0.886 0.897 0.850 0.776 0.761 0.788 0.883 0.891 0.860 0.674 0.737 0.550
Part-time 0.218 0.204 0.271 0.301 0.244 0.392 0.065 0.063 0.071 0.129 0.134 0.125 0.090 0.082 0.111 0.197 0.161 0.267
Unemployed 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.000 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.013 0.020 0.030 0.013 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.000
Retired 0.011 0.001 0.050 0.015 0.012 0.020 0.014 0.002 0.053 0.034 0.030 0.038 0.006 0.000 0.021 0.028 0.000 0.083
Inactive 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.023 0.024 0.020 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.008 0.000
hour worked 3.899 3.984 3.572 3.290 3.667 2.680 4.445 4.501 4.263 4.021 3.924 4.103 3.976 4.012 3.882 3.135 3.432 2.550
BG HU PL
Full-time 0.898 0.899 0.894 0.826 0.727 0.917 0.909 0.918 0.876 0.801 0.858 0.727 0.904 0.918 0.849 0.814 0.839 0.781
Part-time 0.027 0.028 0.024 0.043 0.091 0.000 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.044 0.047 0.040 0.048 0.043 0.071 0.070 0.058 0.086
Unemployed 0.054 0.059 0.039 0.087 0.091 0.083 0.034 0.040 0.016 0.031 0.047 0.010 0.021 0.022 0.014 0.025 0.022 0.029
Retired 0.011 0.001 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.001 0.072 0.053 0.008 0.111 0.012 0.002 0.050 0.021 0.007 0.038
Inactive 0.007 0.009 0.002 0.043 0.091 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.015 0.010
hour worked 4.744 4.758 4.704 4.391 3.909 4.833 4.604 4.653 4.435 4.032 4.288 3.701 4.720 4.776 4.501 4.227 4.328 4.095
CY IE PT
Full-time 0.908 0.919 0.870 0.740 0.810 0.690 0.753 0.777 0.700 0.563 0.556 0.571 0.889 0.905 0.833 0.709 0.796 0.611
Part-time 0.054 0.050 0.066 0.090 0.048 0.121 0.189 0.172 0.227 0.266 0.361 0.143 0.048 0.041 0.074 0.101 0.063 0.143
Unemployed 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.050 0.095 0.017 0.028 0.030 0.023 0.031 0.028 0.036 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.060 0.063 0.056
Retired 0.005 0.000 0.022 0.040 0.000 0.069 0.010 0.000 0.033 0.031 0.000 0.071 0.013 0.006 0.037 0.071 0.035 0.111
Inactive 0.003 0.002 0.010 0.070 0.024 0.103 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.022 0.021 0.024
hour worked 4.264 4.290 4.172 3.560 3.929 3.293 3.559 3.637 3.386 2.902 2.882 2.926 4.275 4.352 3.994 3.356 3.780 2.862
CZ IS RO
Full-time 0.944 0.961 0.902 0.722 0.909 0.566 0.842 0.838 0.853 0.737 0.682 0.813 0.909 0.921 0.864 0.638 0.810 0.500
Part-time 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.052 0.011 0.085 0.100 0.092 0.118 0.184 0.227 0.125 0.061 0.060 0.063 0.106 0.143 0.077
Unemployed 0.011 0.010 0.014 0.052 0.023 0.075 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
Retired 0.018 0.000 0.063 0.082 0.000 0.151 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.001 0.061 0.255 0.048 0.423
Inactive 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.026 0.000 0.063 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
hour worked 4.833 4.916 4.627 3.727 4.545 3.047 4.636 4.559 4.821 4.125 3.733 4.778 4.837 4.916 4.537 3.432 4.429 2.522
DK IT SE
Full-time 0.852 0.874 0.805 0.735 0.764 0.689 0.849 0.851 0.839 0.752 0.760 0.738 0.795 0.809 0.762 0.649 0.671 0.605
Part-time 0.114 0.106 0.131 0.188 0.167 0.222 0.090 0.097 0.065 0.143 0.168 0.100 0.163 0.155 0.182 0.272 0.263 0.289
Unemployed 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.026 0.014 0.044 0.019 0.022 0.009 0.020 0.022 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.012 0.035 0.053 0.000
Retired 0.015 0.000 0.047 0.017 0.000 0.044 0.014 0.001 0.060 0.045 0.005 0.113 0.013 0.000 0.042 0.026 0.000 0.079
Inactive 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.009 0.014 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.019 0.017 0.021 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
hour worked 3.933 4.003 3.783 3.410 3.486 3.289 4.146 4.203 3.925 3.767 3.859 3.613 3.839 3.892 3.717 3.495 3.630 3.237
EE LT SI
Full-time 0.900 0.905 0.883 0.830 0.863 0.794 0.903 0.914 0.876 0.778 0.746 0.803 0.945 0.961 0.886 0.880 0.908 0.818
Part-time 0.038 0.035 0.051 0.071 0.053 0.091 0.031 0.026 0.042 0.081 0.102 0.066 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.063 0.082 0.023
Unemployed 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.038 0.047 0.029 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.022 0.051 0.000 0.018 0.014 0.029 0.035 0.010 0.091
Retired 0.006 0.000 0.027 0.027 0.000 0.057 0.009 0.002 0.026 0.030 0.000 0.053 0.016 0.002 0.066 0.014 0.000 0.045
Inactive 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
hour worked 4.525 4.556 4.421 4.264 4.421 4.092 4.361 4.430 4.193 3.711 3.678 3.737 4.819 4.907 4.502 4.486 4.663 4.091
ES LU SK
Full-time 0.866 0.863 0.875 0.764 0.787 0.730 0.809 0.820 0.761 0.684 0.717 0.613 0.936 0.942 0.914 0.860 0.879 0.831
Part-time 0.068 0.073 0.048 0.076 0.090 0.054 0.148 0.147 0.151 0.203 0.189 0.234 0.015 0.012 0.029 0.042 0.037 0.049
Unemployed 0.048 0.052 0.033 0.071 0.076 0.065 0.016 0.018 0.007 0.041 0.057 0.008 0.023 0.024 0.018 0.034 0.037 0.028
Retired 0.007 0.001 0.030 0.030 0.011 0.059 0.012 0.000 0.065 0.026 0.000 0.081 0.009 0.002 0.035 0.025 0.000 0.063
Inactive 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.028 0.011 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.014 0.019 0.007
hour worked 4.265 4.277 4.224 3.778 3.937 3.526 4.364 4.420 4.114 3.797 3.989 3.387 4.658 4.685 4.547 4.275 4.386 4.106
FI LV UK
Full-time 0.881 0.895 0.849 0.797 0.854 0.706 0.871 0.875 0.857 0.793 0.779 0.806 0.741 0.764 0.689 0.591 0.671 0.484
Part-time 0.057 0.045 0.082 0.094 0.073 0.127 0.034 0.031 0.042 0.052 0.063 0.041 0.210 0.194 0.246 0.302 0.247 0.375
Unemployed 0.016 0.015 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.065 0.071 0.047 0.073 0.105 0.041 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.000 0.016
Retired 0.010 0.000 0.032 0.019 0.000 0.049 0.011 0.001 0.043 0.036 0.000 0.071 0.012 0.000 0.039 0.013 0.012 0.016
Inactive 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.020 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.020 0.012 0.031
hour worked 4.130 4.168 4.050 3.784 3.900 3.596 4.474 4.507 4.370 4.088 4.116 4.061 3.850 3.948 3.629 3.319 3.554 3.000
Note: I define an individual as being old if he/she is 49 years or more, young otherwise. Hours worked per week is a categorical variable. Hour=0 if the number of hours are zero; hour=1 if
the number of hours are between 1 and 20; Hour=2 beween 21-30; Hour=3 beween 31-35; Hour=4 beween 36-39; Hour=5 beween 40-45; Hour=6 more than 46.
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Table B.9: Kernel ATT - using limitation in daily activities - on the probability of transiting into different labour market statuses
FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS
AUSTRIA FRANCE NETHERLAND
-0.033 -0.029 0.021 0.023 0.016* 0.561 -0.099** 0.014 0.039** -0.013 0.021* -0.817 -0.084*** 0.034 0.011 -0.005 0.002 -1.401**
(0.032) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.641) (0.048) (0.035) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.993) (0.031) (0.032) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.641)
BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY
-0.096** 0.041 -0.008** 0.008 0.016 -1.803** 0.027 0.005 0.007 -0.032*** -0.016 1.408 -0.202*** 0.088*** -0.002 0.027* 0.004 -3.826***
(0.047) (0.054) (0.003) (0.014) (0.013) (0.890) (0.052) (0.031) (0.032) (0.011) (0.016) (0.955) (0.039) (0.027) (0.006) (0.016) (0.007) (0.810)
BULGARIA HUNGARY POLAND
0.001 0.023 0.033 -0.096** 0.039 -0.986 -0.103*** 0.019 -0.005 0.034** 0.002 -1.272* -0.050 -0.032 0.013 0.015 0.001 -0.268
(0.16) (0.044) (0.063) (0.042) (0.044) (4.353) (0.028) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.005) (0.733) (0.042) (0.023) (0.013) (0.017) (0.007) (0.766)
CYPRUS IRELAND PORTUGAL
-0.151*** 0.028 0.041 0.031 0.048* -2.033* -0.210** 0.086 0.009 0.029 -0.001 -3.445* -0.166*** 0.029 0.054 0.034 0.038 -0.896
(0.049) (0.026) (0.028) (0.022) (0.025) (1.061) (0.082) (0.069) (0.031) (0.028) (0.001) (1.861) (0.071) (0.05) (0.043) (0.025) (0.032) (1.130)
CZECH REPUBLIC ICELAND ROMANIA
-0.218*** 0.025* 0.038** 0.065*** 0.000 -0.541 -0.017 -0.008 -0.011* -0.004 0.032 -7.875* -0.233*** 0.047 -0.007*** 0.201*** -0.003*** -1.749
(0.035) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.000) (0.573) (0.101) (0.063) (0.007) (0.009) (0.032) (4.226) (0.085) (0.052) (0.003) (0.071) (0.001) (1.627)
DENMARK ITALY SWEDEN
-0.101*** 0.063 0.017 -0.002 0.004 -1.984*** -0.103*** 0.058*** 0.000 0.027*** 0.007 -1.686*** -0.146*** 0.102*** 0.017 0.019 -0.001** -0.383
(0.037) (0.042) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.721) (0.020) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.262) (0.056) (0.040) (0.016) (0.020) (0.001) (0.87)
ESTONIA LITHUANIA SLOVENIA
-0.089*** 0.031*** 0.018 0.016 0.000 -0.412 -0.133*** 0.039* -0.013 0.023 -0.003*** -1.466*** -0.056** 0.049** 0.020 -0.010 -0.001 -1.110
(0.022) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.000) (0.365) (0.042) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.001) (0.649) (0.026) (0.022) (0.016) (0.008) (0.001) (0.574)
SPAIN LUXEMBOURG SLOVAKIA
-0.090*** 0.004 0.022 0.025*** 0.022*** -0.108 -0.111*** 0.041*** 0.026*** 0.006 0.006 -1.518*** -0.071*** 0.025** 0.013 0.007 0.006 -0.633*
(0.023) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.458) (0.027) (0.016) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.626) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.335)
FINLAND LATVIA UNITED KINGDOM
-0.043 0.019 -0.012 0.016 0.007 -0.012 -0.056 0.003 0.015 0.018 0.008 -0.320 -0.089 0.014 -0.009* 0.006 0.027 0.699
(0.03) (0.021) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.667) (0.035) (0.028) (0.027) (0.017) (-1.205) (0.609) (0.058) (0.044) (0.005) (0.021) (0.024) (1.376)
ATT estimation using the Kernel Matching Method with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. The limitation in daily activities indicator is used as the measure of a health shock. The transitions are from full-time (FT) to other different activity statuses:
part-time (PT), unemployed (U), retired (R), inactive (I) and numebers of hour worked per week. For each country it shows number of treated and controls, respectively: AT (175;4209); BE (99;3839); BG (23;507); CY (80;2869); CZ (171;7257); DK
(117;3850); EE (262;3776); ES (349;10989); FI (168;2159); FR (139;3661); GR (71;3702); HU (198;5301); IE (49;1936); IS (29;830); IT (475;16869); LT (119;3712); LU (327;7515); LV (133;1995); NL (187;4162); NO (149;6817); PL (138;7712); PO
(52;901); RO (46;2663); SE (90;3640); SI (130;2559); SK (325;5321); UK (65;2331)
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Table B.10: Kernel ATT - using chronic illness - on the probability of transiting into different labour market statuses
FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS
AUSTRIA FRANCE NETHERLAND
-0.012 -0.016 0.025* 0.017 0.001 1.172*** -0.039 0.022 0.006 -0.010 0.002 -1.405* -0.024 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 -0.116
(0.029) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016) (0.005) (0.568) (0.031) (0.024) (0.013) (0.007) (0.004) (0.762) (0.027) (0.033) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.443)
BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY
-0.028 -0.008 -0.003 0.012 0.005 -1.037 -0.015 0.003 0.039 -0.028*** -0.003 0.502 -0.088*** 0.049*** -0.004* 0.000 0.007 -1.067**
(0.036) (0.032) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.816) (0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.008) (0.002) (0.699) (0.021) (0.019) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.548)
BULGARIA HUNGARY POLAND
0.027 -0.021*** -0.044 0.026 0.013 -0.581 -0.075*** 0.001 0.005 0.037*** 0.000 0.354 -0.058*** -0.006 0.018 0.029*** 0.005 -0.239
(0.045) (0.006) (0.040) (0.036) (0.019) (1.229) (0.020) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.003) (0.353) (0.029) (0.023) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.524)
CYPRUS IRELAND PORTUGAL
-0.017 -0.026 0.007 0.018 0.011 -0.297 -0.160*** 0.061 0.028 0.029 -0.002* -1.321 -0.014 -0.021 -0.017 0.025 0.014 -0.208
(0.029) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.768) (0.059) (0.062) (0.025) (0.024) (0.001) (1.836) (0.051) (0.030) (0.036) (0.019) (0.013) (0.861)
CZECH REPUBLIC ICELAND ROMANIA
-0.150*** 0.042*** 0.028* 0.046*** 0.000 -0.624 0.020 0.004 -0.015 -0.001 0.015 -7.404*** -0.314*** 0.044 0.054 0.225*** -0.003 -0.913
(0.026) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.000) (0.524) (0.058) (0.065) (0.023) (0.000) (0.014) (3.377) (0.100) (0.052) (0.036) (0.067) (0.003) (2.244)
DENMARK ITALY SWEDEN
-0.071* 0.059* 0.011 -0.015*** 0.003 -0.934* -0.056*** 0.023 0.005 0.020*** -0.005 -1.130*** -0.050* 0.020 0.016 0.003 -0.001*** -0.237
(0.038) (0.035) (0.015) (0.005) (0.007) (0.584) (0.021) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.420) (0.031) (0.025) (0.017) (0.009) (0.001) (0.513)
ESTONIA LITHUANIA SLOVENIA
-0.058*** 0.007 0.018 0.021*** 0.000 0.070 -0.093*** 0.040* -0.005 0.031*** -0.002*** -1.379*** -0.028 0.015 0.004 0.008 0.003 -0.067
(0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) ’(0.000) (0.335) (0.037) (0.021) (0.015) (0.011) (0.001) (0.663) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.453)
SPAIN LUXEMBOURG SLOVAKIA
-0.037*** -0.002 0.015 0.013*** 0.012* -0.086 -0.050*** 0.030* -0.001 0.005 -0.002 -0.95* -0.036*** 0.005 0.009 0.015 -0.009*** -0.824***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.387) (0.023) (0.019) (0.007) (0.008) (0.001) (0.543) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.001) (0.339)
FINLAND LATVIA UNITED KINGDOM
0.000 -0.018 -0.002 0.012 0.001 1.142** -0.022 -0.017 0.011 -0.012 -0.005 0.384 -0.007 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.015 0.099
(0.026) (0.021) (0.015) (0.011) (0.005) (0.590) (0.043) (0.029) (0.025) (0.012) (0.006) (1.031) (0.038) (0.037) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (1.138)
ATT estimation using the Kernel Matching Method with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. The chronic illness indicator is used as the measure of a health shock. The transitions are from full-time (FT) to other different activity statuses:
part-time (PT), unemployed (U), retired (R), inactive (I) and numebers of hour worked per week. For each country it shows number of treated and controls, respectively: AT(238;3786); BE(164;4481); BG(62;1187); CY(157;2767);
CZ(238;7544); DK(149;3358); EE(328;3640); ES(532;10933); FI(178;2257); FR(249;2866); GR(102;4600); HU(316;4780); IE(73;1684); IS(62;1208); IT(367;17274); LT(204;3601); LU(358;7700); LV(119;1916); NL(248;3828); NO(341;5378);
PL(280;7090); PO(71;820); RO(34;1107); SE(185;2582); SI(247;2635); SK(268;5500); UK(110;1997)
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Table B.11: Nearest-Neighbor ATT - using limitation in daily activities - on the probability of transiting into different labour market statuses
FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS
AUSTRIA FRANCE NETHERLAND
-0.034 -0.040 0.011 0.029 0.017* 0.198 -0.101* 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.022* -0.344 -0.064 0.005 0.011 -0.005 0.005 -1.021
(0.052) (0.046) (0.021) (0.020) (0.010) (1.089) (0.055) (0.048) (0.025) (0.011) (0.012) (1.337) (0.055) (0.055) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (1.030)
BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY
-0.071 0.010 -0.010 0.010 0.020 -0.576 0.070 -0.028 -0.014 -0.028 -0.014 0.361 -0.128*** 0.040 -0.007 0.020 0.000 -2.626***
(0.071) (0.068) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (1.490) (0.063) (0.049) (0.035) (0.021) (0.015) (1.255) (0.051) (0.044) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010) (1.073)
BULGARIA HUNGARY POLAND
0.000 0.043 0.043 -0.130 0.043 1.168 -0.081 0.015 0.015 -0.005 0.005 -1.272* -0.043 -0.043* 0.022 0.007 0.000 0.224
(0.128) (0.043) (0.085) (0.083) (0.043) (2.283) (0.037) (0.017) (0.015) (0.024) (0.005) (0.733) (0.041) (0.025) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.797)
CYPRUS IRELAND PORTUGAL
-0.075 -0.025 0.050** 0.025 0.050** -0.264 -0.245*** 0.122 0.000 0.041 -0.020 -5.748*** -0.212*** 0.058 0.077 0.038 0.038 -0.896
(0.065) (0.046) (0.031) (0.026) (0.025) (1.514) (0.097) (0.089) (0.042) (0.029) (0.022) (2.276) (0.076) (0.043) (0.054) (0.027) (0.027) (0.781)
CZECH REPUBLIC ICELAND ROMANIA
-0.199*** 0.012 0.041** 0.053** 0.000 -0.232 -0.017 -0.008 -0.011* -0.004 0.032 -7.875* -0.152* -0.022 -0.007 0.174*** 0.000 -1.409
(0.040) (0.020) (0.018) (0.027) (0.000) (0.725) (0.101) (0.063) (0.007) (0.009) (0.032) (4.226) (0.086) (0.070) (0.008) (0.078) (0.010) (1.702)
DENMARK ITALY SWEDEN
-0.103** 0.063 0.000 -0.009 0.009 -2.323*** -0.097*** 0.051** 0.006 0.017 0.015** -1.697*** -0.144*** 0.089 0.022 0.011 0.000 -0.197
(0.055) (0.042) (0.022) (-0.020) (0.009) (0.915) (0.027) (0.022) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.523) (0.069) (0.064) (0.022) (0.025) (0.000) (1.168)
ESTONIA LITHUANIA SLOVENIA
-0.107*** 0.031 0.027 0.027** 0.000 -0.480 -0.134*** 0.017 0.017 0.008 0.000 -1.158 -0.038 0.031 0.031** -0.023 0.000 -0.232
(0.031) (0.020) (0.017) (0.012) (0.000) (0.635) (0.048) (0.032) (0.017) (0.021) (0.000) (1.062) (0.036) (0.028) (0.015) (0.017) (0.000) (0.815)
SPAIN LUXEMBOURG SLOVAKIA
-0.001 -0.043* -0.007 0.023** 0.020** 1.153* -0.052 0.006 0.021 -0.003 0.006 -0.966 -0.083*** 0.028** 0.012 0.009 0.009 -0.365
(0.033) (0.023) (0.021) (0.011) (0.009) (0.716) (0.037) (0.032) (0.014) (0.013) (0.004) (0.883) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.475)
FINLAND LATVIA UNITED KINGDOM
-0.065* 0.018 -0.006 0.006 0.012 -0.390 -0.083* 0.015 0.030 0.015 0.000 -0.301 -0.047 0.031 -0.047* -0.016 0.016 -0.734
(0.039) (0.029) (0.014) (0.017) (0.008) (0.808) (0.048) (0.026) (0.034) (0.019) (0.000) (0.802) (0.083) (0.073) (0.023) (0.028) (0.027) (2.316)
ATT estimation using the Nearest-Neighbor Matching Method with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. The limitation in daily activities indicator is used as the measure of a health shock. The transitions are from full-time
(FT) to other different activity statuses: part-time (PT), unemployed (U), retired (R), inactive (I) and numebers of hour worked per week. For each country it shows number of treated and controls, respectively: AT(175;156);
BE(99;92); BG(23;19); CY(80;71); CZ(171;159); DK(117;110); EE(262;226); ES(349;339); FI(168;153); FR(139;125); GR(71;68); HU(198;188); IE(49;47); IS(29;26); IT(475;454); LT(119;111); LU(327;313); LV(113;119); NL(187;168);
NO(149;145); PL(138;128); PO(52;48); RO(40;42); SE(90;87); SI(130;118); SK(325;293); UK(65;61)
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Table B.12: Nearest-Neighbor ATT - using chronic illness - on the probability of transiting into different labour market statuses
FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS
AUSTRIA FRANCE NETHERLAND
0.000 0.004 0.021 -0.004 -0.008 1.293 0.016 -0.008 0.012 -0.036*** -0.004 -0.706 0.012 0.000 0.000 -0.028*** -0.008 0.720
(0.044) (0.039) (0.018) (0.019) (0.008) (0.918) (0.041) (0.037) (0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.974) (0.048) (0.047) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.824)
BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY
-0.012 -0.037 0.006 0.006 0.012 -1.260 0.010 0.000 0.029 -0.039** 0.000 0.180 -0.076*** 0.038 -0.006 0.000 0.003 -0.709
(0.051) (0.049) (0.006) (0.017) (0.009) (1.235) (0.050) (0.034) (0.033) (0.018) (0.000) (1.194) (0.030) (0.026) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.715)
BULGARIA HUNGARY POLAND
0.000 -0.032 -0.016 0.032 0.016 -0.076 -0.054* -0.013 0.003 0.025 0.000 0.589 -0.021 -0.014 0.014 0.004 0.004 0.552
(0.057) (0.028) (0.036) (0.034) (0.016) (1.257) (0.028) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.005) (0.480) (0.031) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.67)
CYPRUS IRELAND PORTUGAL
-0.025 -0.025 0.025** 0.006 0.006 0.630 -0.110 -0.014 0.027 0.041* 0.000 -0.856 0.000 -0.056 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.959
(0.034) (0.023) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (1.021) (0.086) (0.081) (0.036) (0.023) (0.000) (2.397) (0.059) (0.040) (0.033) (0.026) (0.014) (1.168)
CZECH REPUBLIC ICELAND ROMANIA
-0.105*** 0.042*** 0.017 0.004 0.000 -0.867 0.177** -0.113 0.000 0.000 0.000 -6.450*** -0.235*** -0.059 0.059 0.265*** -0.029 3.400
(0.035) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.000) (0.621) (0.099) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (3.592) (0.116) (0.091) (0.041) (0.077) (0.035) (2.329)
DENMARK ITALY SWEDEN
-0.027 0.034 0.013 -0.027*** 0.000 -0.768 -0.022 -0.008 0.014 0.003 -0.003 -0.529 -0.059 0.022 0.022 0.011 0.000 -0.747
(0.048) (0.044) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.997) (0.030) (0.024) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.595) (0.046) (0.042) (0.017) (0.011) (0.000) (0.793)
ESTONIA LITHUANIA SLOVENIA
-0.076*** 0.012 0.034*** 0.009 0.000 0.082 -0.123*** 0.059*** 0.000 0.034*** 0.000 -1.414** -0.036 0.016 -0.008 0.024 0.004 -0.043
(0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.000) (0.404) (0.034) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.000) (0.762) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.004) (0.553)
SPAIN LUXEMBOURG SLOVAKIA
-0.041* 0.004 0.015 0.017*** 0.009 0.118 -0.067*** 0.042 0.011 -0.014 0.000 -1.220 -0.060*** 0.000 0.022** 0.015 0.000 -0.349
(0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007) (0.539) (0.033) (0.030) (0.008) (0.012) (0.000) (0.757) (0.023) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.000) (0.488)
FINLAND LATVIA UNITED KINGDOM
0.028 -0.022 -0.034* 0.006 0.000 1.575** 0.042 0.000 0.008 -0.092*** 0.000 -0.025 0.035 -0.043 0.009 -0.010 0.018 0.577
(0.039) (0.025) (0.020) (0.015) (0.009) (0.718) (0.055) (0.024) (0.038) (0.030) (0.000) (0.870) (0.061) (0.058) (0.009) (0.017) (0.013) (1.682)
ATT estimation using the Nearest-Neighbor Matching Method with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. The chronic illness indicator is used as the measure of a health shock. The transitions are from full-time (FT) to other different
activity statuses: part-time (PT), unemployed (U), retired (R), inactive (I) and numebers of hour worked per week. For each country it shows number of treated and controls, respectively: AT(238;217); BE(164;155); BG(62;54);
CY(157;145); CZ(238;222); DK(149;144); EE(328;293); ES(532;500); FI(178;161); FR(249;225); GR(102;98); HU(316;293); IE(73;64); IS(62;45); IT(367;360); LT(204;188); LU(358;330); LV(119;100); NL(248;221); NO(341;312);
PL(280;258); PO(71;66); RO(34;30); SE(185;172); SI(247;224); SK(268;242); UK(110;101)
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Table B.13: Kernel ATT - using limitation in daily activities - on the probability of transiting into different labour market statuses - Male sample
FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS
AUSTRIA FRANCE NETHERLAND
-0.104** 0.033 0.013 0.038 0.019 0.069 -0.145** 0.056 0.031 -0.013 0.028 -1.300 -0.104** 0.026 0.033 -0.010 -0.003 -1.489***
(0.046) (0.031) (0.017) (0.025) (0.013) (0.66) (0.066) (0.047) (0.038) (0.023) (0.023) (1.032) (0.050) (0.049) (0.021) (0.013) (0.003) (0.64)
BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY
-0.123* 0.035 -0.008 0.023 -0.004*** -1.463 0.030 -0.010 0.003 -0.046 -0.003 0.633 -0.106*** 0.051* -0.008* 0.022 0.016 -3.605****
(0.064) (0.053) (0.011) (0.029) (0.002) (1.349) (0.055) (0.042) (0.035) (0.031) (0.026) (1.394) (0.046) (0.028) (0.005) (0.021) (0.018) (1.117)
BULGARIA HUNGARY POLAND
-0.200*** 0.100 0.100 0.000 0.000 -4.321 -0.117*** 0.011 0.011 0.024 0.008 -1.088** -0.045 -0.026 -0.017 0.001 -0.003*** 0.568
(0.061) (0.157) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (7.881) (0.042) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.504) (0.046) (0.036) (0.009) (0.014) (0.001) (0.871)
CYPRUS IRELAND PORTUGAL
-0.155*** 0.079** -0.019*** 0.056 0.041 -3.550** -0.150 0.059 -0.048** 0.021 -0.001 -2.050 -0.138 -0.024 -0.017 0.040 0.095* -0.994
(0.057) (0.039) (0.006) (0.038) (0.03) (1.655) (0.098) (0.06) (0.022) (0.042) (0.001) (1.638) (0.137) (0.025) (0.061) (0.049) (0.057) (1.132)
CZECH REPUBLIC ICELAND ROMANIA
-0.206*** 0.021 0.037 0.040* 0.000 -0.060 -0.061 -0.005 -0.024 0.000 0.091 -6.433 -0.418*** 0.131* -0.012 0.301*** -0.002 -2.311
(0.044) (0.019) (0.028) (0.023) (0.000) (0.812) (0.086) (0.012) (0.126) (0.000) (0.081) (9.373) (0.111) (0.073) (0.007) (0.104) (0.001) -2.391
DENMARK ITALY SWEDEN
-0.182*** 0.175*** -0.004 0.017 0.000 -2.768 -0.076*** 0.032** -0.010 0.024** 0.003 -1.254*** -0.114** 0.019 0.049 0.034 0.000 0.630
(0.068) -0.070 (0.005) (0.025) (0.000) (1.641) (0.023) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.421) (0.055) (0.034) (0.040) (0.026) (0.000) (1.065)
ESTONIA LITHUANIA SLOVENIA
-0.102*** 0.007 0.036* 0.014 0.000 0.280 -0.104* -0.002 -0.007 0.005 -0.001 0.642 -0.101** 0.055 0.051 -0.002 -0.001 -1.957***
(0.033) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.000) (0.63) (0.061) (0.016) (0.027) (0.017) (0.001) (1.198) (0.048) (0.036) (0.032) (0.015) (0.001) (0.779)
SPAIN LUXEMBOURG SLOVAKIA
-0.102*** 0.004 0.025 0.023** 0.020* 0.199 -0.077*** -0.006 0.032** 0.016 0.005 -0.524 -0.071*** 0.016 0.018 0.004 0.007 -0.204
(0.029) (0.008) (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.676) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.462) (0.029) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.007) (0.566)
FINLAND LATVIA UNITED KINGDOM
-0.074* 0.031 -0.011 0.008 0.014 -0.288 -0.181*** 0.047 0.054 0.031 -0.014 -1.051 -0.083 -0.007 -0.050*** 0.033 0.035 1.497
(0.042) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (1.172) (0.059) (0.033) (0.056) (0.027) (0.021) (0.881) (0.130) (0.04) (0.017) (0.039) (0.035) (1.771)
ATT estimation using the Kernel Matching Method with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. The limitation in daily activities indicator is used as the measure of a health shock. The transitions are from full-time (FT) to other different activity
statuses: part-time (PT), unemployed (U), retired (R), inactive (I) and numebers of hour worked per week. For each country it shows number of treated and controls, respectively: AT(96;2344); BE(51;1591); BG(10;20); CY(46;1433);
CZ(83;3641); DK(35;1725); EE(136;1779); ES(187;6405); FI(69;951); FR(70;1740); GR(39;1725); HU(93;2842); IE(25;948); IS(11;111); IT(235;10019); LT(56;1666); LU(173;4398); LV(62;981); NL(83;2352); NO(62;3600); PL(76;2692);
PO(21;179); RO(25;1180); SE(46;1710); SI(67;1098); SK(141;2689); UK(27;747)
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Table B.14: Kernel ATT - using limitation in daily activities - on the probability of transiting into different labour market statuses - Female sample
FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS
AUSTRIA FRANCE NETHERLAND
0.030 -0.084 0.032 0.003 0.011 0.825 -0.046 -0.044 0.051 -0.011 0.013 -0.313 -0.025 0.000 -0.007 -0.003** 0.006 -0.631
(0.068) (0.055) (0.031) (0.028) (0.014) (1.087) (0.068) (0.063) (0.033) (0.015) (0.012) (1.245) (0.045) (0.042) (0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (1.061)
BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY
-0.109 0.091 -0.006*** -0.011 0.036 -1.803 0.006 0.021 0.002 -0.019 -0.001 1.611 -0.238*** 0.083* 0.003 0.030* -0.005*** -3.079**
(0.083) (0.105) (0.002) (0.008) (0.029) (1.512) (0.076) (0.063) (0.038) (0.012) (0.002) (2.364) (0.053) (0.051) (0.015) (0.016) (0.001) (1.377)
BULGARIA HUNGARY POLAND
0.156 -0.017 0.041 -0.262 0.082 2.598 -0.088** 0.024 0.000 0.038* -0.003*** 0.098 -0.059 -0.026 0.054 0.029 -0.007 -1.192
(0.208) (0.052) (0.111) (0.156) (0.092) (2.843) (0.038) (0.026) (0.019) (0.020) (0.001) (0.838) (0.046) (0.020) (0.034) (0.021) (0.023) (0.954)
CYPRUS IRELAND PORTUGAL
-0.116 -0.049 0.093 -0.004 0.061 -0.517 -0.256** 0.099 0.065 0.028 -0.001 -4.205 -0.148 0.021 0.114 0.028 0.000 0.363
(0.078) (0.057) (0.069) (0.005) (0.039) (1.820) (0.117) (0.104) (0.053) (0.037) (0.001) (4.36) (0.127) (0.111) (0.084) (0.041) (0.001) (1.918)
CZECH REPUBLIC ICELAND ROMANIA
-0.218*** 0.016 0.039 0.082*** 0.000 -0.781 0.009 0.014 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -5.110 0.013 -0.067*** 0.000 0.071 -0.002 -1.117
(0.056) (0.030) (0.027) (0.034) (0.000) (0.955) (0.171) (0.106) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (5.100) (0.088) (0.024) (0.002) (0.082) (0.003) (2.913)
DENMARK ITALY SWEDEN
-0.030 -0.014 0.025 -0.012 0.002 -0.790 -0.105*** 0.063*** 0.010 0.030*** 0.010 -1.388*** -0.175*** 0.184** -0.013*** 0.001 -0.003** -1.746
(0.048) (0.045) (0.023) (0.014) (0.011) (0.822) (0.034) (0.025) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.517) (0.076) (0.081) (0.005) (0.028) (0.001) (1.102)
ESTONIA LITHUANIA SLOVENIA
-0.083** 0.063* 0.000 0.011 0.000 -1.327* -0.156*** 0.075** -0.015 0.034 -0.004*** -3.228*** -0.004 0.041 -0.015* -0.022 -0.001 -0.120
(0.039) (0.034) (0.017) (0.026) (0.000) (0.714) (0.047) (0.037) (0.015) (0.029) (0.002) (1.335) (0.03) (0.037) (0.008) (0.017) (0.001) (0.929)
SPAIN LUXEMBOURG SLOVAKIA
-0.054 -0.022 0.024 0.026** 0.024* 0.443 -0.116*** 0.057 0.019 -0.004 0.006 -1.797** -0.065** 0.028 0.008 0.007 0.003 -0.704
(0.036) (0.026) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.725) (0.039) (0.038) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.82) (0.029) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.433)
FINLAND LATVIA UNITED KINGDOM
-0.017 0.003 -0.012 0.023 0.002 0.669 0.020 -0.011 -0.018 0.012 -0.004* 0.224 -0.068 0.028 -0.010** -0.007* 0.023 0.233
(0.041) (0.028) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.749) (0.039) (0.033) (0.020) (0.025) (0.002) (1.377) (0.074) (0.075) (0.004) (0.004) (0.023) (2.537)
ATT estimation using the Kernel Matching Method with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. The limitation in daily activities indicator is used as the measure of a health shock. The transitions are from full-time (FT) to other different
activity statuses: part-time (PT), unemployed (U), retired (R), inactive (I) and numebers of hour worked per week. For each country it shows number of treated and controls, respectively: AT(79;1491); BE(48;1411); BG(11;58);
CY(33;413); CZ(88;2918); DK(82;1743); EE(126;1651); ES(162;4118); FI(99;1079); FR(69;1535); GR(31;1310); HU(105;2422); IE(24;536); IS(18;269); IT(240;7489); LT(63;1830); LU(154;3028); LV(71;916); NL(104;2142); NO(87;2838);
PL(62;2930); PO(31;274); RO(19;360); SE(44;1314); SI(63;1302); SK(184;2246); UK(38;909)
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Table B.15: Kernel ATT - using limitation in daily activities - on the probability of transiting into different labour market statuses - Young sample
FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS
AUSTRIA FRANCE NETHERLAND
-0.020 -0.023 0.024 0.000 0.020* 0.587 -0.099* 0.028 0.037 0.000 -0.001 -1.020 -0.104* 0.061 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.920
(0.042) (0.042) (0.022) (0.000) (0.011) (0.726) (0.053) (0.049) (0.033) (0.000) (0.001) (1.377) (0.053) (0.051) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001) (0.877)
BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY
-0.072 0.028 -0.008** 0.000 0.014 -0.443 -0.072 0.036 0.020 -0.003 -0.002 1.041 -0.124*** 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.008 -1.882**
(0.073) (0.069) (0.003) (0.000) (0.020) (1.810) (0.064) (0.063) (0.049) (0.002) (0.001) (1.197) (0.042) (0.034) (0.013) (0.000) (0.009) (0.929)
BULGARIA HUNGARY POLAND
-0.221 0.112 0.109* 0.000 0.000 -3.518 -0.030 0.004 0.015 0.010 -0.004*** -0.281 -0.061 -0.006 0.004 -0.002*** 0.010 -1.370
(0.172) (0.086) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (3.489) (0.033) (0.014) (0.022) (0.013) (0.001) (0.983) (0.041) (0.022) (0.021) (0.001) (0.015) (1.044)
CYPRUS IRELAND PORTUGAL
-0.091 -0.020 0.083 0.000 -0.001 0.061 -0.211*** 0.181** 0.007 0.000 -0.002 -2.675 -0.152 0.068 0.058 -0.007 0.034 -0.278
(0.093) (0.042) (0.060) (0.000) (0.001) (1.209) (0.087) (0.092) (0.040) (0.000) (0.002) (2.042) (0.096) (0.067) (0.059) (0.030) (0.031) (1.401)
CZECH REPUBLIC ICELAND ROMANIA
-0.038 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.676 -0.109 0.122 -0.019 0.000 0.000 -11.056 -0.086 0.098 -0.007 0.000 -0.005 -3.691
(0.037) (0.015) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.747) (0.217) (0.180) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (6.895) (0.108) (0.104) (0.041) (0.000) (0.007) (2.194)
DENMARK ITALY SWEDEN
-0.120** 0.064 0.006 0.000 0.008 -2.090*** -0.093*** -0.071*** 0.007 -0.001*** 0.007 -2.087*** -0.129 0.089 0.040 0.000 -0.001 -0.122
(0.055) (0.043) (0.017) (0.000) (0.015) (0.848) (0.026) (0.021) (0.011) (0.001) (0.008) (0.61) (0.067) (0.069) (0.026) (0.000) (0.001) (0.991)
ESTONIA LITHUANIA SLOVENIA
-0.075** 0.016 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.040 -0.192*** 0.102 0.003 0.000 -0.006*** -3.370*** -0.068* 0.067** 0.003 -0.001 0.000 -1.238
(0.037) (0.019) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.543) (0.059) (0.047) (0.032) (0.000) (0.002) (1.409) (0.034) (0.029) (0.012) (0.001) (0.000) (0.838)
SPAIN LUXEMBOURG SLOVAKIA
-0.072** 0.029 0.013 0.009 0.001 0.106 -0.121*** 0.046 0.039** 0.000 0.005 -1.082* -0.070*** 0.012 0.025 0.000 0.016 -0.442
(0.032) (0.021) (0.017) (0.006) (0.004) (0.728) (0.031) (0.027) (0.018) (0.000) (0.005) (0.624) (0.024) (0.010) (0.018) (0.000) (0.013) (0.453)
FINLAND LATVIA UNITED KINGDOM
-0.003 -0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.006* 0.276 -0.051 0.019 0.020 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.015 -0.056 0.011 -0.007* 0.000 0.023 -0.012
(0.041) (0.019) (0.022) (0.000) (0.003) (0.71) (0.053) (0.032) (0.032) (0.002) (0.003) (0.822) (0.077) (0.067) (0.004) (0.000) (0.031) (1.516)
ATT estimation using the Kernel Matching Method with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. The limitation in daily activities indicator is used as the measure of a health shock. The transitions are from full-time (FT) to other different
activity statuses: part-time (PT), unemployed (U), retired (R), inactive (I) and numebers of hour worked per week. I define an individual as being young if he/she aged less than 49 years. For each country it shows number of treated
and controls, respectively: AT(963042); BE(532143); BG(843); CY(301539); CZ(654429); DK(632255); EE(1182606); ES(2128274); FI(951356); FR(742491); GR(372280); HU(933539); IE(251135); IS(13257); IT(27412900); LT(461258);
LU(2045793); LV(631451); NL(1002863); NO(884425); PL(655863); PO(28566); RO(16602); SE(561574); SI(801655); SK(1704034); UK(401303)
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Table B.16: Kernel ATT - using limitation in daily activities - on the probability of transiting into different labour market statuses - Old sample
FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS FT-FT FT-PT FT-U FT-R FT-I HOURS
AUSTRIA FRANCE NETHERLAND
-0.024 -0.041 0.025 0.023 0.008 0.865 -0.071 -0.003 0.024 -0.038* 0.046* -1.754 -0.086 0.031 0.020 -0.013 0.005 -2.016**
(0.079) (0.048) (0.026) (0.036) (0.010) (1.330) (0.075) (0.063) (0.036) (0.020) (0.024) (1.686) (0.063) (0.058) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.960)
BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY
-0.097 0.050 -0.009*** 0.000 0.013 -2.683 0.092 -0.013 0.008 -0.083* -0.003 0.763 -0.209*** 0.107 -0.001 0.057 0.000 -5.876***
(0.093) (0.065) (0.004) (0.029) (0.042) (1.833) (0.081) (0.036) (0.030) (0.049) (0.005) (2.32) (0.087) (0.072) (0.001) (0.04) (0.000) (1.540)
BULGARIA HUNGARY POLAND
0.142 -0.056 0.037 -0.190 0.067 3.483 -0.149*** 0.032 -0.014 0.026 0.007 -0.653 -0.026 -0.057 0.024 0.014 -0.007*** 0.645
(0.178) (0.052) (0.055) (0.135) (0.071) (5.953) (0.038) (0.021) (0.012) (0.028) (0.010) (0.575) (0.054) (0.042) (0.021) (0.028) (0.002) (0.995)
CYPRUS IRELAND PORTUGAL
-0.188*** 0.062 0.016 0.044 0.077 -3.286** -0.174 -0.032 0.001 0.044 0.000 -2.989 -0.198 0.001 0.088 0.083 0.042 -0.442
(0.064) (0.052) (0.034) (0.031) (0.040) (1.621) (0.152) (0.130) (0.053) (0.079) (0.001) (4.265) (0.171) (0.126) (0.091) (0.061) (0.039) (2.502)
CZECH REPUBLIC ICELAND ROMANIA
-0.299*** 0.038* 0.047 0.084*** 0.000 -0.439 0.049 -0.075 -0.016 -0.014 0.057 1.158 -0.344*** 0.001 -0.005 0.354*** -0.002 0.959
(0.056) (0.023) (0.029) (0.030) (0.000) (0.947) (0.185) (0.148) (0.101) (0.028) (0.048) (4.559) (0.097) (0.075) (0.004) (0.090) (0.002) (2.901)
DENMARK ITALY SWEDEN
-0.039 0.035 0.029 -0.017 -0.001 -1.211 -0.111*** 0.049** -0.007 0.050*** 0.007 -0.710 -0.146 0.083 -0.015 0.050 -0.001 -0.726
(0.063) (0.059) (0.032) (0.039) (0.000) (1.114) (0.037) (0.024) (0.005) (0.022) (0.009) (0.515) (0.097) (0.080) (0.015) (0.047) (0.001) (1.482)
ESTONIA LITHUANIA SLOVENIA
-0.099*** 0.041 0.012 0.026 0.000 -0.703 -0.087* -0.006 -0.023* 0.025 0.000 0.073 -0.021 0.016 0.050 -0.044 -0.002 -0.571
(0.033) (0.024) (0.018) (0.022) (0.000) (0.761) (0.046) (0.019) (0.013) (0.032) (0.000) (0.902) (0.057) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.002) (0.813)
SPAIN LUXEMBOURG SLOVAKIA
-0.131*** -0.022 0.040*** 0.041* 0.056*** -0.699 -0.079* 0.042 0.011 -0.010 0.008 -2.630** -0.042 0.028 0.001 -0.013 0.000 -0.424
(0.041) (0.026) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.669) (0.044) (0.036) (0.012) (0.023) (0.009) (1.382) (0.032) (0.023) (0.013) (0.018) (0.000) (0.695)
FINLAND LATVIA UNITED KINGDOM
-0.089 0.047 -0.029** 0.031 0.021 -0.217 -0.084 0.004 0.018 0.041 -0.018 -0.855 -0.161 0.039 -0.007 0.015 0.037 1.538
(0.057) (0.036) (0.014) (0.027) (0.022) (1.096) (0.070) (0.045) (0.037) (0.030) (0.029) (1.247) (0.149) (0.102) (0.007) (0.056) (0.036) (3.402)
ATT estimation using the Kernel Matching Method with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. The limitation in daily activities indicator is used as the measure of a health shock. The transitions are from full-time (FT) to other different
activity statuses: part-time (PT), unemployed (U), retired (R), inactive (I) and numebers of hour worked per week. I define an individual as being old if he/she is 49 years or more. For each country it shows number of treated and
controls, respectively: AT(79;876); BE(45;743); BG(15;30); CY(50;753); CZ(106;2676); DK(54;1458); EE(144;1080); ES(137;2624); FI(73;626); FR(65;722); GR(34;881); HU(105;1261); IE(23;21); IS(16;108); IT(201;4168); LT(73;1289);
LU(123;1462); LV(70;561); NL(87;1304); NO(61;2063); PL(73;2017); PO(24;65); RO(30;531); SE(34;1065); SI(50;613); SK(155;1136); UK(25;845)
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Table B.17: Kernel ATT - using limitation in daily activities - on the probability of staying in full-time job - Education sample
With education: more than tertiary
AUSTRIA BELGIUM BULGARIA CYPRUS CZECH REPUBLIC DENMARK ESTONIA SPAIN FINLAND FRANCE GREECE HUNGARY IRELAND ICELAND
-0.133 0.003 no obs. -0.056 -0.151* -0.026 -0.036 0.006 -0.008 0.069 0.005 -0.094* -0.419*** 0.052
(0.104) (0.070) (0.096) (0.091) (0.074) (0.047) (0.03) (0.045) (0.078) (0.077) (0.051) (0.145) (0.103)
[(41;1076)] [(36;1778)] [(11;391)] [(20;708)] [(42;1356)] [(89;1029)] [(94;3871)] [(58;826)] [(26;1184)] [(19;821)] [(43;1223)] [(13;390)] [(5;13)]
ITALY LITHUANIA LUXEMBOURG LATVIA NETHERLAND NORWAY POLAND PORTUGAL ROMANIA SWEDEN SLOVENIA SLOVAKIA UNITED KINGDOM
-0.093 -0.155*** -0.095* -0.084 -0.045 -0.308*** 0.018 no obs. -0.500*** -0.140 0.028 -0.051 -0.103
(0.059) (0.055) (0.050) (0.066) (0.055) (0.057) (0.072) (0.167) (0.095) (0.024) (0.040) (0.076)
[(90;3820)] [(73;2161)] [(71;2387)] [(33;568)] [(70;1808)] [(65;2948)] [(28;1025)] [(2;2)] [(27;1048)] [(25;461)] [(58;880)] [(31;775)]
No education: less than tertiary
AUSTRIA BELGIUM BULGARIA CYPRUS CZECH REPUBLIC DENMARK ESTONIA SPAIN FINLAND FRANCE GREECE HUNGARY IRELAND ICELAND
-0.018 -0.115 -0.026 -0.162*** -0.229*** -0.142*** -0.105*** -0.122*** -0.05 -0.127* 0.041 -0.102*** -0.110 -0.041
(0.029) (0.082) (0.166) (0.055) (0.034) (0.058) (0.033) (0.028) (0.032) (0.040) (0.064) (0.031) (0.093) (0.122)
[(134;2692)] [(63;1664)] [(20;315)] [(69;1768)] [(151;6127)] [(75;2529)] [(173;2147)] [(255;6732)] [(110;996)] [(113;2260)] [(51;1790)] [(155;3929)] [(36;715)] [(24;549)]
ITALY LITHUANIA LUXEMBOURG LATVIA NETHERLAND NORWAY POLAND PORTUGAL ROMANIA SWEDEN SLOVENIA SLOVAKIA UNITED KINGDOM
-0.103*** -0.086 -0.104*** -0.049 -0.093*** -0.115*** -0.066 -0.158*** -0.247*** -0.144*** -0.079*** -0.076*** -0.075
(0.027) (0.072) (0.027) (0.051) (0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.100) (0.079) (0.055) (0.027) (0.021) (0.093)
[(385;13018)] [(46;1065)] [(256;4913)] [(100;1346)] [(117;2288)] [(84;3660)] [(110;5736)] [(48;756)] [(44;1568)] [(63;2059)] [(104;1743)] [(267;4214)] [(34;1093)]
ATT estimation using the Kernel Matching Method with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. The limitation in daily activities indicator is used as the measure of a health shock. The transitions are from full-time (FT) to full-time (PT)
by education degree. The standard errors are in parentheses. In square brackets, number of treated and controls.81
Table B.18: Sensitivity analysis for Nearest-Neighbor matching estimates
Country ATT Old Male
AT -0.034 0.003 -0.017
BE -0.071 -0.051 -0.066
BG 0.000 -0.033 -0.005
CY -0.075 -0.116 -0.133
CZ -0.199 -0.164 -0.175
DK -0.103 -0.064 -0.023
EE -0.107 -0.088 -0.093
ES -0.001 -0.07 -0.058
FI -0.065 -0.04 -0.035
FR -0.101 -0.089 -0.077
GR 0.070 0.030 0.034
HU -0.081 -0.069 -0.073
IE -0.245 -0.183 -0.202
IS -0.034 -0.014 -0.023
IT -0.097 -0.083 -0.07
LT -0.134 -0.103 -0.124
LU -0.052 -0.07 -0.063
LV -0.083 -0.05 -0.048
NL -0.064 -0.046 -0.06
NO -0.128 -0.147 -0.139
PL -0.043 -0.012 -0.026
PO -0.212 -0.125 -0.158
RO -0.152 -0.132 -0.181
SE -0.144 -0.129 -0.136
SI -0.038 -0.048 -0.046
SK -0.083 -0.049 -0.053
UK -0.047 -0.057 -0.081
Notes: This table displays results of the
sensitivity analysis developed by Ichino




Do ut des is not enough:
intergenerational transfers and
exchange in informal care
3.1 Introduction
Private monetary transfers from parents to adult children, living in a separate house-
hold, have been identified as an important share of aggregate net worth in the developed
economies such as the United States or Germany (Villanueva, 2005). Moreover, recent
evidence from Europe suggests that unpaid elderly care from adult children can be
at least partly explained by exchange.1 In this analysis I combine these two different
branches of the literature in order to explain the effect of having received the monetary
transfer on the intergenerational exchange of informal care later in life. Some authors ar-
gue that competition between siblings for the access to bequests or monetary intervivos
transfer may induce them to increase the contacts with their parents (Bernheim et al.,
1985; Angelini, 2007). Several studies on parent-to-child financial assistance show that
a large fraction of parents help their adult offspring with housing, either in the form of
cohabitation, downpayments, real-estate donations or other kinds of monetary support
(Pollak, 1988; Guiso and Jappelli, 2002; Cox and Stark, 2005; Manacorda and Moretti,
1Jimenez-Martin and Prieto (2013) use the first two waves of the Survey of Health and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) to estimate a double-hurdle model for a parental decision to provide financial support
for adult children and the amount involved, taking into account the potential endogeneity of informal
caregiving.
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2006). Other economists focus on intervivos and intergenerational transfers, which have
received particular attention in the literature because of their tied nature (Norton and
Houtven, 2006; Alessie et al., 2011; Norton and Huang, 2013).
I aim to contribute to this last area of research by empirically investigating the
causal effect of tied monetary transfers on both unpaid elderly care and grandchildren
care later on in life. To the extent of my knowledge, this is one of the few empirical
analyses which look both at transfer and caring decisions in a extended family.2 I
extensively study which covariates influence the exchange of future services including the
monetary transfer received in the past which represent the main regressor. Empirically
addressing the relationship between intervivos transfers and exchange of services later
on in life is complex, due to different factors which may influence this association and
confound the causal effect. I synthetically summarize them as follows: (i) differences
across cohorts, areas and individuals with different observable characteristics which
may determine this relationship; (ii) smaller current geographical distance associated
with the monetary help. The exchange of informal care may be partially induced by
the geographical distance; (iii) unobservable characteristics associated with a greater
propensity for transfers determined by “family taste”. This study exploits data from
two waves (1998 and 2003) of the Italian Multipurpose Survey on Families. This data
contains a rich set of retrospective information on (financial) help received by adult
children, together with information on the current individual socioeconomic conditions
and the family network.3
In this analysis I consider these three issues above mentioned. I take advantage of
the extremely rich information available in the dataset and, in particular, in order to
tackle the endogeneity issue driven by family taste, I exploit the variation in the job
occupations of parents and in-laws when their (adult) children were 14 years old. I
check the sensitivity of the estimates using different estimators. An ideal instrument
should be relevant and exogenous with respect to the main outcomes. On the one hand,
the specific job occupations of the parents should be correlated with the affordability
of the financial transfer, which can be tested in the first-stage regression (sub-section
3.5.1). On the other hand, the probability of receveing transfer must not directly im-
2I consider the interactions in terms of monetary and care exchange between generations.
3Although recent data from SHARELIFE contain similar information, that dataset has the limit of
being focused on individuals aged 50 or more. Differently, here I am able to select younger individuals
as well, for which childcare is likely to be more valuable.
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pact the future exchange of informal care, which seems plausible. Nevertheless I check
the sensitivity in sub-section 3.5.6 where I can compare different results under different
econometric assumptions. I study the set of instruments in Section 3.5.5. In all the
specifications I control for a large number of individual and household covariates both
for parents and adult children. I find the job occupations within the family of origin
highly correlated with the likelihood to obtain a money transfer (from parents). The
underlying mechanism principally relies on the interaction between mother and father
work positions (and in-laws) which should capture the heterogeneity in wealth of house-
hold of origin. The likelihood of receiving a monetary transfer from parents depends
on the specific combination of the occupation of the parents during the childhood of
their offspring. Basically, when parents or in-laws are both employed I should observe a
higher probability to receive the monetary transfer to adult children. The results hold
using both different specifications and estimators. I therefore define an IV strategy by
estimating a two-equation model in which I exploit the variability in job occupations
within the family of origin, when the offspring was 14 years old, to explain the propen-
sity to obtain a monetary transfer later in life conditioning on a rich set of covariates
for the parents, the adult couple and the children. My findings suggest that the adult
children who have received the monetary help from parents are 8 percentage points
more likely to provide informal care to their parents (0.16 in the IV specification). In
addition, those parents, who have helped their adult children during some periods of
economic hardship, are the ones who provide more grandchildren care.
Several ideas have been advanced to explain the positive correlation between tied
transfers and exchange in services. Cox and Stark (2005) formalize four possible reasons
which explain its relevance. One reason is related to the paternalistic preferences in the
sense that donors care about the composition of the recipient’s consumption. Second,
the parents want to avoid their children overconsuming early in life and demanding
again financial help later on. The third one relates to the idea that this assistance is
particularly relevant when children have liquidity constraints, for instance when they
need to borrow a durable good (e.g. a house) or when they suffer from economic
hardship. The fourth and last explanation reconnects these transfers with unpaid care.
Elderly parents invest in their adult children in order to increase the “production of
grandchildren”, through a transfer. The reason is that in the presence of offsprings
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the adult children are more willing to provide care, because grandchildren are likely
to imitate their behaviour and help them when they will be old themselves (Cox and
Stark, 1996). By way of explanation, it may be the case that parents transfer the money
to their adult children increasing, defacto, the likelihood to “produce” granchildren.
Then, the adult children could make visible the provision of elderly care so that, when
the time comes, the grandchildren will, in turn, feel committed to behave accordingly
with their own parents. This is called demonstration effect. Taking into consideration
these theoretical reasons, I should expect to empirically observe a positive relationship
between intergenerational transfers and exchange in services.
The remainder of the analysis is organized as follows: Section 3.2 briefly describes
the theoretical models. Section 3.3 provides some stylized facts. Section 3.4 describes
the data and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 presents the empirical
method, it explains the identification strategy, it discusses the empirical findings on the
effect of monetary transfer on the exchange of informal care later on in life and finally




The intergenerational transfers between families are heterogeneous because they differ
both in types (monetary, in-kind, time) and in motives. Arrondel and Masson (2006)
demonstrate that, in developed countries, upstream transfers are generally in form of
caregiving (so basically the time spent) from adult children to their elderly parents
(Arrondel and Masson, 2006). The financial and in-kind transfers normally take place
at an earlier stage of the life-cycle, when young individuals are investing in their hu-
man capital, or later on, when they acquire their own house or if they experience a
period of economic instability. In fact, financial transfers from parents to adult chil-
dren are also used as an informal insurance towards income shocks, in particular in the
case of economic harship caused by, for instance, unemployment Becker et al. (2010).
Other branches of the literature about downstream transfers describe the provision of
grandchildren care from grandparents so that the parents are able to work and/or re-
duce expenditure on paid child-care (Arpino et al., 2010). Evidently, this brings about
self-evident policy implications for the society.
Taken to the extreme, the majority of the models of family transfers considers only
two generations and focuses on two motives: “altruism” and “exchange”. Unfortu-
nately, despite the potential importance of understanding family behaviors, a consensus
has not yet been reached on the most appropriate model of behavior as none of the
hypothesized models appears to be consistent with observed patterns of giving. In fact,
the empirical evidence has sometimes been inconsistent with any of the standard models
McGarry (2012). Laferrere and Wolff (2006) and Arrondel and Masson (2006) provide
a comprehensive review of the relevant theoretical literature and summarize the avail-
able empirical evidence, respectively. In the case of altruism, the individual maximizes
his utility considering as part of his own objective function someone else’s utility. Cox
(1987) points out the fact that altruism motive does not rule out the possibility that
children provide services to their parents. At the same time, the adult children are
over-compensated, therefore the parents do not ”obtain” the whole surplus from their
relationship. In a similar framework, the altruism model allows for heterogeneity in the
parents’ behaviour, and this is the case in which, for example, the parents care about a
specific components of the other’s utility.
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On the far side of altruism, the exchange may induce individuals to interact with
other members in their extended family. The timing of this reciprocity can take place
either contemporaneously or at different moments in time. This study focuses on the
second case which involves adult children who reward their parents with elderly care once
they have received from them money help during a period of downturn. For example,
Norton and Houtven (2006); Norton and Huang (2013), empirically analysed the fact
that caregivers are more likely to have received (or receive) money from their parents
(although there are no difference in terms of amounts). The second alternative is that
parents use strategically their bequeatable wealth. Assuming that they are indifferent
between siblings, they can make threats of disinheriting and increase the amount of
caregiving or attention they can receive Bernheim et al. (1985). Looking at the more
complex set of possible intervivos transfers, there are several reasons why financial help
may be part of an inter-temporal exchange with services provided by adult children later
on. First of all, when intergenerational transfers act as a substitute for the credit market
(Guiso and Jappelli, 2002), it is not difficult to believe that caregiving services are used
to pay back part of the sum. This can be part of a “family constitution” (Cigno et al.,
2006) that leads to an equilibrium across generations, where each individual voluntarily
chooses whether to take part in it or not. Secondly, Cox and Stark (2005) suggest
that elderly parents may invest in their adult children’s housing in order to increase
the “production of grandchildren”, hoping that their presence will induce the middle
generation to set a good example by providing elder care (“demonstration effect”).
From the policy prospective, households responding to altruism feelings will com-
pletely neutralize the effects of a government redistribution by perfectly adjusting the
level of their family assistance, at least when it exists an interior solution for such pri-
vate transfer (Barro, 1974). Under exchange motives, public income redistribution is
not necessarily neutralized by modifications of family transfer. For instance, the US
flows between parents and their non-coresident children is of 65 billion in 2010 dollars
(Gale and Scholz, 1994). Such transfers are likely to have a substantial impact on the
well-being of both donors and recipients and will have consequences for the distribution
of wealth and not only. As large as these transfers are, more likely the individual will
possibly alter his/her behavior in response to incentives, as theory predicts. In addition,
family transfers may interact with public ones, and in doing so, they could alter the ef-
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fectiveness and eventual beneficiaries of government transfer programs. In the following
Section I show some stylized facts which motivate this study.
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3.3 Stylized facts and motivation of this study
On the one hand, informal care is the largest source of long-term care for elderly, surpass-
ing home health care and nursing home care. By definition, informal care is unpaid. It
remains a puzzle why so many adult children give away their time for free. On the other
hand, intergenerational transfers between family members are a crucial economic phe-
nomenon, particularly those transfers from parents to children. Family transfers matter
for the effectiveness of public safety nets, since the effects of public income redistribu-
tion depend in part on private responses to them and especially on family assistance
decisions. Different outcomes for public policies that redistribute income are expected
under “altruism” and under “exchange”. Understanding this relationship is relevant
because it involves two of the most important forms of support between members of the
extended family network: informal care exchange and monetary transfers.
Table 3.1: Transfer from parents and informal care in Europe















50+ who help their
children with
grandchildrencare
France 22 3362 5.3 41.6
Germany 27 2203 8.2 37.2
Spain 9 3493 8.7 42.2
Italy 16 3436 6.4 45.4
Source: SHARE (2004), Pittini (2012), Brugiavini et al. (2013), Albertini et al. (2007).
First, the frequency of the monetary transfers from parents to children is not only
a peculiarity of the Italy as people might think. It appears as a strong and common
phenomenon across Europe which involves a large fraction of households as it is shown
in Table 3.1. This should help to believe on the external validity of this study. In
column (1) the percentage of households that receive a financial transfer from parents
ranges between 9% in Spain (with a confidence interval between 7% to 10%) and 27%
in Germany (Albertini et al., 2007). The authors give a brief descriptive overview of
the frequency and intensity of money and time transfers between parents and children
across 10 European countries covered by SHARE. Their results confirm the existence
of a common transfer pattern at the European level. There is a net downward flow
from the older to the younger generations, both by intervivos financial transfers and
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by social support. Transfers from the elderly parents to their children are much more
frequent and also usually much more intense than those in the opposite direction. These
numbers are coherent with the ones I find in my sample, where I slightly underestimate
this effect. I observe that around 11% of the married couples received a financial transfer
from their parents while Albertini et al. (2007) estimate around 16 %. In column (2)
I report the financial amount of the transfer per donor. In Germany the yearly mean
value is the lowest (about 2200 euros) while in France, Spain and Italy, as expected, the
financial transfer to children is higher than Northern countries (about 3500 euros).
Second, informal care involves a large fraction of the population and it has relevant
economic implications. Despite the growth of professional services, unpaid help from
adult children still represents an important form of assistance for the elderly in need of
care. Only less than 3% of the sample buys formal care on the market. Data from the
SHARE survey show that in Italy the proportion of households with members aged 50+
receiving help from adult children is around 6.4 per cent, coherently with figures from
other European countries. Similarly, grandparents play a crucial role in looking after
young children, with around 40 per cent of them providing this kind of help in France,
Germany, Spain and Italy, according to the SHARE survey (Table 3.1). Furthermore,
as highlighted by Brugiavini et al. (2013), there is evidence of reciprocity between the
provision of grandchildren care and the receipt of informal care later on.
I aim at providing additional evidence regarding the relation between monetary
transfers during a period of hardship and exchange of informal care later in time, for
which the available empirical literature is rather limited. First of all, I want to under-
stand whether there is support for the claim by Arrondel and Masson (2006) that there
is limited empirical evidence for intertemporal exchange between family transfers. This
yields the estimation of the effect of monetary transfer on the exchange of services. Sec-
ondly, I check whether this relation is simply driven by other important factors such as
socio-economic variables or geographical proximity, which implies that parents choose
strategically in order to keep their children close to them. Then I implement an instru-
mental variable approach in order to address the issue of the potential endogeneity of
monetary transfers. Furthermore, I give robust evidence of the relation between mone-
tary transfer and granchildren care. Parents who have helped their offsprings during a
period of economic downturn are those who also provide more granchildren care later
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in life. Moreover, I corroborate the hypothesis of possible “demonstration effect” intro-
duced by Cox and Stark (2005). In fact, I observe a positive correlation between having
received the monetary help from the parents and the adult child fertility. I show that
tied transfers, elderly care and help with grandchildren are part of a complex network
of exchange. I find evidence of reciprocity between members of the extended family and
pure altruism in the case of grandchildren care.
As it shown in Table 3.1, the intergenerational exchange within a family has rele-
vant consequences for many countries in Europe and among these Italy represents an
interesting case study. In the first place, the provision of care services both to the el-
derly in need and the kids are mainly left to families. Secondly, debt restrictions and
credit markets to the young are more severe than in other countries, so individuals may
need to ask for help to their parents. The main findings indicate that only a small part
of the association between these different forms of intergenerational assistance can be
explained by geographical proximity, which, in principle, should induce the exchange.
Furthermore, the IV estimates limit the endogeneity concerns suggesting that the re-
sults are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity in the strength of family ties. To the
best of my knowledge, there are only a few studies that are closely related to this one,
although they only focus on housing transfers. Tomassini et al. (2003) explored data
from the first wave of the Multipurpose Survey. They find that tied housing transfers
from parents induce smaller geographical distance of adult children after their marriage,
and that this proximity is quite persistent over time. Differently from them, I focus on
monetary transfers during a period of economic hardship and the relation with elderly
and grandchildren care. Coda Moscarola et al. (2010) investigate a similar question
to mine, but using data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and
Wealth. Similarly to Tomassini et al. (2003), they find that children who receive larger
financial transfers tend to live closer to their parents. They interpret this result in a
model where the old generation increases the proximity to their adult children because
this raises the likelihood of receiving care. Therefore, they only focus on geographical
distance as a proxy for caregiving, but in fact they are only able to provide evidence
similar to Tomassini et al. (2003). Furthermore, their dataset does not contain direct
information on unpaid care, which are instead among my main dependent variables.4
4Other studies on this area of research, which are not very recent are: Schoeni (1997) and Altonji
et al. (2000). They both use tobit models to estimate the relation between care and intervivos transfers
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3.4 Data and descriptives
3.4.1 Data and sample selection
I use data from the first two consecutive waves of Multiscopo sulle Famiglie, soggetti
sociali e condizione dell’infanzia (Multipurpose Survey on Family and Childhood Con-
ditions), a survey carried by ISTAT every five years starting from 1998 on the private
household population of Italy. The survey sampled around 30,000 households to collect
information on household structure, family network, unpaid assistance, important life
cycle events and labour market conditions. The total sample size is 108,591 respondents
and the selection procedure is reported in Table 3.2.5
There are no missing values, because ISTAT traditionally provides data where all
values have been imputed using multivariate methods.6 Clearly, this is a drawback
for the analysis, but unfortunately ISTAT does not provide indicators for whether or
not a single variable has been subject to imputation or correction. Only for some
discrete explanatory variables, such as health or retrospective questions, missing values
are explicitly allowed to account for cases where the respondent does not want to answer
or does not remember. Instead of dropping them, I add the respective category along
with the other dummies. The dataset is a stratified sample where strata are defined
by region and dimension of the town/city of residence.7 To guarantee anonymity, the
dataset is released in two versions that cannot be merged: in the first one, the region of
residence is provided, but not the dimension of the town; in the other one, the dimension
is provided but only broader geographical areas are available. I prefer to use the former
although results do not change if the other dimension is chosen.8
I focus on the household dimension and the consequences of a monetary transfer
between generations so I restrict the analysis to married cohabiting couples. To maintain
consistency throughout the paper, I refer to the first generation as parents (or in-laws),
on the one hand and donor and recipient income on the other.
5I also have the data for the wave 2009 but were no questions about money transfers, which is one
of the main variable of interest. This is the main reason why I do not consider this wave.
6In the original responses there are missing values but they have been recoded by ISTAT.
7I do not include sample weights, both because I pool two cross-sections and because I focus on
modelling the relationships among different variables. Nevertheless, as Solon et al. (2013) claim, in the
case of mis-specification, it is not clear whether unweighted estimates produce a good approximation.
Given that this is not guaranteed even when using weights, I follow the quite standard approach of
including the stratification variables (area of residence and regions) among the covariates
8The results are the same if I cluster the standard errors by Italian regions. I use robust option to
control for heteroskedasticity in the errors.
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the second one as adults both wife and her partner and the third generation as children.
Figure 3.1 sketches the intergenarational exchange pattern under this analysis. Par-
ents and in-laws may help their adult children through a financial transfer. In turn,
adult children may provide elderly care to their parents. In addition, in the presence
of offspring, adults may also benefit from their parents’ assistance (grandchildren care).
In this analysis I study all these relationships in place.9
Figure 3.1: Monetary transfer and informal care exchange
In order to correctly identify the adult children, I keep only cases where one of the
partners is the reference person of the interview, which are the large majority of the
cases (around 98%).
Table 3.2: Sample selection
1998 2003 Total
Obs % Obs % Obs
Original sample 59050 49541 108591
Only married couple 29750 -49.6 24138 -51.3 53888
Only if reference person or partner 29038 -2.4 23574 -2.3 52612
Only one observation per couple (wife) 14519 -50.0 11787 -50.0 26306
Only if both partners aged between 20 and 70 12993 -10.5 9990 -15.2 22983
With at least one parent alive on BOTH sides 7466 -42.5 5247 -47.5 12713
Not cohabiting with parents or in-laws 7143 -4.3 5065 -3.5 12208
Excluding those with parents or in-laws abroad 6966 -2.5 4863 -4.0 11829
Source: Multipurpose Survey on Family and Childhood Conditions Dataset.
Given that I am interested in the exchange of informal care between parents and
adult children, I decide to select couples aged between 20 and 70 years old. According
to the National Statistical Office, almost 80% of the population under the age of 70
has the mother still alive, while the father is alive in 61.4% of the cases (Battistin
et al., 2013). I estimate a number of specifications using different age groups to test
the sensitivity of the results in Section 3.5. The information on marriage is collected
9The second generation, adult children in Figure 3.1, is the observation unit in this study.
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with respect to the first wedding in 1998, and to the last one in 2003, and therefore I
exclude cases of previous divorce or widowhood. These were still a minority in 1998,
and slightly increased in 2003 (Table 3.2). I restrict the sample to couples where there
is at least one parent alive, because the main interest lies on the intervivos exchange
of family services. I also exclude those cases where the couple cohabits with parents at
the time of the interview, because the survey does not allow me to identify elderly care
in such cases. This involves only around 4% of the couples. Lastly, I exclude the few
cases with parents or in-laws residing abroad, because these are likely to be driven by
sensibly different migratory processes. At the end of the selection process I end up with
11,829 observations.
In all the waves, adults are asked whether they provide any help to non-coresident
individuals. They then have to specify the most important kind of help they provide,
and who receives it, with possible multiple recipients. The question in the Multipurpose
Survey on Family and Childhood Conditions states:
In the last four weeks, have you provided free services (medical assistance,
adult care, domestic work, company, or paper work) to your parents?
Possible answer: Yes or No
Around 85.29% of those who report that their most important help is directed towards
their parents say that it consists of informal care. I define the dummy ICP (Informal
Care Provided) equal to one for those who report that this help is directed to their
parents and that it consists of either medical assistance, adult care, domestic work,
company, or paper work. The fact that I observe elderly care only when it is the most
important help provided to non-coresident individuals can lead to an underestimation
of the total amount of caregivers.
Furthermore, respondents are asked to identify the person who currently entrusts
with their child or teenager when she is not with her parents or at school. I define the
dummy ICR (Informal Care Received) equal to one for those who report that this task is
carried out by their grandparents, without distinguishing the wife’s parents from her in-
laws. I select the first category and around 43% of the individuals in the sample report
that they receive this kind of help from their parents. The corresponding question is:
Which of the following adults is entrusted for child care when the offsprings
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are not with their parents or school?
Possible answer: 1. grandparents 2. Uncle/Aunt 3. Brothers/sisters 4.
Other relatives 5. Friends 6. Baby-sitter.
Individuals are also asked about the distance between their residence and that of their
parents at the time of the interview. The distance should have a strong impact on
the informal care provision because it may induce the exchange. The information is
reported as a categorical variable: cohabiting; in another flat in the same building; in
the same town, within 1 km; in the same town, more than 1 km away; in another town,
within 16 kms; in another town between 16 and 50 kms away; more than 50 kms away.
I define the variable DIST (distance to parents or in-laws) as the minimum distance
from either the mother or the father, in case they live apart. This is available for both
adults.10
The main explanatory variable, Parents’ transfer, is a dummy for monetary help
received during a period of economic hardship and difficulties. This covariate is equal
to one for those who report that they received monetary help from parents (or in-laws),
and to zero otherwise. Around 11% of sample reports that they have received a transfer
from the family of origin. The statement in the questionnaire is:11
During your life, starting from the time you moved out of your parents’
house, have you ever been in financial difficulties?
Possible answer: Yes or No
As briefly described in the Introduction, I address the endogeneity issue, coming from
potential family taste between generations, using the job variability of parents and in-
laws when the adult child was 14 years old. The ideal instruments should be correlated
with Parents’ transfer and they should not directly impact the informal care later on in
life. In this context, the set of instruments can be considered as a proxy for the wealth
of the family of origin and, once I control for all the other possible covariates which may
influence the transmission mechanism, I use the variation across families as a source of
shock in wealth. Among the most relevant variables which may influence the likelihood
of receveing the transfer, I include a large set of socio-demographic controls such as
10In the cases where parents or in-laws live apart, this is defined as the distance from either the
mother or the father, whichever is the smallest. This information is available for both adults.
11The couple has received the trasfers in the past with respect to the year of the interviews.
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number of siblings, number of children, job position, etc. Despite the absence of direct
information on income and wealth, I have information on education, employment status
and sources of income of the individuals at the time of interview (1998 and 2003), which
are good proxies for them. Moreover, I control for parents’ characteristics such as age,
health condition and education.12 In Panel A of Table D.2, I show the statistics on the
parents’ occupation during the childhood of their offspring. In Panel B I do the same
exercise for the parents in-law. The most common occupation is blue collar employee
(44%) and housework (65%) for both parents’ side.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.3 shows the incidence of earmarked transfers is substantial: about 12% of the
married couples in the sample received financial support from parents or in-laws in 1998
and this figure marginally shrinks to 8% in 2003.
Table 3.3: Monetary transfer from parents and in-laws
Money Help Year
1998 2003 Total
No 87.91 91.90 89.55
[Obs.] [6,124] [4,469] [10,593]
Yes 12.09 8.10 10.45
[Obs.] [842] [394] [1,236]
Total 6966 4863 11829
Source: Multipurpose Survey on Family and Child-
hood Conditions Dataset (1998 and 2003). In squared
brackets I show the numbers of observed adult couples.
Then, I analyse the trend of the intergenerational transfer from parents to adult
children over time. Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of couples who received transfer
from parents during the period 1965-2000. The variable of interest evolves following an
increasing trend and it reaches the local pick after each period of economic downturn
(such as OPEC oil price shock in the early 70s and it grows again during the 90s when
Italy decided to devalue Italian Lira by 7%).13 Several authors have recognized the
role of the family as an insurance mechanism against different risks or misadventures
(Altonji et al., 1997). Better knowledge of the criteria used by families, and especially
parents, to provide financial support for their adult children would improve decision-
12I provide all set of covariates in Table D.1.
13In the empirical Section, I statistically test the presence of possible cohort effect. I set age groups
every ten years from 1930 to 1980 and I test the joint significance of the parameters. In all the specifi-
cations, I could not reject H0 (all the parameters equal to zero) with a F-test with prob(0.62). Similar
results in case in which I select groups of five years. Then, once I account for all the set of covariates,
the cohort effects are not statistically different from zero.
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makers’ ability to design effective social programs that improve the quality of life of
more vulnerable individuals.
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The data show an increasing trend of the percentage of people who receive a tied
transfer from parents or in-laws till the mid-1980s and then it stabilizes in the last 15
years. Then I focus on the relationship between geographical location between parents
and adult children because the distance itself may be one of the most important driving
forces. Geographical proximity between generations is one of the possible links between
tied transfer and the reproduction of the familistic welfare system. Figure 3.3 describes
the current distance between wife and husband and their corrispondent parents by
help received (“No transfer” and “Received transfer”). As I explained in the previous
Section, the information is reported as a categorical variable and I define the distance as
the minimum value between the adult residence and their parents or in-laws. In Figure
3.3. I describe two cases: adult children who did not receive any transfer from parents
and adult children who did.
Panel A describes the current distance of the wives with respect to her parents, while
Panel B refers to the husbands, in order to control for parents and in-laws geographical
proximity. In Panel A, I observe that the wives who receive monetary help from their
parents are more likely to live closer to them compared to their counterparts. In fact,
around 13% of the adult children who receive a transfer live in the same building as
their parents and only 10% do so when they do not receive any transfer. In Panel B,
I observe a different pattern in the first geographical category. Considering individuals
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(b) Panel B: husband distance from parents
in the same parents building those who did not receive any financial help slightly tends
to locate closer to their parents, around 16% and 12% respectively. It appears indeed
consistent with Panel A once the distance becomes greater than the “same bldg”.
Next, I determine whether residential proximity between generations - in the case of
help received from parents during economic hardship - is related to the future exchange
in services both the elderly and the grandchildren care. Figure 3.4 shows large differences
between the two groups (“No transfer” and “Received transfer”): in fact, the percentage
providing elderly care to parents is always higher no matter the distance (to parents or
in-laws). When distance is equal to the first category ”same building”, individuals who
receive the trasfer from their parents seem to provide about 11% more informal care than
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their counterparts who did not receive any transfers.14 For any other category, the adult
children provide, on average, 5-6% more elderly care than couples who do not receive the
transfer. Those who received the monetary help provide more elderly care and this effect
decreases when the distance become greater than 16 Km (10 percentage points less).
As for the individuals who did not receive the money help, I do not observe a persistent
trend between distance and elderly care. This picture suggests that the distance is not
strongly (negatively) correlated with elderly care for the subgroup of individuals who
have not been helped by their parents. The effect seems almost constant across distance
categories. In other words, evidence suggests that (i) no matter the distance, those who
receive the money from parents also provide more elderly care later on in life; (ii) the
distance seems negatively correlated with the provision of elderly care only in the case
of adult children who have received the financial help from parents.
Figure 3.4: Percentage providing informal care to parents or in-laws (ICP), by current
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Figure 3.5 shows the percentage of people receiving help with child-care from parents
or in-laws distinguishing between adult children who received and those who did not.
For any geographical location, those who received monetary transfer experience a higher
percentage of grandchildren care from parents or in-laws with respect to the couples who
did not. This picture leads to believe that (i) no matter the distance, who received the
transfer are those who also currently receive more grandchildren care; (ii) the distance
14This is difference between 0.33 and 0.22.
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seems more relevant in explaining the relationship in case of “No transfer” received
than the counterpart. For instance, considering only the first distance (“same bldg”), I
observe a 2 percentage points difference between the two categories and this divergence
increases when distance from parents becomes greater. In Figure 3.5 the No transfer
couples show a strong and negative correlation between the distance to parents and
the probability of grandchildren care received while who Received transfer increases the
exchange in informal care from parents than the other group, no matter the geographical
distance I account for. All these figures show that, on average, the adult child who
receives the monetary transfer from parents or in-laws will exchange more informal care
later on in life while the proximity to parents does not entirely explain the exchange
itself.
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As discussed in the previous Sections, I focus on the relationship between monetary
help and exchange of informal care considering three generations. I estimate a model
in which elderly care (ICP) and grandchildren care (ICR) depends on whether the
adult children receive any type of monetary help from their parents (Parents’ transfer)
controlling for a rich set of observable exogenous covariates (X ), and where  and ν are
the unobservable parameters. The married couple, identified by a wife and her partner,
is the unit of observation i. I define a dummy for Parents’ transfer which is the main
regressor of interest. As follows the main equations of interest both for elderly care (3.1)
and for grandchildren care (3.2).15
ICPi = β0 + β1Parents
′ transferi,past +X
′
δ + εi (3.1)
ICRi = γ0 + γ1Parents
′ transferi,past +X
′
θ + νi (3.2)
where equation (3.1) and (3.2) are the outcome regressions, X
′
is a vector of ob-
servables which include dummies for wave, area and region of residence. I have access
to a rather large set of demographic covariates for the couple such as age, education,
health status, number of brothers and sisters. I also have good information for the
job occupation, income and wealth at the time of the interviews (1998-2003). Among
family characteristics, I have information on the kind of dwelling and tenure, the pos-
session of a long list of housing equipment, cars and motorbikes, the presence of other
buildings owned by the family (which are another good proxy for wealth). I include all
of them as covariates, together with the presence and the number of children and the
age of the youngest child which are relevant characteristics to control for in a informal
care provision.16 At the individual level, I know the employment status and the kind
15For a matter of clarity, the subscript past in the main regressor indicates the fact that the monetary
transfer occurs in the past with respect to the time of the interviews (1998 and 2003). The set of
instruments are measured when the adult children were 14 years old, this is the reason for the subscript
14yr in the equation (3.3).
16When I estimate the equation 3.2, I do not include any covariates about children. In principle, I
have a downward bias in the estimate because when the couple do not have any child the grandchildren
effect goes to zero, trivially. In the next Section I show the estimates considering different specifications.
The results are fairly robust.
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of occupation, the main source of income (labour, pensions, wealth) and the highest
educational attainment of both partners. I also take into account the presence and
number of siblings, the presence of health-related limitations in the daily activities, and
an indicator for foreign citizens. For both of the partners’ parents I include a set of vari-
ables accounting for their health conditions and for their socio-economic status: binary
indicators for the presence of both or either parents, a set of indicators for them having
health-related limitations (interacted with the wave dummy because of a minor change
in the question wording), their age and their highest educational achievement.17 The
full set of results is reported in the Appendix, while here I discuss only the covariates
of interest.18
For the identification stategy, I need to assume that Z is uncorrelated with both
εi and νi. The parameters of interest are both β1 and γ1, which indicate the impact
of having received the monetary transfer from parents on informal care later on in life.
As discussed in more detail below, the IV estimates have a Local Average Treatment
Effect (LATE) interpretation (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). The corresponding first-stage
regression for both 3.1 and 3.2 is:
Parents′ transferi,past = α0 + α1Zi,14yr +X
′
σ + µi (3.3)
Although the outcome variables are binary, in order to estimate the effect of Par-
ents’ transfer I implement a linear probability model, as it is quite standard in the IV
framework. I firstly model the equations (3.1) and (3.2) as linear and then I estimate
the standard 2SLS estimator with the parents’ job occupation in the past and their
interactions as the instruments for the monetary transfer from parents. Secondly, since
the main regressor in both equations (3.1) and (3.2) are also binary, I use the two-step
estimation strategy with binary endogenous regressor as discussed in Windmeijer and
Santos Silva (1997) and then described by Wooldridge (2001). Wooldridge’s procedure
17I control for year of the interview, geographical area and regions. Specifically, the demographic
covariates include: age, health limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children
and their age. All these controls are for parents and in-laws, married couple and children. The wealth
characteristics are: house ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the
economic stability of the family and their job characteristics.
18Furthermore, I also exploit the information (i) on the number of phone calls and (ii) on the number
of visits to parents in order to capture possible observable family ties. These variables are highly
correlated with the geographical distance to parents so I choose not to include them. The results, not
shown here, are identical to the main ones.
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is a useful implementation in the case of a binary endogenous regressor X, for which
standard 2SLS may be woefully inefficient. Improved efficiency can be obtained by first
regressing X on the instrument via probit (or logit), predicting the probability and using
this one as a single instrument for Parents’ transfer.19 The robustness of this estimator,
which I refer to as 2SIV, does not depend on the correct specification of the equation
for endogenous dummy variable, i.e., the estimator is robust to misspecification of such
equation as probit (Wooldridge, 2001).
In the following sub-sections I discuss the results from the empirical analysis which
may be sensitive to differences across cohorts, living areas, individuals with different
observable characteristics and smaller current geographical distance. The first part
is dedicated to exploit all the information using a linear probability model where the
outcome variables are ICP and ICR while the main regressor is help received during
a period of economic hardship - Parents’ transfer. Then I implement the IV strategy
using different estimators.20
3.5.2 Main results
Table 3.4 shows the extensive margin results for ICP. In column (1) the adult children
who received the monetary transfer in the past are 7.2 percentage points more likely
to currently provide elderly care to their parents considering all set of demographic
characteristics. This effect is not negligible, given that the proportion of informal carers
in the overall sample is 20%.21
When I add wealth related covariates, column (2), the estimated coefficient of in-
terest remains substantially stable to 7.2. Adding distance from parents and in-laws
(column 3), the probability of elderly care provision associated with past transfer gets
slightly bigger and still statistically significant at 1% level. Obviously, the estimates in
columns (2) and (3) are not statistically independent, so I cannot test their difference
by using their confidence intervals. The point estimate is similar between column (2)
19This procedure has been recently exploited also by Finlay and Neumark (2010) to estimate the
causal effect of never-married motherhood on child educational outcomes.
20In Appendix I show the results for the full set of covariates (Table D.7). In column (1) and (2) the
estimates for for ICP and ICR, respectively. I also consider the non-linear models (probit) and Table
D.3 and D.4 present very similar results in terms of average partial effects with respect to the previous
one.
21In Table D.5 and D.6 I also analyzed the relationship divided by gender so only for the wife and
for the husband side, respectively. As expected, the female tends to provide the most of the care.
Furthermore, help with childcare has been recently investigated as a key determinant of their labour
supply. For any futher details see Compton and Pollak (2011).
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Parents’ transfer 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.075***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Parents: in twn <1km 0.011
(0.014)
Parents: in twn >1km -0.035**
(0.014)
Parents: out twn <16km -0.021
(0.015)
Parents: out twn 16-50 -0.057***
(0.016)
Parents: out twn >50km -0.094***
(0.016)
In-laws: in twn <1km -0.020*
(0.012)
In-laws: in twn >1km -0.007
(0.013)
In-laws: out twn <16km -0.029*
(0.015)
In-laws: out twn 16-50 -0.038**
(0.017)
In-laws: out twn >50km -0.086***
(0.015)
Observations 11829 11829 11829
R2 0.085 0.091 0.101
Wave, region, area X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICP is the dependent variable. Reference category for distance to parents:
no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age, health
limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age (these controls
are for parents and in laws, married couple and their children). The wealth characteristics are: house
ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the
family and their job characteristics. OLS estimates with robust standard error in brackets.
and (3) but, using an appropriate Wald test, I conclude that the difference between
the coefficient - even if it is not large in magnitude - is statistically significant at the
5% level. It is interesting to note that, although geographical distance is generally as-
sociated with less parental care, the negative effect of distance becomes substantially
large only when adult children are located further than 16 km away which confirms the
prediction in the descriptive Section.22 This might explain why the positive associa-
tion between proximity and Parents’ transfer does not result in a stronger association
between the latter and elderly care. Indeed, comparing those who receive help with
those who do not, approximately half of the increased proportion of couples living in
the same building of the wife’s parents (Figure 3.3) comes from a reduction in those
living within a 16 km distance, who still tend to provide a substantial amount of care.
22For any detail, see Figure 3.4 and 3.5.
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This casts some doubts about the possibility of inferring a strong correlation between
tied transfer and parental assistance from the simple correlation with proximity, as in
Coda Moscarola et al. (2010).
The most important determinants of ICP are shown in Table D.7, column (1). The
coeffients estimated are in line with the previous studies. For instance, the age and
the general health of the adult children are generally negatively correlated with the
provision of elderly care, as expected. People more educated provide more elderly care
while I find, predictably, opposite sign both for number of brothers (-0.7 percentage
points) and having at least a child (-5.5 percentage points). As one would expect both
the parents’ age and health condition positively relate to the elderly care.
Table 3.5: Poisson model for hours of ICP (informal care provided to parents or in-laws)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ICP Hours ICP Hours ICP Hours ICP Hours
Parents’ transfer 2.558*** 2.675*** 2.765*** 2.640***
(0.839) (0.842) (0.840) (0.842)
Observations 11829 11829 11829 11829
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26
Wave, region, area X X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
Distance to parents X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICP is the dependent variable. Reference category for distance to parents:
no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age, health
limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age; all these
controls are valid for parents and in laws, adult and children. The wealth characteristics are: house
ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the
family and their job characteristics. I show the average partial effect in all the columns, robust standard
error in brackets.
Then, I focus on the number of hours of elderly care provision in the last 4 weeks
(intensive margins) and Table 3.5 shows the results.23 The variable hours measures the
intensity of elderly care in the last month and, because of its count nature, I cannot
estimate the model using OLS as discussed by Wooldridge (1997). There are at least
two reasons why linear models are not suitable for analyzing count data. First, it does
not ensure that predicted values of the outcome are nonnegative. Second, a linear model
for E(y|x) rules out theoretically and empirically important functional forms, such as
constant elasticity. For all these reasons I estimate a count model regression.24
Interestingly, the correlation in Table 3.5 hardly changes when enlarging the set of
controls (columns 1 to 4). Having received monetary transfer in the past will increase
23In the case of ICR, due to data limitation, I cannot compute the intensive margins.
24I use the STATA command poisson in order to handle the mass of zeros in the variable hours
(around 82%).
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the hours of elderly care provided to the parents. In all specifications, the effect is
very stable and is around 3 hours more with respect to couple who did not receive any
transfer, keeping all the variables at their means. Specifically, the couples who have
been helped by their parents through a transfer provide almost 50% more elderly care
than the counterpart, which is a considerable increase.25




Parents’ transfer 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.059***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Parents: in twn <1km -0.061***
(0.015)
Parents: in twn >1km -0.077***
(0.015)
Parents: out twn <16km -0.113***
(0.017)
Parents: out twn 16-50 -0.145***
(0.018)
Parents: out twn >50km -0.209***
(0.018)
In-laws: in twn <1km -0.009
(0.013)
In-laws: in twn >1km -0.052***
(0.014)
In-laws: out twn <16km -0.033**
(0.016)
In-laws: out twn 16-50 -0.104***
(0.018)
In-laws: out twn >50km -0.150***
(0.017)
Observations 11829 11829 11829
R2 0.164 0.224 0.245
Wave, region, area X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICR is the dependent variable. Reference category for distance to parents:
no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age, health
limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age (these controls
are for parents and in laws, married couple and their children). The wealth characteristics are: house
ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the
family and their job characteristics. OLS estimates with robust standard error in brackets.
Next I start investigating the relation of between ICR and Parents’ transfer and I
show the results in Table 3.6. At the beginning, I study the regression without condi-
tioning on the presence of children because I further investigate the potential existence
of fertility effect in act induced by the monetary transfer. By positing an indirect
exchange motive, Stark (1991) provides something of a bridge between the economic
literature on altruism and exchange and the literature on reciprocity using the so called
25The variable hours has mean equal to 5.58 and standard error of 28.04.
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“demonstration effect”. Also according to Cox and Stark (2005), elderly parents may
invest in their adult children in order to increase the “production of grandchildren”. In
this case, the adult children are more willing to provide care to their parents, because
grandchildren are likely to imitate their behaviour and help them when they will be
old themselves, hence the definition of demonstration effect. This is the theoretical
reason why, in presence of offspring, I should expect to empirically observe a positive
relationship between intergenerational transfers and exchange in services.26
Table 3.6 shows the results for grandchildren care. In column (1) I find that adult
children who have received the financial help from parents have 4.5 more percentage
points in terms of grandchildren care later in life. In column (2) I introduce wealth
covariates and, also in this case, the effect is positive and statistically significant at the
1% level. The individuals who receive the transfer are 5.3 percentage points more likely
to receive grandchildren care from parents or in-laws. This effect is quite large, given
that the proportion of informal carers in the overall sample is 40%.
When I add dummies for distance from parents and in-laws, which are strongly
negatively correlated with ICR, the coefficients on help received from parents slightly
increases to 5.9 percentage points and is still statistically significant at the conventional
1% level. Using the Wald test, the difference between the coefficient in columns (2) and
(3) is statistically significant at the 5% level.27 The evidence appears to be quite strong
and stable in any specifications.28 Concerning the other covariates shown in column (2)
Table D.7, column (2), shows the effects of all the other controls which are generally
coherent with the ones found in the previous (scarce) literature.
The finding indicates that tied transfers are tightly related to the exchange of ser-
vices in the family network.29 On the one hand, those adult children who receive the
money transfer are also more likely to currently provide elderly care. The financial
costs to the informal carers can be substantial, especially if the caregivers are forced
to interrupt their careers or retire early in order to facilitate the provision of informal
26The full set of variables is included.
27In both ICP and ICR I introduce family contacts characteristics and the results, not shown here,
do not change. I generally not include these controls in the specifications because they are correlated
with the distance from parents.
28One may argue that using two waves I could compare individuals under different health care system.
In order to capture this kind of heterogeneity I also add an interaction term between regional dummies
and wave. This interaction never appears statistically significant. The results, not shown here, are in
fact identical to the main ones.
29Only 0.36% and less than 3% of the sample buy formal care, both elderly and grandchildren, on
the market. Both controls never appear to be statistically significant in the regression analysis.
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elderly (Viitanen, 2007). On the other hand, they are also more likely to receive help
with child-care.30
3.5.3 Sensitivity of the main results
In this Section, I consider some sensitivity checks on the main specification, clearly
focusing on the differential effects across age groups. This analysis may help to under-
stand which age category drives the results. Firstly, I re-estimate the linear probability
model for ICP (informal care provided to parents or in-laws) considering the parents’
age 65+ (Upper panel) and if at least one parent is with health-related limitations or
aged 85+ (Lower panel) - Table 3.7 reports the results. Secondly I focus on the linear
probability model for ICR (informal care received to parents or in-laws) considering
only couple with at least a child (Upper panel) and if at least one them aged less than
14 years old (Lower panel) - I show the results in Table 3.8.
Table 3.7: Linear probability model for ICP (informal care provided to parents or
in-laws) considering parents’ age 65+ (Upper panel) and if at least one parent with
health-related limitations or aged 85+ (Lower panel)
Upper panel (1) (2) (3)
ICP ICP ICP
Parents’ transfer 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.081****
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 10226 10226 10226
R2 0.084 0.091 0.102
Lower panel (1) (2) (3)
ICP ICP ICP
Parents’ transfer 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.068***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Observations 3774 3774 3774
R2 0.086 0.098 0.116
Wave, region, area X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
Distance parents and in-laws X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICP is the dependent variable. Reference category for distance to parents:
no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age, health
limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age; all these
controls are valid for parents and in laws, adult and children. The wealth characteristics are: house
ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the
family and their job characteristics. OLS estimates, robust standard error in brackets.
In Table 3.7 (Upper panel) I observe an increase in the point estimate with respect
to the results in Table 3.4. In details, the individuals who receive the monetary transfer
from their parents are 8 percentage points more likely to provide elderly care later on in
30I do not find any effect of the monetary duration of parents’ help on both ICP and ICR later on in
life. It seems only relevant for the future exchange in services the fact that the adult children receive
the trasfer from parents and not the duration itself.
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life in the case in which at least one of the parents is 65 years old or more. The results
are stable when controlling for demographic and wealth characteristics - columns (1)
and (2). This result is consistent with the fact that this group of people is the one in real
need of care. With the introduction of distance covariates (column 3) the coefficient on
past help from parents marginally rises to 8.1 percentage points and still economically
and statistically significant at the 1% level.31 In Table 3.7 (Lower panel) I consider a
more stringent case in which one of the parents or in-laws suffers from health-related
limitation or is aged more than 85. Also in this case the estimates are stable through
the different specifications. The adult child who receives the finalcial help from parents
in the past is around 7 percentage points more likely to currently provide elderly care
to them. Some authors argue that formal care expenditure does not significantly affect
informal care-giving in intergenerational households (Viitanen, 2007), nevertheless I
suspect that this slightly decrease in magnitude are is to the substitution effect between
formal and informal care, in the case of specific medical assistance which possibly cannot
be delivered by the adult children. In fact, in this sample I select parents aged 85+ or
suffer from health related problems so in greater need of care and medical help.32
Before turning to IV estimates, I examine the relationship between money transfer
and grandchildren care considering different age sub-samples. Table 3.8 shows the result
for married couples with at least one child (Upper panel) and with at least a child aged
less than 14 (Lower panel), which are more likely to demand help with childcare. In the
first case, the correlation between ICR and monetary help from parents appear strong
and statistically significant at 1% level, column (2), once I control for demographics
and wealth covariates. When I introduce, in column (3), geographical distance I do not
observe any relevant change in the results. In the second case, I isolate couples with
at least a child aged less than 14, because they are expected to demand more care.
Table 3.8 presents the results (Lower panel). Controlling for demographic and wealth
characteristics, the adult child who receives the monetary transfer is 5 percentage points
more likely to also obtain grandchildren care from parents or in-laws. When I add the
geographical distance from parents, consistently with previous findings, the coefficient of
31The results are robust also in the case in which I do include only young parents (less than 55 years
old). The estimated effect of help on the informal care provided is around 0.56 with standard error of
0.02 so strongly statistically significant.
32I cannot directly test this hypothesis but only the 3% of this sample uses formal care provision and,
as previously explained, the informal care is mainly left to the family.
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Table 3.8: Linear probability model for ICR (informal care received to parents or in-
laws) considering only couple with at least a child (Upper panel) and if at least one
them aged less than 14 (Lower panel)
Upper panel (1) (2) (3)
ICR ICR ICR
Parents’ transfer 0.022 0.036*** 0.042***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 10179 10179 10179
R2 0.280 0.319 0.344
Lower panel (1) (2) (3)
ICR ICR ICR
Parents’ transfer 0.039** 0.053*** 0.063***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 7479 7479 7479
R2 0.097 0.139 0.195
Wave, region, area X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
Distance parents and in-laws X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICR is the dependent variable. Reference category for distance to parents:
no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age, health
limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age; all these
controls are valid for parents and in laws, adult and children. The wealth characteristics are: house
ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the
family and their job characteristics. OLS estimates, robust standard error in brackets.
interest remains stable and still economically and statistically significant at 1%, column
(3).33
Overall, the sensitivity analysis suggests that, conditional on different sample selec-
tions, the probability to provide and receive informal care is still positively correlated
with the fact that the parents helped their offspring with a monetary transfer. As
expected, this effect is marginally bigger for some specific age group in which I select
individuals in greater demand of care, both the parents and the children.
3.5.4 Possible fertility effects
Although norms are likely to play a key role in driving intergenerational relationships,
an alternative explanation that has its roots in biology has recently begun to receive
attention. As Cox and Stark (2005) argued, much human behavior may be motivated
by a desire to ensure the survival of one’s genes. With respect to intergenerational
transfers, this evolutionary perspective hypothesizes that the older generation invests
in the younger generation to pass on their own genetic line rather than out of concern
for the happiness or well-being of their offspring. In particular, parents will care for
33The results are stable also in the case in which I do include only adult children with offspring
younger than 6 years old. The estimated effect of monetary help on the grandchildren care is 0.054 with
standard error of 0.020, it is so strongly and statistically significant at 1%.
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their children to ensure that they are healthy and survive to reproductive age and, in
more modern times, invest in their schooling so that they will be successful and have
children of their own. This investment by parents in the survival of their genes need
not stop with the next generation, but ought to carry on to later generations as well.
Cox and Stark (2005) argue that parents provide help to their children because
this monetary transfer may be complementary with the production of grandchildren.
They theoretically focus on the possibility that a child’s conduct is conditioned by the
parents’ example. Parents may want to take advantage of the child’s learning potential
by engaging in care provision for their own parents when children are present and can
observe their parents’ behavior. Parents who expect to require attention, care, and old-
age support have an incentive to behave in a distinct exemplary manner. Such behavior
gives rise to a derived demand for grandchildren, because potential grandparents know
that they will be treated better by their own children if conditioning of grandchildren is
at work (Cox and Stark, 2005, p. 1666). This is called demonstration effect. Therefore, I
expect to empirically observe a positive relationship between intergenerational transfers
and exchange in services. I find evidence of fertility effect for the adult children. If
adults are delaying childbearing until they can afford all the expenses, for example, a
parent might hasten the process by providing funds for their offspring (Bianchi et al.,
2006).
Table 3.9 shows the fertility effect results for the couple. Interestingly, the relation
hardly changes when enlarging the set of controls (columns 1 to 4). In particular, it is
worth emphasizing how coefficients remain strongly stable around 0.03 so the adult who
receive monetary help from the parents or in-laws is 3 percentage point more likely than
the counterpart to have a child. This is crucial in order to understand and interpret
the effect of monetary transfer on the outcomes. In fact, I should interpret the effect of
monetary help on future grandchildren care as combined with possible fertility effect.
In principle, the effect of Parents’ transfer on ICR is the combination between the
probability that the couple has a kid (or more) times the effect of grandchildren care.34
Geographical proximity can be interpreted as a proxy for grandchildren care but as I
explained in the previous Section, it cannot perse explain the whole story of exchange in
34The fertility results is confirmed in Table D.9 where the adult child who receives the monetary
transfer from parents or in-laws is about 5 percentage points more likely to interrupt the work career.
Table 3.9 and D.9 show OLS estimates but I find same results in terms of average partial effect using
probit.
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Table 3.9: Linear probability model for the probability of having children
(1) (2) (3)
Have a child Have a child Have a child
Parents’ transfer 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Parents: in twn <1km -0.011
(0.011)
Parents: in twn >1km -0.015
(0.011)
Parents: out twn <16km -0.024**
(0.012)
Parents: out twn 16-50 -0.018
(0.013)
Parents: out twn >50km -0.012
(0.014)
In-laws: in twn <1km -0.008
(0.009)
In-laws: in twn >1km -0.020**
(0.010)
In-laws: out twn <16km -0.016
(0.012)
In-laws: out twn 16-50 -0.032**
(0.014)
In-laws: out twn >50km -0.006
(0.013)
Observations 11829 11829 11829
Wave, region, area X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. Having at least a child is the dependent variable. Reference category for
distance to parents: no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics
include: age, health limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and
their age (these controls are for parents and in laws, married couple and their children). The wealth
characteristics are: house ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the
economic stability of the family and their job characteristics. OLS estimates with robust standard error
in brackets.
services. The results explain why families with children are also more motivated to live
closer to their parents or in-laws so as to receive informal care to their children, as also
argued by Coda Moscarola et al. (2010). In this case the demonstration effect approach
gives an active role to parents-to-be. There is an ever growing body of evidence that in
traditional societies as in modern societies, grandparents make substantial contributions
to the production and the rearing of grandchildren (Cox and Stark, 2005). Kaplan
(1994) analysed three traditional societies and find that the increased demands for food
generated by the arrival of children were not met solely by members of the parents’
generation but the grandparents provided help as well. In this paper the parents not
only economically help their adult children but provide grandchildren care to them later
on in life. Cardia and Ng (1997), using the dataset from the Health and Retirement
Survey in the United States, report relevant contributions of time related transfers from
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grandparents in the form of childcare as I find in this study. Such behavior parallels the
tied transfers to which I have referred.
3.5.5 Main IV results
I then turn to discuss IV estimations which are reported in Table 3.11. An approach is
to estimate a linear probability model using 2SLS IV, which is advocated by Angrist and
Pischke (2009) and supported by much real-world experience comparing partial effects
from more plausibly correct models to the partial effects from a linear probability model
(Wooldridge, 2008). This procedure has the advantage of easily interpretable coefficients
when measuring effects in the probability metric, but for those who are used to effect
sizes measured in terms of log odds, it may be a less appealing option. In cases where
response to treatment varies across individuals, Imbens and Angrist (1994) point out
that using linear IV gives an estimate of the average effect of treatment on the treated for
“compliers” (those induced to get treatment by assignment to the treatment group).35
The results of the IV strategy are shown in Table 3.11 which describe the second
stage where the help from parents, the endogenous variable, is instrumented by the
parents (and in-laws) work occupation of the when the offspring was 14 years old. The
first-stage results in Table 3.10 suggest that the instruments are associated with the
potential endogenous variable, Parents’ transfer.36
Table 3.11 (Panel B) shows the F-statistic which is in all the specification at least
larger than the 10, which is considered the rule-of-thumb threshold to measure the rele-
vance of the instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The Wooldridge’s robust score test
is significant so, the variables have to be treated as endogenous. The test for overidenti-
fying restrictions fails to reject the null hypothesis which indicates that the instruments
are jointly relevant. The economic intuition behind the first-stage in Table 3.10 relies
on the fact that parents work occupations in the past directly affect the probability to
transfer money to their offspring later on in life without a direct effect on the outcome
variables, future informal care provision. In the first-stage regression I control for a
large set of covariates both for parents and couple which should rule out other possible
confounding channels. Among the most relevant I mention the job occupations, the
35See also Abadie (2003) and Nichols (2011).
36As a matter of clarification the instruments are both (i) the parents’ job occupation when the adult
child was 14 years old and (ii) the interaction between them.
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Baseline: Employed - Clerical worker








Mother jobs (Parents in Law)
Baseline: Employed - Clerical worker
Employed - White Collar 0.071* 0.372*
(0.042) (0.202)





Father * Mother job
Employed - Blue Collar * Employed - Blue Collar -0.131** -0.703***
(0.058) (0.266)
Employed - Blue Collar * Employed - Occasional -0.109** -0.531**
(0.050) (0.251)
Employed - Blue Collar * Housework -0.077* -0.417**
(0.043) (0.202)
Employed - White Collar * Employed - Blue Collar -0.113** -0.616**
(0.056) (0.302)
Retired * Employed - Blue Collar -0.346** -1.551***
(0.168) (0.549)
Retired * Housework -0.243* -0.988**
(0.113) (0.470)
Retired * Unemployed -0.362* -0.552*
(0.189) (0.249)
Deceased * Employed - Occasional -0.128* -1.021*
(0.069) (0.447)
Unemployed * Deceased -0.113* -0.703*
(0.067) (0.352)
Father jobs (Parents in Law)
Baseline: Employed - clerical worker






Interaction parents in-laws job
Father * Mother job
Employed - Occasional * Employed - Blue Collar -0.684*** 0.442**
(0.177) (0.210)
Employed - Occasional * Employed - White Collar -0.811*** 0.452**
(0.058) (0.190)
Employed - Occasional * Employed - Occasional -0.727*** -0.853**
(0.111) (0.348)
Employed - Occasional * Housework -0.758*** -0.166**
(0.047) (0.076)
Employed - Occasional * Retired -0.926*** -0.167**
(0.108) (0.057)
Employed - Occasional * Deceased -0.704*** -0.645***
(0.262) -0.239
Retired * Retired 0.421* 0.750**
(0.222) (0.315)
Deceased * Employed - White Collar 0.664*** 0.654*
(0.118) (0.312)
Deceased * Employed - Occasional -0.221*** -0.750**
(0.062) (0.315)
Demographic characteristics X X
Wealth characteristics X X
Distance parents and in-laws X X




* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. Parents’ transfer is the dependent variable. Reference category for
distance to parents: no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic charac-
teristics include: year of the interview, geographical area, region, age, health limitations, number
of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age; all these controls are valid for
parents and in-laws, adult and children. The wealth characteristics are: house ownership, various
durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the family and their job
characteristics. OLS estimates in column (1), Probit in column (2) where I show only the coefficient
statistically significant. Robust standard error in brackets.
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level of education and the health condition of the individuals. Moreover, I control for
a specific variable which takes into consideration the possibility that the income of the
parents may currently be the main source of wealth for the adult couple.37 Potentially,
the monetary help from parents depends positively on “good” job occupations (such as
white collar) while it may be more difficult to help their offspring in the case of “bad” job
occupations (for example blue collar) or, even worse, in case of unemployment periods.
Moreover, the tranfer is not only determined by the work positions of the father and
mother themselves but also induced by the interactions between them. This produces
a proxy for the wealth of the family of origin.38
Table 3.11 shows the second-stage both for ICP and ICR outcomes. I observe that
β1 and γ1 are statistically significant at the 1% level regardless of the estimator used:
2SLS, 2SIV and IVGMM.39 In columns (1) and (3) I implement the standard 2SLS
in order to estimate the impact of the transfer on the elderly and granchildren care
later in life, respectively. In this case the large standard errors suggest imprecision in
the estimates due to the fact that the independent and dependent variables are binary.
Nevertheless both coefficient appear strongly statistically significant. In columns (2)
and (4) I implement the two-step model strategy with binary endogenous regressor -
2SIV - as discussed in Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997) and Wooldridge (2001). This
procedure is a useful implementation in the case of a binary endogenous regressor, which
causes woefully inefficient estimates. Also in this case, the results from the first-stage
confirm the strong predictive power of the instrument, which now reflects the predicted
value obtained from a probit model of Parents’ transfer on both the instruments and
the whole set of covariates.40
Differently from the results in column (1) and (3), the 2SIV regressions increase the
precision of the estimates and they are still strongly statistically significant at the 1%
level, column (2) and (4) in Table 3.11. Smaller standard errors indicate an increase
in precision due to the fact that I treat the endogenous dichotomous variable as binary
37The results are robust also when I drop all the parents (mother) who were “housework” - when the
adult child was 14 years old - which may be correlated with “family” taste. In the restrict sample I get
an F-statistic around 15 so it seems relevant also in this subsample. Nevertheless, I choose not to drop
them because I would have reduced the sample size by 50%.
38In Table 3.10 I only show the instruments which are statistically significant while the whole firststage
is in Table D.8.
392SLS, 2SIV and IVGMM stand for Two Stage Least Square, Two Stage IV and IV Poisson using
GMM, respectively. I run the models using the STATA command ivregress and ivpoisson.
40Table 3.10 shows the first-stage results.
116
in the first-stage regression shown in Table 3.10 column (2). Once again it is impor-
tant to clarify what the estimated model identifies and how the IV estimates should be
interpreted. Following Imbens and Angrist (1994)’s LATE interpretation, they would
reveal the causal marginal effect of parents’ transfer for the adult child whose likeli-
hood of getting the Parents’ transfer is affected by changes in parents or in-laws job
occupations. This interpretation would also reasonably motivate why the IV results are
particularly larger, in magnitude, than OLS ones. Regarding the ICP intensive margins
(number of hours in the provision of elderly care), I show that a couple who received
the monetary help from parents provide them about 7 more hours in the last 4 weeks
than the counterpart who did not have any help, column (3b) in Table 3.11.41 In the
presence of heterogeneous effects, the IV results may well exceed OLS one; they would
pin down the effect on the marginal person which can be greater than the average effect,
though this requires a suitable monotonicity assumption (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
In this framework, this hypothesis would mean that even if the instrument may have
no effect on the likelihood of receiving the trasfer for some couple, all those one whose
likelihood is influenced by changes in the instruments are influenced in the same man-
ner. Roughly speaking, while changes in the instrument may affect only couple with
economic difficulties (though not dramatic), all these couple are affected in the same
way.
The standard IV estimator is a special case of a Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) estimator. The advantages of GMM over IV is that, if heteroskedasticity is
present, the GMM estimator is more efficient than the simple IV estimator, whereas
if heteroskedasticity is not present, the GMM estimator is no worse asymptotically
than the IV estimator (Angrist and Krueger, 2001). Nevertheless, the use of GMM
does come with a price. The problem, as Hayashi (2000, p.215) points out, is that the
optimal weighting matrix at the core of efficient GMM is a function of fourth moments,
41Even in the case in which the point estimates in columns (1) and (4) may not be informative about
the magnitude of the effect of Parents’ transfer, looking at the confidence intervals helps getting an
idea of how significant is the main regressor to explain the increase in informal care both provided and
received among the sample. The 95% CI for the estimate in columns (1) and (4) in the upper panel, for
instance, ranges from 0.15 to 0.60 and 0.01 to 0.46 for elderly and grandchildren care, respectively. This
proves that the effect of Parents’ transfer on the main outcomes is positive and statistically different
from zero. Again where I consider the lower bound estimates (0.15 and 0.01, respectively), the true
coefficient of Parents’ transfer would still have a positive effect on the main outcome variables. In
particular, having received the transfer from parents would increase the probability of future informal
elderly care by at least 15 percentage points more than the counterpart who did not have any money
transfer (1 in the case of grandchildren care).
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and obtaining reasonable estimates of fourth moments may require very large sample
sizes. The consequence is that the efficient GMM estimator can have poor small sample
properties but this is not the case for this study. In particular, Wald tests tend to
over-reject the null - this is a good news for the unscrupulous investigator in search of
large t-statistics, perhaps, but not for the rest of the econometricians.
It is crucial to distinguish the concept of 2SLS estimation with robust standard
errors from the concept of estimating the same equation with IVGMM, allowing for
arbitrary heteroskedasticity. I compare an overidentified regression model estimated (a)
with IV and classical standard errors and (b) with robust standard errors. Model (b)
will produce the same point estimates, but different standard errors in the presence
of heteroskedastic errors. However, if I re-estimate the overidentified model using the
GMM two-step estimator, I will get different point estimates because I am solving an
other optimization problem: one in the space of the instruments (and moment condi-
tions) rather than the space of the regressors. I will also get different standard errors,
and in general smaller standard errors as the IVGMM estimator is more efficient so it
would be preferable to implement IVGMM (Baum et al., 2002).
Interestingly, the IV estimates prove that Parents’ transfer significantly positively
affects the elderly care provided and grandchildren care later on in life. Particularly,
having received the monetary transfer from parents would increase the probability of
future informal care and this effect ranges between by 16 (2SIV) to 46 (IVGMM) per-
centage points, while, in the case of grandchildren care, it varies between 23 (2SLS) to
32 (2SIV) percentage points.42
3.5.6 Sensitivity of the main IV results
Lastly, I investigate whether the results are sensitive to other estimators. I firstly
estimate the model with different specifications and secondly I propose some placebo
tests which may help to explain that the instruments are not picking other economic
trends within region. There are two common approaches to estimate the causal effects
in the binary models. One approach disregards the binary structure of the outcome
and treatment variables and presents linear instrumental variables estimates of the
42A prudent practice would include clustering standard errors at the regional level. However, the
number of clusters is too small to get unbiased estimates. Therefore I estimate the model with robust
standard errors in all the specification for completeness. The results are anyway very similar even in
the case of clustering.
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Table 3.11: Transfer from parents and informal care: IV estimates
ICP: elderly care ICR: granchildren care
(1) (2) (3) (3b) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 2nd stage 2SLS 2SIV IVGMM IVGMM 2SLS 2SIV IVGMM
Parents’ transfer 0.376*** 0.167** 0.465*** 6.702*** 0.231** 0.323*** 0.247***
(0.113) (0.089) (0.096) (1.350) (0.116) (0.105) (0.046)
Wave, region, area X X X X X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X X X X X
Wealth characteristics X X X X X X X
Distance parents and in-laws X X X X X X X
Observations 11829 11829 11829 11829 11829 11829 11829
Panel B: 1st stage statistics
F-test statistics 19 120 19 16 17 118 22
Robust score test (Wooldridge 1995) Reject 1% Reject 1% Reject 1% Reject 1%
Overidentification statistic (p-value) 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.51 0.85 0.21 0.82
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICP is the dependent variable in column (1)-(3). In column (3b) I show the results where the
dependent variable is hours of ICP in the last 4 weeks. ICR is the dependent variable for column (4)-(6). Reference category
for distance to parents: no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age,
health limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age (these controls are for parents
and in laws, married couple and their children). The wealth characteristics are: house ownership, various durable goods and
assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the family and their job characteristics.
treatment effect - as I shown in the previous Section; the second computes maximum-
likelihood estimates of a bivariate probit (BP) model, which assumes that the outcome
and treatment are each determined by latent linear index models with jointly normal
error terms. Sometimes the two approaches can produce markedly different results
(Altonji et al., 2005). It is necessary to distinguishing carefully between the Local
Average Treatment Effect estimated under the linear IV with the Average Treatment
Effect estimated under the BP model. Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 201) typify
one form of received wisdom on bivariate probit and IV regression: “bivariate probit
probably qualifies as harmless in the sense that it is not very complicated and easy to
get right.” Again Angrist and Pischke (2009): “bivariate probit and other models of this
sort can be used to estimate unconditional average causal effects and/or effects on the
treated. In contrast, 2SLS does not promise an average causal effects, only local average
causal effects” (p. 202). The biprobit approach, given its parametric assumptions, also
allows the calculation of various probabilities using the bivariate normal distribution, for
various average partial effects. However, note that one of its assumptions is a constant
treatment effect so that average treatment effects for any subpopulation are assumed to
be the same as for any other subpopulation or the population.
Table 3.12 shows in column (1) and (4) the maximum-likelihood bivariate probit
(Heckman, 1978). The model are completed by assuming that the latent errors have a
bivariate standard normal joint distribution with correlation ρ. If ρ = 0, separate esti-
mation of the first structural equation by a simple probit model identifies the structural
treatment effect. If ρ 6= 0, the treatment is said to be “endogenous” and joint estimation
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is required. In both estimates, the ρs, which measure the correlation coefficient between
the residuals of each of the two probits, are not significant at 5% level then you could
also stick to estimating two separate probits.43 In (2) and (5) the estimates using GMM
that allows for heteroskedasticity and nonnormality in the errors. Lastly, in columns
(3) and (6) I re-estimate the previous models using the LIML estimator to control for
potential weak-instruments problems (Staiger and Stock, 1997). Also in this case, the
results certify a significant and positive effect of the transfer on the future informal care
exchange and I do not find any evidence in favour of a weak instrument issue. The es-
timates demonstrate the positive causal effect of having received the monetary transfer
on the exchange in informal care later on in life which is the stable findings in all the
specifications.44
Table 3.12: Robustness checks: IV estimates
ICP: elderly care ICR: granchildren care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 2nd stage BP GMM IVLIML BP GMM IVLIML
Parents’ transfer 0.013*** 0.151*** 0.480*** 0.018*** 0.317*** 0.495***
(0.003) (0.030) (0.173) (0.005) (0.051) (0.131)
Wave, region, area X X X X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X X X X
Wealth characteristics X X X X X X
Distance parents and in-laws X X X X X X
Observations 11829 11829 11829 11829 11829 11829
Panel B: 1st stage statistics
F-test statistics 19 22
Overidentification statistic (p-value) 0.77 0.82
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICP is the dependent variable in column (1)-(3). ICR is the dependent variable
for column (4)-(6). Bivariate probit in column (1) and (4). GMM estimates in column (2) and (5). IV LIML
in column (3) and (6). GMM estimates in column (2) and (5). Reference category for distance to parents: no-
help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age, health limitations,
number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age (these controls are for parents and
in laws, married couple and their children). The wealth characteristics are: house ownership, various durable
goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the family and their job characteristics.
Finally, I implement some falsification exercises to demostrate that the set of in-
struments is only capturing the specific heterogeneity across households of origin and
not any other regional/macro economic trend which may confound the principal mech-
anism. Even in this case it would not be problematic issue assuming no direct effect of
the confounding on the outcomes variables. Nevertheless, to banish all doubts away, I
check whether there is any correlation between the regional economic conditions, at the
time in which the adult child was 14 years old, and the future informal care provision.45
In order to prove that this is not the case, I use the regional GDP per capita (when the
43I use the STATA command biprobit.
44I estimate the model in column (3b) of Table 3.12 using IV Poisson in order to take into account
the mass of zeros of ICP hours provided.
45I choose exactly this particular age because the set of instruments are defined when the adult
children were 14 years old.
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adult child was 14) as a first instrument (Z1) for monetary help. This in theory should
capture any economic fluctuations during the period analysed. The column (1) and (3)
in Table 3.13 show the results for ICP and ICR, respectively and they provide no evi-
dence of any kind of relationship between the potential confounding and the outcomes.
I do not detect any statistical significance of Z1 on the endogenous variable. Then, I
replicate the same exercise exploiting a second instrument, namely home consumption
per capita (Z2). In column (2) and (4) I do not observe, again, any relationship in
place.46 This gives some evidence on the fact that the set of instruments are not related
with the mechanism I exploited.47
Table 3.13: Placebo: IV estimates with different instruments
ICP: elderly care ICR: granchildren care
Panel A: 2nd stage 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parents’ transfer -58765.7 -74245.6 -8.1 3.8
(61001.3) (98025.4) (12.3) (4.5)
Wave, region, area X X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X X
Wealth characteristics X X X X
Distance parents and in-laws X X X X
Observations 11829 11829 11829 11829
Panel B: 1st stage
Z1: GDP per capita -2.30 -1.56
(2.40) (2.33)
Z2: Home consumption per capita -3.24e-07 -3.58e-07
(4.30e-07) (4.01e-07)
F-test statistics 0.92 0.57 0.45 0.80
Robust score test (Wooldridge 1995) Reject 1% Reject 1% Reject 1% Reject 1%
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. The instrument is gdp per capita in column (1) and (3). The other
instrument is home consumption per capita in column (2) and (4). Reference category for distance
to parents: no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics
include: age, health limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children
and their age (these controls are for parents and in laws, married couple and their children). The
wealth characteristics are: house ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good
proxy for the economic stability of the family and their job characteristics. OLS estimates in
column (1), Probit estimates in column (2). All the estimations use robust standard error which
are in brackets.
46Data collected from G. Tagliacarne and ISTAT.
47I also repeat the main IV analysis with further checks. I focus on the differential effects mainly
considering two age groups. In the first case, I restrict the sample of parents aged 65+ and I still find
the same relationship in place. Second, I select adult couples with at least one child under 14 years old
and also in this case the findings are similar. I do not show here the Table but the effect varies between
0.197(s.e. 0.100) and 0.266(s.e. 0.115) for the ICP and ICR equation, respectively.
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3.6 Conclusions
In this paper I contribute to the debate about the economic reasons behind monetary
transfer and unpaid assistance to aging parents and grandchildren. Using the Italian
Multipurpose Survey on Families, I investigate the causal effect of tied transfers on both
unpaid elderly care and grandchildren care later in life. To the extent of my knowledge,
this is one of the few empirical papers which looks both at the transfers and caring
decisions.
Empirically estimating the relationship between intervivos transfers and exchange
of services later on in life is complex, due to different factors which may influence this
association: differences across cohorts, areas and individuals with different observable
characteristics; smaller current geographical distance associated with the monetary help;
and unobservable characteristics associated with a greater propensity for transfers in-
duced by family taste. Controlling for a rich set of covariates and implementing an IV
approach, I find that married couples who receive monetary help from their parents are
more likely to help them later in life. On the other hand, I observe a strong correlation
between tied transfer and grandchildren care later in the life cycle. The results show
not only the existence of reciprocity between parents and adult children in terms of ex-
change (money for future elderly care provided), but also a higher likelihood of receiving
grandchildren care, a sort of pure altruism. I investigate whether this correlation is en-
tirely due to smaller geographical distance between the generations. Interestingly, the
increased geographical proximity between the families partially accounts for this rela-
tionship. Finally, I implement IV estimates of the effect of receiving a transfer from the
parents or in-laws on the likelihood of exchange informal care later on in life. The iden-
tification strategy exploits the variation in the parents job occupation when the adult
child was 14 years old. Results uncover a significant and positive impact of monetary
help on future informal care.
Understanding the dynamics of reciprocity in the provision of informal care among
families represents a timely and highly relevant policy issue. On the one hand, ac-
tive informal care provision by parents might reduce the cost of raising grandchildren.
Previous transfer by active parents seems to result later in a reciprocated provision of
informal elderly care by their adult children, especially once older parents experience
122
the onset of care needs. Such an informal delayed transfer of in-kind services is likely
to reduce the burden on welfare state budgets. On the other hand, I show that this
exchange is not only induced by increased geographical proximity, which may affect
adult children’s mobility and, through this channel, also their labour market outcomes.
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Appendix C
Figure C.1: Percentage providing help with care to parents or in-laws, by monetary
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Figure C.2: Percentage receiving help with child-care from parents or in-laws, by mon-






























Table D.1: Summary statistics, ISTAT
Elderly care Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Grandchildren care Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ICP 11829 0.204 0.403 0 1 ICR 11829 0.424 0.494 0 1
Geographical and wave variables Household characteristics
Percent Cum. Percent Cum.
Year Type of contract
1998 58.89 58.89 Rent 17.47 17.47
2003 41.11 100 Own Property 69.58 87.05
Usufruct 12.95 100.00
Area Type of home
Northwest 20.52 20.52 1. Cottage 8.91 8.91
Northeast 19.17 39.69 2. Large house 9.14 18.05
Center 17.33 57.02 3. Civil 64.93 82.98
South 30.95 87.97 4. Popular 12.50 95.48
Insular 12.03 100 5. Rural 2.31 97.79
Regions 6. Improper home 0.31 98.10
Piedmont 8.99 8.99 7. Don’t know 1.90 100.00
Lombardy 8.89 17.88 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
South Tyrol - Trentino 4.82 22.71 Electronic devices
Veneto 6.08 28.79 yes 11829 0.37 0.48 0 1
Friuli V. G. 3.16 31.95 no 11829 0.10 0.30 0 1
Liguria 2.64 34.58 Number Pc
Emilia Romagna 5.11 39.69 yes 11829 44.80 0 1
Tuscany 5.39 45.09 no 11829 55.20 0 1
Umbria 3.2 48.28
Marche 4.29 52.57 Number mobile 11829 1.66 1.30 0 9
Lazio 4.45 57.02 Number TV 11829 1.83 0.88 0 9
Abruzzo 4.37 61.39 Number bike 11829 1.80 1.42 0 9
Molise 3.18 64.58 Number Vespa 11829 0.36 0.59 0 8
Campania 6.52 71.1 Number motorcycle 11829 0.11 0.37 0 7
Apulia 7.67 78.77 Number cars 11829 1.63 0.67 0 8
Basilicata 3.27 82.04 Number rooms 11829 4.81 1.61 1 30
Calabria 5.93 87.97 Dishwasher 11829 0.50 0.50 0 1
Sicily 7.82 95.79 Video recorder 11829 0.85 0.36 0 1
Sardinia 4.21 100 Video camera 11829 0.41 0.49 0 1
Stereo 11829 0.72 0.45 0 1
Wife controls Partner controls
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 11829 39.00 8.03 20 68 Age 11829 42.24 8.30 20 69
Education Education
None or primary school 9.98 0 1 primary school 10.16 0 1
Middle school 35.34 0 1 middle school 39.02 0 1
School of vocational 8.88 0 1 school of vocational 8.83 0 1
High school 34.14 0 1 high school 31.45 0 1
Bachelor or more 11.65 0 1 bachelor or more 10.55 0 1
Health Problems Health Problems
No 96.73 0 1 No 96.52 0 1
Yes - sometimes 3.02 0 1 Yes - sometimes 3.12 0 1
Yes - most of the time 0.24 0 1 Yes - most of the time 0.36 0 1
Brother/Sister 0.89 0 1 Brother/Sister 0.90 0.31 0 1
Number of Brothers 11829 2.09 1.75 0 20 Number of Brothers 2.19 1.82 0 20
Have a child 11829 0.86 0 1
Number of Children 11829 1.54 0.92 0 9
Age - Children 11829 8.05 7.74 0 39
Occupation Occupation
Employed - White Collar 28.88 0 1 Employed - White Collar 31.84 0 1
Employed - Blue Collar 12.97 0 1 Employed - Blue Collar 30.43 0 1
Employed - Clerical worker 10.04 0 1 Employed - Clerical worker 31.09 0 1
Unemployed 3.76 0 1 Housework 4.86 0 1
Housework 39.86 0 1 Retired 1.78 0 1
Retired 1.59 0 1
Students or other 2.89 0 1
Main source of income Main source of income
Employee 41.76 0 1 Employee 62.06 0 1
Self-employee 10.01 0 1 Self-employee 27.40 0 1
Retirement 2.48 0 1 Retirement 5.49 0 1
Benefits 0.92 0 1 Benefits 1.36 0 1
Estate income 0.63 0 1 Estate income 0.29 0 1
From origin family 44.20 0 1 From origin family 3.41 0 1
Visits to parents Visits to parents
Every day 43.95 0 1 Every day 42.46 0 1
Often 29.23 0 1 Often 28.67 0 1
Once a week 10.32 0 1 Once a week 11.32 0 1
Less than 4 in a month 8.73 0 1 Less than 4 in a month 8.82 0 1
Couple of time in a year 7.24 0 1 Couple of time in a year 8.12 0 1
Never 0.52 0 1 Never 0.61 0 1
Calls - parents Calls - parents
Every day 43.97 0 1 Every day 25.27 0 1
More than once a week 31.81 0 1 More than once a week 35.21 0 1
Once a week 6.38 0 1 Once a week 8.80 0 1
Less than 4 in a month 4.78 0 1 Less than 4 in a month 8.55 0 1
Few times per year 1.97 0 1 Few times per year 4.14 0 1
Never 11.08 0 1 Never 18.03 0 1
Parents controls Parents in-laws controls
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mother Age 11829 65.85 9.42 36 99 Mother Age 11829 69.02 9.44 41 101
Father Age 11829 67.58 8.78 40 102 Father Age 11829 70.04 8.66 41 101
Mother Education Mother Education
None or primary school 68.35 0 1 None or primary school 71.05 0 1
Middle school 16.1 0 1 Middle school 14.41 0 1
School of vocational 3.42 0 1 School of vocational 2.95 0 1
High school 6.9 0 1 High school 6.17 0 1
Bachelor or more 2.57 0 1 Bachelor or more 2.13 0 1
Father Education Father Education
None or primary school 74.71 0 1 None or primary school 76.19 0 1
Middle school 14.55 0 1 Middle school 13.39 0 1
School of vocational 2.44 0 1 School of vocational 2.37 0 1
High school 5.19 0 1 High school 4.42 0 1
Bachelor or more 1.13 0 1 Bachelor or more 0.88 0 1
Mother Health Problems Mother Health Problems
No 89.68 0 1 No 87.44 0 1
Yes - sometimes 6.31 0 1 Yes - sometimes 7.03 0 1
Yes - most of the time 4.01 0 1 Yes - most of the time 5.54 0 1
Father Health Problems Father Health Problems
No 92.21 0 1 No 91.94 0 1
Yes - sometimes 4.58 0 1 Yes - sometimes 4.64 0 1
Yes - most of the time 3.21 0 1 Yes - most of the time 3.42 0 1
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Table D.2: Parents’ and in-laws’ job when the adult child was 14 years old
Panel A. father of the wife father of the husband
Type of jobs Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Employed - Clerical worker 2,054 17.36 1,882 15.91
Employed - Blue Collar 5,425 45.86 5,309 44.88
Employed - White Collar 3,227 27.28 3,493 29.53
Employed - Occasional 208 1.76 230 1.94
Retired 353 2.98 347 2.93
Unemployed 343 2.90 344 2.91
Deceased 219 1.85 224 1.89
Panel B. mother of the wife mother of the husband
Type of jobs Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Employed - Clerical worker 661 5.59 537 4.54
Employed - Blue Collar 1,666 14.08 1,497 12.66
Employed - White Collar 1,489 12.59 1,549 13.09
Employed - Occasional 141 1.19 146 1.23
Housewife 7,536 63.71 7,716 65.23
Retired 135 1.14 145 1.23
Unemployed 54 0.46 56 0.47
Deceased 147 1.24 183 1.55
Source: Multipurpose Survey on Family and Childhood Conditions Dataset.
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Table D.3: Average marginal effects from PROBIT model for ICP (informal care pro-
vided to parents)
(1) (2) (3)
Parents’ transfer 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.071***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Parents: in twn <1km 0.010
(0.013)
Parents: in twn >1km -0.033**
(0.013)
Parents: out twn <16km -0.020
(0.014)
Parents: out twn 16-50 -0.056***
(0.016)
Parents: out twn >50km -0.104***
(0.017)
In-laws: in twn <1km -0.019*
(0.011)
In-laws: in twn >1km -0.008
(0.012)
In-laws: out twn <16km -0.025*
(0.014)
In-laws: out twn 16-50 -0.038**
(0.016)
In-laws: out twn >50km -0.094***
(0.017)
Observations 11829 11829 11829
Wave, region, area X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICP is the dependent variable. Reference category for distance to parents:
no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age, health
limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age (these controls
are for parents and in laws, married couple and their children). The wealth characteristics are: house
ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the
family and their job characteristics. Probit estimates with robust standard error in brackets.
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Table D.4: Average marginal effects from PROBIT model for ICR (informal care re-
ceived from parents)
(1) (2) (3)
Parents’ transfer 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.060***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Parents: in twn <1km -0.058***
(0.014)
Parents: in twn >1km -0.077***
(0.015)
Parents: out twn <16km -0.111***
(0.016)
Parents: out twn 16-50 -0.140***
(0.017)
Parents: out twn >50km -0.217***
(0.018)
In-laws: in twn <1km -0.011
(0.012)
In-laws: in twn >1km -0.052***
(0.013)
In-laws: out twn <16km -0.031**
(0.015)
In-laws: out twn 16-50 -0.105***
(0.018)
In-laws: out twn >50km -0.156***
(0.018)
Observations 11829 11829 11829
Wave, region, area X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICR is the dependent variable. Reference category for distance to parents:
no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age, health
limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age (these controls
are for parents and in laws, married couple and their children). The wealth characteristics are: house
ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the
family and their job characteristics. Probit estimates with robust standard error in brackets.
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Table D.5: Linear probability model for ICP (informal care provided to parents): only
for wife
(1) (2) (3)
ICP wife ICP wife ICP wife
Parents’ transfer 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.063***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Parents: in twn <1km 0.009
(0.011)
Parents: in twn >1km -0.029***
(0.011)
Parents: out twn <16km -0.025**
(0.012)
Parents: out twn 16-50 -0.079***
(0.012)
Parents: out twn >50km -0.114***
(0.011)
Observations 11829 11829 11829
R2 0.086 0.091 0.104
Wave, region, area X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICP is the dependent variable. Reference category for distance to parents:
no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age, health
limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age (these controls
are for parents and in laws, married couple and their children). The wealth characteristics are: house
ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the
family and their job characteristics. OLS estimates with robust standard error in brackets.
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Table D.6: Linear probability model for ICP (informal care provided to parents): only
husband
(1) (2) (3)
ICP husband ICP husband ICP husband
Parents’ transfer 0.019* 0.021** 0.021**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
In-laws: in twn <1km 0.004
(0.009)
In-laws: in twn >1km 0.001
(0.009)
In-laws: out twn <16km -0.006
(0.011)
In-laws: out twn 16-50 -0.030**
(0.012)
In-laws: out twn >50km -0.072***
(0.010)
Observations 11829 11829 11829
R2 0.077 0.081 0.087
Wave, region, area X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. ICP is the dependent variable. Reference category for distance to parents:
no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics include: age, health
limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and their age (these controls
are for parents and in laws, married couple and their children). The wealth characteristics are: house
ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the economic stability of the
family and their job characteristics. OLS estimates with robust standard error in brackets.
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Table D.7: Linear probability model for ICP and ICR, full set of covariates
Variables (1) (2)
ICP ICR
Parents’ transfer 0.075*** 0.059***
(0.013) (0.014)
Distance
Parents: in twn <1km 0.011 -0.061***
(0.014) (0.015)
Parents: in twn >1km -0.035** -0.078***
(0.014) (0.015)
Parents: out twn <16km -0.021 -0.113***
(0.015) (0.017)
Parents: out twn 16-50 km -0.057*** -0.145***
(0.016) (0.018)
Parents: out twn >50km -0.094*** -0.209***
(0.016) (0.018)
In-laws in twn <1km -0.020* -0.009
(0.012) (0.013)
In-laws in twn >1km -0.007 -0.052***
(0.012) (0.014)
In-laws out twn <16km -0.029* -0.033**
(0.015) (0.016)
In-laws out twn 16-50 km -0.038** -0.104***
(0.017) (0.018)
In-laws out twn >50km -0.086*** -0.150***
(0.015) (0.017)
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Regions
































Middle school 0.021 0.046***
(0.014) (0.014)
School of vocational 0.017 0.076***
(0.019) (0.019)
High school 0.030* 0.069***
(0.016) (0.017)
Bachelor or more 0.039* 0.069***
(0.022) (0.023)
Continued on next page
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Limitation
Limitation: Yes - sometimes 0.029 0.002
(0.037) (0.037)










Middle school 0.016 0.038***
(0.014) (0.014)
School of vocational 0.055*** 0.044**
(0.018) (0.019)
High school 0.057*** 0.053***
(0.016) (0.017)
Bachelor or more 0.076*** 0.090***
(0.021) (0.022)
Limitation
Limitation: Yes - sometimes -0.038 0.033
(0.043) (0.038)




Number of brother -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.003)
At least a child -0.055*** -
(0.016)
Number of children 0.001 -
(0.005)
Age of youngest child 0.001 -
(0.001)
Only at least one father alive 0.039** -0.029
(0.017) (0.020)
Only at least one mother alive 0.011 0.014
(0.009) (0.019)
Mother age 0.002** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Father age 0.002** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Continued on next page
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In-laws: mother age 0.002*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
In-laws: father age 0.001* 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Wife: father
primary school -0.021* -0.017
(0.012) (0.014)
middle school 0.008 -0.017
(0.022) (0.025)
school of vocational 0.003 -0.056***
(0.019) (0.021)
high school -0.034 -0.008
(0.028) (0.034)
bachelor or more 0.012 -0.068*
(0.036) (0.039)
Wife: mother
primary school 0.001 -0.013
(0.012) (0.015)
middle school 0.029 -0.047
(0.026) (0.030)
school of vocational -0.000 -0.019
(0.021) (0.024)
high school -0.014 0.020
(0.037) (0.045)
bachelor or more -0.045 0.102**
(0.041) (0.045)
Limitation for parents
Limitation:parents mother (1998) 0.085*** -0.009
(0.024) (0.021)
Limitation:parents mother (2003) 0.089*** -0.001
(0.030) (0.026)
Limitation:parents father (1998) 0.191*** -0.058**
(0.030) (0.025)
Limitation:parents father (2003) 0.235*** 0.053*
(0.035) (0.029)
Continued on next page
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Husband: father
primary school -0.010 -0.034**
(0.013) (0.015)
middle school 0.019 -0.038
(0.024) (0.026)
school of vocational 0.035* 0.011
(0.020) (0.023)
high school -0.012 0.0120
(0.030) (0.034)
bachelor or more -0.013 -0.022
(0.031) (0.039)
Continued on next page
Husband: mother
primary school -0.003 -0.023
(0.014) (0.016)
middle school -0.029 -0.039
(0.025) (0.031)
school of vocational -0.037* 0.003
(0.0220) (0.0261)
high school 0.060 0.050
(0.047) (0.050)
bachelor or more 0.013 0.019
(0.034) (0.042)
Limitation for in-laws
Limitation: in-laws mother (1998) 0.062** -0.020
(0.025) (0.026)
Limitation: in-laws mother (2003) 0.104*** -0.051*
(0.033) (0.030)
Limitation: in-laws father (1998) 0.186*** -0.003
(0.031) (0.029)
Limitation: in-laws father (2003) 0.120*** -0.062**
(0.038) (0.031)
Wife and husband




Large house -0.028 0.005
(0.017) (0.019)








Improper home -0.035 -0.002
(0.054) (0.079)
Don’t know -0.024 -0.069**
(0.027) (0.030)
Number of rooms 0.002 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Dish washer -0.020** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.009)
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Wife
Employed - Blue Collar -0.020 -0.052***
(0.013) (0.015)








Students or other -0.037 -0.052
(0.083) (0.090)
Husband
Employed - Blue Collar 0.000 0.020*
(0.010) (0.012)













Estate income -0.017 -0.049
(0.082) (0.093)









Estate income -0.002 -0.056
(0.071) (0.091)
From origin family 0.088 0.004
(0.060) (0.058)






* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. OLS estimates in column (1) and (2) for ICP
and ICR, respectively. Parents’ transfer is the dependent variable. Reference
category for distance to parents: no-help, parents and in-laws in the same
building For area: islands. For regions: Piedmont; Tuscany, Abruzzo, Calabria
and Sardinia are omitted because of collinearity. For education: elementary.
For Limitation: none. For occupations: white collar. All the estimations use
robust standard error which are in brackets.
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Baseline: Employed - Clerical worker
Employed - Blue Collar 0.028 0.181
(0.032) (0.183)
Employed - White Collar 0.084** 0.469**
(0.042) (0.195)








Mother jobs (Parents in Law)
Baseline: Employed - Clerical worker
Employed - Blue Collar 0.023 0.144
(0.042) (0.236)
Employed - White Collar 0.071* 0.372*
(0.042) (0.202)
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Interaction parents job
Father * Mother job
Employed - Blue Collar * Employed - Blue Collar -0.131** -0.703***
(0.058) (0.266)
Employed - Blue Collar * Employed - White Collar -0.070 -0.396
(0.062) (0.310)
Employed - Blue Collar * Employed - Occasional -0.109** -0.531**
(0.050) (0.251)
Employed - Blue Collar * Housework -0.077* -0.417**
(0.043) (0.202)
Employed - Blue Collar * Retired -0.086 -0.456
(0.072) (0.643)
Employed - Blue Collar * Unemployed -0.112 -0.739
(0.117) (0.690)
Employed - Blue Collar * Deceased -0.003 -0.249
(0.133) (0.643)
Employed - White Collar * Employed - Blue Collar -0.113** -0.616**
(0.056) (0.302)
Employed - White Collar * Employed - White Collar -0.052 -0.323
(0.051) (0.282)
Employed - White Collar * Employed - Occasional -0.026 0.044
(0.044) (0.120)
Employed - White Collar * Housework -0.041 -0.248
(0.034) (0.193)
Employed - White Collar * Retired -0.009 0.101
(0.086) (0.760)
Employed - White Collar * Unemployed 0.034 0.065
(0.150) (0.752)
Employed - White Collar * Deceased -0.063 -0.036
(0.067) (0.063)
Employed - Occasional * Employed - Blue Collar -0.417 -0.456
(0.270) (0.643)
Employed - Occasional * Employed - White Collar -0.366 -0.055
(0.268) (0.120)
Employed - Occasional * Employed - Occasional -0.127 -0.165
(0.268) (1.071)
Employed - Occasional * Housework -0.243 -1.041
(0.264) (0.747)
Employed - Occasional * Retired -0.338 -0.239
(0.292) (0.267)
Employed - Occasional * Deceased 0.070 0.052
(0.366) (1.071)
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Retired * Employed - Blue Collar -0.346** -1.551***
(0.168) (0.549)
Retired * Employed - White Collar 0.265 1.152*
(0.131) (0.674)
Retired * Employed - Occasional -0.092 0.105
(0.237) (0.760)
Retired * Housework -0.243* -0.988**
(0.113) (0.470)
Retired * Retired -0.186 -0.555
(0.175) (0.728)
Retired * Unemployed -0.362* -0.552*
(0.189) (0.249)
Retired * Deceased -0.244 -1.021
(0.167) (0.747)
Unemployed * Employed - Blue Collar -0.049 -0.288
(0.069) (0.411)
Unemployed * Employed - White Collar -0.051 -0.530
(0.072) (0.606)
Unemployed * Employed - Occasional 0.047 (0.447)
(0.059) -0.388
Unemployed * Housework 0.035 0.179
(0.057) (0.364)
Unemployed * Retired -0.031 -0.234
(0.071) (0.423)
Unemployed * Unemployed -0.114 -0.554
(0.117) (0.628)
Unemployed * Deceased 0.001 -0.004
(0.067) (0.063)
Deceased * Employed - Blue Collar -0.024 -0.429
(0.083) (0.578)
Deceased * Employed - White Collar -0.144 -0.535
(0.123) (0.643)
Deceased * Employed - Occasional -0.128* -1.021*
(0.069) (0.447)
Deceased * Housework 0.034 -0.349
(0.060) (0.678)
Unemployed * Deceased -0.113* -0.703*
(0.067) (0.352)
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Father jobs (Parents in Law)
Baseline: Employed - clerical worker
Employed - Blue Collar -0.018 -0.143
(0.035) (0.233)
Employed - White Collar 0.003 0.004
(0.033) (0.203)








Mother jobs (Parents in Law)
Baseline: Employed - clerical worker
Employed - Blue Collar 0.0038 0.046
(0.038) (0.220)
Employed - White Collar 0.002 0.005
(0.042) (0.263)
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Interaction parents in-laws job
Father * Mother job
Employed - Blue Collar * Employed - Blue Collar 0.007 0.053
(0.050) (0.304)
Employed - Blue Collar * Employed - White Collar 0.003 0.003
(0.056) (0.361)
Employed - Blue Collar * Employed - Occasional 0.009 -0.041
(0.113) (0.715)
Employed - Blue Collar * Housework -0.003 0.004
(0.036) (0.238)
Employed - Blue Collar * Retired -0.090 -0.353
(0.115) (0.485)
Employed - Blue Collar * Unemployed -0.095 -0.400
(0.150) (0.582)
Employed - Blue Collar * Deceased 0.050 0.246
(0.220) (0.801)
Employed - White Collar * Employed - Blue Collar -0.062 -0.471
(0.051) (0.332)
Employed - White Collar * Employed - White Collar -0.030 -0.189
(0.051) (0.318)
Employed - White Collar * Employed - Occasional -0.026 -0.198
(0.116) (0.804)
Employed - White Collar * Housework -0.031 -0.162
(0.035) (0.211)
Employed - White Collar * Retired -0.152 -0.678
(0.120) (0.652)
Employed - White Collar * Unemployed -0.101 -0.381
(0.169) (0.655)
Employed - White Collar * Deceased -0.114 -0.638
(0.219) (0.936)
Employed - Occasional * Employed - Blue Collar -0.684*** 0.442**
(0.177) (0.210)
Employed - Occasional * Employed - White Collar -0.811*** 0.452**
(0.058) (0.190)
Employed - Occasional * Employed - Occasional -0.727*** -0.853**
(0.111) (0.348)
Employed - Occasional * Housework -0.758*** -0.166**
(0.047) (0.076)
Employed - Occasional * Retired -0.926*** -0.167**
(0.108) (0.057)
Employed - Occasional * Deceased -0.704*** -0.645***
(0.262) -0.239
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Retired * Employed - Clerical worker -0.109 -0.423
(0.188) (0.611)
Retired * Employed - Blue Collar -0.119 -0.406
(0.209) (0.730)
Retired * Employed - White Collar 0.067 0.279
(0.287) (1.011)
Retired * Employed - Occasional -0.197 -0.814
(0.177) (0.551)
Retired * Housework -0.244 -1.005
(0.210) (0.681)
Retired * Retired 0.421* 0.750**
(0.222) (0.315)
Retired * Unemployed -0.390 -0.591
(0.259) (0.259)
Unemployed * Employed - Clerical worker 0.109 0.605
(0.067) (0.435)
Unemployed * Employed - Blue Collar 0.0627 0.341
(0.072) (0.524)
Unemployed * Employed - White Collar 0.174 0.922
(0.188) (0.922)
Unemployed * Employed - Occasional 0.086 0.547
(0.053) (0.388)
Unemployed * Housework 0.107 0.530
(0.157) (0.600)
Unemployed * Retired -0.159 -0.459
(0.140) (0.340)
Unemployed * Unemployed -0.103 -0.303
(0.197) (0.397)
Deceased * Employed - Clerical worker 0.182 0.550
(0.168) (0.890)
Deceased * Employed - Blue Collar 0.034 0.542
(0.059) (0.590)
Deceased * Employed - White Collar 0.664*** 0.654*
(0.118) (0.312)
Deceased * Employed - Occasional -0.221*** -0.750**
(0.062) (0.315)
Deceased * Housework -0.032 -0.423
(0.106) (0.406)
Deceased * Retired -0.107 -0.124
(0.137) -0.157
Deceased * Unemployed 0.057 0.007
(0.191) (0.161)
Deceased * Deceased 0.004 0.034
(0.010) (0.061)
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Wave, region, area X X
Demographic characteristics X X
Wealth characteristics X X
Distance parents and in-laws X X




* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. Parents’ transfer is the dependent variable. Reference category for
distance to parents: no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic characteristics
include: age, health limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of children and
their age (these controls are for parents and in laws, married couple and their children). The wealth
characteristics are: house ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good proxy for the
economic stability of the family and their job characteristics. OLS estimates in column (1), Probit
estimates in column (2). All the estimations use robust standard error which are in brackets.
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Table D.9: Linear probability model for work interruptions
(1) (2) (3)
interruzioni interruzioni interruzioni
Parents’ transfer 0.053*** 0.044*** 0.045***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Parents: in twn <1km -0.001
(0.014)
Parents: in twn >1km 0.022
(0.014)
Parents: out twn <16km 0.006
(0.016)
Parents: out twn 16-50 0.029*
(0.018)
Parents: out twn >50km 0.004
(0.018)
In-laws: in twn <1km 0.007
(0.012)
In-laws: in twn >1km -0.013
(0.013)
In-laws: out twn <16km 0.012
(0.016)
In-laws: out twn 16-50 -0.015
(0.018)
In-laws: out twn >50km -0.010
(0.017)
Observations 11829 11829 11829
Wave, region, area X X X
Demographic characteristics X X X
Wealth characteristics X X
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01. Number of work interruptions is the dependent variable. Reference
category for distance to parents: no-help, parents and in-laws in the same building. The demographic
characteristics include: age, health limitations, number of sisters and brothers, education, number of
children and their age (these controls are for parents and in laws, married couple and their children).
The wealth characteristics are: house ownership, various durable goods and assets, which are good
proxy for the economic stability of the family and their job characteristics. OLS estimates with robust
standard error in brackets.
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